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Congress regularly, and with increasing frequency, removes jurisdiction from 
the federal courts. This dissertation argues that the underlying motivation for doing so 
is to deny litigants access to the judicial system in response to the costs and policy 
disruption created by lawsuits filed against the federal government. This assertion runs 
counter to two longstanding assumptions held by most scholars: Congress rarely 
removes court review, and manipulations to judicial procedure are a congressional 
reaction to court ideology. The judiciary is a creature of the litigation process.  In 
fundamental terms, this means that the incentives and economics of litigation are an 
integral part of institutional behavior whenever the judiciary is involved. Drawing 
upon two separate literatures, law and economics and strategic institutionalism, this 
dissertation argues that when it comes to congressional reaction to the courts, in 
particular congressional manipulation of court structure and procedure, the strategy, 
process, and economics of litigation must be considered.   
The research presented establishes the growing prevalence of jurisdictional 
removals, examines the underlying causal factors, and considers specific case studies 
of these trends. Jurisdiction stripping is largely an unstudied phenomenon, at least 
from an empirical perspective, and so this dissertation addresses the issues in two first-
order contexts: legislation that removes court jurisdiction from the entire federal 
system, and legislation that functionally eliminates jurisdiction from all other federal 
courts by allowing review only in the courts of the D.C. Circuit. The research
is based upon two newly created databases which identify all such jurisdiction 
stripping public laws enacted from 1943 to 2004. A case study of jurisdiction stripping 
statutes in a single policy area, Forest Service wilderness designations, augments the 
empirical analyses. The research concludes that the operative variable in jurisdiction 
stripping is litigation pressure, captured by case filings, and the attendant costs 
imposed on a wide range of institutional actors when the government is forced to 
defend itself in court.  
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CHAPTER 1 
 
CONGRESS AND THE COURTS 
Congress regularly, and with increasing frequency, removes jurisdiction from 
the federal courts. This fact runs counter to longstanding assumptions, held by most 
scholars, that while Congress may threaten to strip court jurisdiction, Congress rarely 
removes court review. Not only does Congress engage in jurisdiction stripping, but the 
underlying motivation for doing so is an attempt to control the policy disruption and 
costs created by lawsuits filed against the federal government. This litigation based 
analysis challenges the dominant account of court-Congress interactions, offered by 
strategic institutionalism, which assumes that congressional manipulation of 
jurisdiction, if any, is driven primarily by ideological differences between the 
branches. That assumption is questioned in the following chapters. 
This dissertation establishes the growing prevalence of jurisdictional removals, 
examines the underlying causal factors, and provides specific case studies of these 
trends. Jurisdiction stripping is largely an unstudied phenomenon, at least from an 
empirical perspective, and so this dissertation addresses the issue in two first-order 
contexts: legislation that removes court jurisdiction from the entire federal system, and 
legislation that functionally eliminates jurisdiction from all other federal courts by 
allowing review only in the courts of the D.C. Circuit.  
The research is based on two newly created databases which identify all such 
jurisdiction stripping public laws enacted from 1943 to 2004. An extensive case study 
of jurisdiction stripping statutes in a single policy area, Forest Service wilderness 
designations, augments the empirical analyses. The problem is viewed from the 
congressional perspective: what stimuli might drive Congress to remove jurisdiction 
from the courts?  The research concludes that the operative variable in jurisdiction 
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stripping is litigation pressure on the federal government, captured by case filings, and 
the attendant costs imposed on a wide range of institutional actors when the 
government is forced to defend itself in court.   
As the size and reach of government has expanded, with the advent of the New 
Deal, the rise of the administrative state, and the exponential increase in legislation 
aimed both at the regulation of society and the provision of social benefits, the federal 
courts became a point of access for the public to challenge and influence government 
policy. This access – easily engaged by filing a lawsuit – is encouraged by a 
confluence of factors. Congress very often tackles complex regulatory or benefit 
conferring policies through generalized laws that delegate significant authority to 
administrative agencies, tasked with using their policy and technical expertise to 
formulate and carry out the specifics of broad legislative directives. So, for example, 
as the case study discussed later in the dissertation shows, the Department of 
Agriculture and the U.S. Forest Service are directed to manage national forests for 
“multiple use” with limited guidance as to how the allocation between preservation, 
recreation, and commercial activity on public lands should be made.  
Judicial review, as practiced by the federal courts and framed by the 
Constitution, allows litigants to  demand judicial examination of both the contours and 
underlying legitimacy of executive and legislative action as well as the enforcement of 
legislative rights conferred on individuals by the growing catalog of public laws. In 
the administrative context, by both case law and statute, the federal courts may be 
used to police agencies to assure that policy follows legislative intent. When 
legislative language is not specific, and legislative intent is expressed in broad terms, 
as is so often the case, space is created for litigants, dissatisfied with policy as 
effectuated, to engage court review. This is done by filing lawsuits against the federal 
actor responsible for policy implementation. The comprehensive nature of judicial 
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review, the lack of clearly expressed legislative intent,  and the sheer number of public 
laws all contribute to the growth of these suits. 
Jurisdiction stripping is a targeted response to the burgeoning pressures created 
by litigation against the federal government. Litigation imposes costs on the 
government both in real terms and in terms of policy distortion and delay. These costs 
attach and grow from the time a case is filed in federal court, and impact a broad range 
of government actors, including courts, Congress, and agencies, regardless of final 
case disposition or institutional ideology. From this perspective, jurisdiction removal 
is not a congressional reaction to the judiciary or to judicial ideology, as suggested by 
standard institutional accounts. Instead, jurisdiction stripping is designed to control 
litigant access to the federal court system and protect government institutions and 
policy from public interference. 
The judiciary is a creature of the litigation process.  In fundamental terms, this 
means that the incentives and economics of litigation are an integral part of 
institutional behavior whenever the judiciary is involved. Theories addressing 
interactions among Congress, courts, and agencies often overlook this basic fact.  
Drawing upon two separate literatures, law and economics and strategic 
institutionalism, this dissertation argues that when it comes to congressional reaction 
to the courts, in particular congressional manipulation of court structure and procedure 
(such as jurisdiction stripping), the strategy, process, and economics of litigation must 
be considered.   
Incorporating insights from law and economics, into theoretical studies of 
Congress and court interactions has important implications for political science and 
institutional studies. Traditional accounts of inter-institutional behavior misidentify the 
full nature of institutional incentives where courts are concerned. This is because 
scholars assume ideological preferences are the operative motivators for strategic 
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positioning among Congress, courts, and agencies. This is a problematic assumption 
on several levels, particularly with respect to manipulation of federal court 
jurisdiction. First, unlike Congress, the president, or agencies, the judiciary cannot 
instigate action. It operates from the bottom up, activated by outside parties, litigants, 
through the filing of court cases. These case filings can occur in any federal court 
across the system, depending on where the parties reside, and where the dispute arose, 
matters not within the government’s control. This makes it very difficult to identify, ex 
ante, the court actor whose preferences or ideology will impact a particular policy, and 
accordingly, very difficult to craft specific structural controls aimed at reigning in 
court actors whose ideology diverges from congressional or agency preference.  
Although the Supreme Court is often identified as the relevant actor against whom 
Congress and agencies react, that court’s docket is a miniscule percent of filed cases, 
and is a docket, by Court intent, declining rapidly over time. In addition, across the 
entire judicial system, the rarity of court decisions, and hence court expressions of 
preference, as compared to other case dispositions, further argues against 
congressional reaction to courts based on judicial policy interference. Each of these 
factors strongly suggests that congressional manipulations of court jurisdiction are a 
response to something other than ideological positioning.  
 Litigation economics offers an alternative way of looking at institutional 
response to the courts by providing insight into the litigation process, including the 
dynamics of individual incentives and aggregate effects created by the costs and 
benefits of an adversarial dispute resolution system. Law and economics literature 
rarely applies these observations to strategic inter-institutional behavior or 
congressional changes to court jurisdiction. In this context, institutional studies and 
law and economics have much to contribute to one another. What the strategic 
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explanation lacks, and law and economics can provide, are the insights derived from 
the study of litigation effects. 
The nature of litigation, and its attendant incentives, shapes the behavior of 
courts, parties, and potential parties.  Increasingly, these parties include government 
defendants, brought into the judicial system by challenges to government policies and 
behavior. Court action instigated against the federal government imposes costs on all 
three branches at the point of filing regardless of where a case is introduced in the 
federal system and regardless of differing institutional ideology. These costs accrue at 
the time of filing and increase as the case progresses whether or not a case proceeds to 
trial or appeal.  Increasing litigation against the government implicates policy 
implementation by creating delay and expense. These factors, across the board 
litigation expense, increased implementation costs, and policy delay, result in strategic 
attempts by government actors to reduce litigation-based costs in ways that are 
independent of ideological preference and theoretically consistent with the way courts 
operate and dispose of cases.  
This entire dynamic is triggered by private actors making the affirmative 
decision to sue the government. Unlike a private defendant, however, the government, 
through Congress, has unique powers over the structure and procedure of dispute 
resolution in the federal courts, including the ability to manipulate litigant access to 
the judicial system by stripping courts of jurisdiction or funneling cases into a specific 
court within that system. If courts do not have jurisdiction over a policy area, litigants 
cannot sue, or if they do sue, their legal action is subject to rapid dismissal. If litigants 
are forced to file in only one court, and as a result incur increased costs, the incentives 
to bring suit are significantly reduced. Under either scenario, the federal government’s 
overall litigation costs alleviate if the jurisdiction removed implicates the public’s 
ability, or willingness, to sue government actors. From this perspective, jurisdiction 
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stripping and exclusive jurisdictional grants are a response to increased costs, both in 
terms of resources and policy delay, caused by litigation against the federal 
government. 
The nature and growth of the U.S. political system, and of judicial review, 
result in the default position that most government action can be challenged by the 
public in court. Whether or not this is a positive state of affairs can be debated. 
Jurisdiction stripping selectively removes or discourages this public access, 
particularly so since courts generally acquiesce to these limitations. This raises several 
legitimate concerns. Should certain governmental actions be removed from judicial 
scrutiny? When one group is treated differently than the public at large, what 
characteristics distinguish these group members from their fellow citizens, and what 
justification does the government have for differentiating in this way? How these 
questions are answered depends largely on both the nature of jurisdiction stripping 
laws as well as on how one views the role of the courts. The judiciary has a strong part 
to play in assuring that the basic constitutional structure and parameters of individual 
rights are protected from overreaching by the elective branches. But this is a different 
thing than using the judicial process to thwart properly enacted laws and regulations. 
Too often, parties who lose in the legislative process turn to the courts as an 
alternative way to affect policy.   
It is true, that jurisdictional removals do not occur uniformly with respect all 
government action, appearing instead in specific policy areas. This raises the specter 
of interest or industry group influence over these legislative enactments designed to 
deliver specific advantages and benefits to the groups with adequate control over the 
jurisdictional language in question. Of course, this happens throughout the legislative 
process in a myriad of ways, but in this instance, the advantage is gained by 
selectively removing (or discouraging) public access to the very branch of government 
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designed to oversee the behavior of the elective branches. In practice, jurisdictional 
removals do not fully remove court involvement, even if they do preclude litigation 
based on a particular legislative enactment. Instead jurisdiction stripping gives the 
courts, institutions that are often at the forefront of the messy business of applying 
generalized policy in real world contexts, an additional tool to control excessive 
litigation that interferes with policy outcomes. If jurisdictional removals are designed 
to prevent litigation-based legislative bargaining that has reached a certain tipping 
point with the courts, Congress, and agencies, then jurisdiction stripping is a positive 
contribution to the appropriate balance of powers in the federal system.  
The dissertation is organized as follows. Chapter One considers strategic 
institutionalism, the prevailing model for court-Congress interactions, and discounts it 
as an explanation for jurisdiction stripping. Strategic institutionalism’s failure to 
capture the litigation process, including the extreme rarity of judicial opinions as 
compared to case filings, is discussed.  Chapter Two discusses economic and political 
incentives generated by litigation against the federal government, including the costs 
imposed on Congress, courts, and agencies by increasing litigation levels in the past 
sixty years, the unique nature of governmental defendants, and the institutional effects 
of these incentives. Litigation based economic models for both full jurisdictional 
removal and selective jurisdictional assignments to the D.C. federal courts are 
presented. Chapter Three presents the results of a 62-year study identifying all public 
laws that completely remove jurisdiction from the federal courts. The nature and 
characteristics of these laws are presented and discussed. Case filing, economic, and 
ideological causes for jurisdictional removal are empirically tested. The results show 
that jurisdiction stripping is strongly related to the pressures created by cases filed 
against the federal government, but is not related to ideology. Chapter Four presents 
the results of a second 62-year study identifying all public laws that grant jurisdiction 
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exclusively to the federal courts in the D.C. Circuit, thereby effectively stripping 
jurisdiction from all other federal courts. The content and characteristics of these laws 
are presented and discussed. This congressional action is modeled as a type of 
government forum selection designed to increase costs of litigation to private actors 
and decrease government costs thereby damping case filings against the federal 
government. This thesis is empirically tested. The results show exclusive grants to the 
D.C. Circuit are related to case filings against the federal government, but not related 
to ideology. Chapter Five presents a case study analysis of jurisdictional removals in 
response to the environmental litigation opposing logging in national forests. It 
analyzes the interests, both private and public, that generated, and had a stake in, this 
litigation, statements of congressional intent behind jurisdiction removal, and the 
legislations’ impact on litigation dynamics in this policy context. Chapter Six 
discusses the implications of this research, including the role of interest group 
influence over jurisdiction stripping legislation, considers remaining questions, and 
makes recommendations for future study. 
The Existing Institutional Paradigm 
 Strategic institutionalism, the dominant paradigm in institutional studies, falls 
short as a way to explain jurisdiction stripping, although it does provide valuable 
insights into Congress-court relations. This theory blends rational actor assumptions, 
agency theory, and lessons learned from strategic games, concluding, and rightly so, 
that institutional behavior cannot be explained in isolation from the incentives and 
actions of other actors in the institutional setting. As a model, its strength lies in the 
interactive mechanisms it identifies, and its weakness lies in its application which 
often entails an almost exclusive focus on ideology, a broad heuristic for policy 
preferences, as the operative force behind cross-institutional behavior.  
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 As an explanatory paradigm for congressional response to the judiciary this 
approach stumbles on two fronts. First, strategic institutionalism’s emphasis on the 
salience of ideologically based preference as the wellspring for institutional behavior 
is problematic when it comes to the courts because expression of judicial preference 
requires some kind of dispositive judicial action on the merits, and the vast majority of 
cases leave the court system well before trial, and well before any indicia of court 
policy preference. Second, for Congress to react strategically to the judiciary, 
Congress must identify a specific actor with control over congressional policy. This is 
not possible in a federal judicial system where the Supreme Court is rarely a 
participant, litigants choose the legal forum, and any lower level court in the country 
has the power to hear federal cases. With respect to jurisdiction stripping in particular, 
strategic institutionalism as applied ignores the role of litigants, focusing instead on 
judicial decision makers, and misses the cooperative and common interests shared by 
government actors faced with the disruptive costs and effects of litigant access to the 
courts. 
Institutional Preferences.  The lynchpin of strategic institutionalism, and one 
if its most powerful and useful contributions, is the assertion that institutions, acting 
through their median members, seek to imprint their preferences upon public policy 
(Epstein, Knight, and Martin 2001; Weingast 2002). Institutional behavior can be 
explained as a response to member preference, more specifically median member or 
(in the case of the executive branch) dominant member preference (Cox and 
McCubbins 1993, Epstein, Knight, and Martin 2001; Weingast 2002; Weingast and 
Marshall 1998). Scholarship in this vein is legion. Congressional studies identify 
congressional preference based on the policy outcomes preferred by the median 
participating member, be it the majority party (Aldrich 1995; Aldrich and Rohde 
2001), chamber floor or Senate cloture pivot (Krehbiel 1998), veto override point 
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(Cameron 2000), or policy-controlling committee (Kiewiet and McCubbins 1991). 
Agency behavior is explained as an attempt to maximize the preferences of a variety 
of principal actors dominated by theories of executive control (Calvert, McCubbins, 
and Weingast 1989; Eskridge and Ferejohn 1992; Moe 1987, 1990; Spence 1997; 
Wood and Anderson 1993; Wood and Waterman 1991), but at various times in the 
scholarships’ history also including Congress and oversight committees (McCubbins, 
Noll and Weingast 1987,1989; Weingast and Moran 1983), the independent interests 
of agency actors (Carpenter 2001; Dodd and Schott 1979; Macey 1992; Niskanen 
1971), or a combination of multiple principal influences (Huber 2007).  
By the same token, the bulk of judicial system’s scholarship assumes rational, 
preference maximizing behavior on the part of the judges and Justices (Epstein and 
Knight 1997; Segal 1997; Segal and Spaeth 1993, 2002; Weingast 2002). The modern 
conception is that judicial decisions are a product of individualized judicial preference 
or ideology, moderated by the median justice when cases are heard in front of a panel. 
This is the contemporary wisdom even for those who dispute courts’ ability to act in 
an unconstrained manner (Epstein and Knight 1997; Maltzman et al. 2000).  The vast 
majority of judicial studies attempt to determine the effects of this preference based 
behavior on legal decisions and other government actors, covering such diverse topics 
as court review of agency action (Cross and Tiller 1998; Humphries and Songer 1999; 
Revesz 2001; Sheehan 1992), civil rights cases (Eskridge 1991a), court oversight of 
environmental regulation (Revesz 1997), and litigant characteristics affecting case 
success rates (Sheehan, Mishler and Songer 1992). 
The primary insight, that institutions are rational actors driven by some form of 
collective preference, is an important part of understanding government actions. 
However, much institutional scholarship relies too heavily on quantifiable measures of 
preference, often called ideology, which have become both the heuristic for 
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institutional interests and the presumptive explanation for much government behavior. 
This is a critical weakness in current institutional studies because it makes it very easy 
to bypass close examination of the nature and structure of the institution being studied, 
in favor of a quick reduction to an ideologically identified median member. This is the 
case with respect to treatment of the courts, which are too often considered only in 
terms of the ideology score of a median judge or justice, rather than seen as part of a 
broad based dispute resolution process driven by litigant access and litigant choices. 
 The Role of Preference and Ideology. As the scholarship on rational actors 
and institutions matured, ideological measures replaced the concept of preference. 
This is true despite the fact that there is no agreed upon meaning of what constitutes 
ideology or ideological behavior. Instead, in many instances, the measurement itself 
has become the meaning. This is, in part, a function of both the way the literature 
developed and the limitations inherent in operationalizing preference. Congress was 
the primary focus of much early writing in this area, and the strong domination of 
party mechanisms in congressional behavior made it natural to speak of preference in 
terms of party affiliation. Since the party system in Congress operates to bundle 
preferences into a cohesive group identifier, with distinct, albeit evolving, platform 
positions and policy prescriptions, the concept of party and preference intermingled 
and transformed into a single heuristic, often referred to as ideology. This 
transformation was aided by the work of Poole and Rosenthal (1997), who developed 
an algorithm demonstrating that congressmember’s voting behavior aligns the 
members along a continuous, primary dimension from left to right that is remarkably 
stable over time, and that correlates with party affiliation.  
In a similar fashion, party, and then ideology, became synonymous with 
preference in judicial studies, aided in no small part by the Supreme Court Database 
created by Harold Spaeth and used as the source for Spaeth and Segal’s work arguing 
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that Supreme Court Justice’s decisions are a function of individualized ideological 
characteristics that operate consistently across cases and within subject areas. With the 
Spaeth database and Poole and Rosenthal Common Space Scores (Poole 2005; Poole 
and Rosenthal 1997) as source material, scholars had a quick shortcut for 
operationalizing preference in the form of either party or a liberal to conservative 
numeric ranking for each government actor. Giles et al. (2001, 2002), Martin and 
Quinn (2002, 2005),  and Epstein et al. (2007) aided in this empirical project by 
providing ideological rankings for Supreme Court, appellate, and lower court judges, 
premised either on the party identifiers of home state senators, or algorithmic 
calculations similar to those created by Poole and Rosenthal.  
The availability of quantifiable measures for preference (now largely referred 
to in the literature as ideology), that exist on a single dimensional scale and can be 
applied across issue areas, allows for easy calculation of the relevant median member 
in whatever institution is studied, as well as establishing some kind of distance 
between the preferences of various government actors. As a result, the terms 
“ideology” and “preference" are used interchangeably in most of the institutional 
literature, although they represent arguably different concepts.  Much of the 
scholarship identifies preference as a quantifiable measurement, used to align 
members of the relevant institutions along a one dimensional scale that is either 
dichotomous (with Democrat representing left, or liberal, and Republican representing 
right, or conservative) or continuous, also ranging from liberal to conservative. Both 
measurement rubrics represent a general ideological assessment which purports to 
predict some kind of systematized behavior across a broad range of issues.  
Adversarial Institutions. Most institutional studies also assume that 
government actors compete against each other to gain control over policy outcomes. 
While this has much explanatory power, provided that the salient actors affecting 
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institutional behavior are properly identified, in the context of court-Congress 
interactions, this assumption often fails to capture the vital role of litigants both in 
controlling and in shaping the judicial process. Congressional studies have long 
recognized that few laws are self-executing, and increasingly the nuts and bolts of 
legislation, from its practical application to its adaptation and refinement over time, 
are left to the discretion of executive agencies and their attendant bureaucracies 
(Eskridge and Ferejohn 1992; Spence 1997). This opens opportunities for judicial 
review, which is analyzed in terms of judicial preference as opposed to litigant 
behavior. 
Broad legislative delegation to agencies provides the courts with additional 
avenues to influence policy through review of both agency action and the underlying 
enabling statutes. The result is congressional policy subject to both agency and court 
influence. Institutional scholars argue that delegatory legislation presents a classic 
control problem in which Congress, as principal, must seek ways to reign in agents’ 
deviating preferences to assure that policy implementation reflects congressional 
wishes. This engenders a game of strategy between entities with the ability to affect 
policy outcomes, with the powers, incentives, structures, and dynamics of Congress, 
courts, agencies, and the executive all used to arrive at some kind of policy stasis.  
Strategic institutionalism rightly notes that Congress is uniquely positioned to 
influence bureaucratic and judicial policy-making through the use of procedural 
requirements. Because Congress cannot anticipate all possible agency or judicial 
decisions in a policy area, Congress steers policy by using the initial legislation or 
later corrective legislation, to set up processes that either favor enacting coalitions, or 
influence decision making in such a way that favors certain types of outcomes or 
interests. This accommodates both the need for flexible policy responses, often in 
areas which are highly technical, and the need to control agent behavior (Bawn 1995). 
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In the bureaucratic context, McCubbins, Noll, and Weingast (1987, 1989) maintain 
that Congress imposes decision making processes (“deck stacking”) upon agencies so 
that they will act in ways that align with congressional preferences. The Freedom of 
Information Act and the Administrative Procedure Act mandate that agency records 
and rules be publicly available and agency actions and data gathering be regularly 
reported, reducing agencies’ control over information, and allowing outside interest 
groups to intervene earlier in the process. Notice and comment periods for proposed 
agency actions ensure input from affected organizations (Spence 1999). National 
Environmental Policy Act environmental impact statements, force agencies to consider 
the views and concerns of the environmental lobby whenever engaging in major 
federal actions (McCubbins, Noll, and Weingast 1987). Substantial evidence 
requirements for agency decisions can be used to lock in original legislative 
compromises and limit later agency discretion.  
   Control of Court Jurisdiction. Institutional scholars took the lessons learned 
in the context of agency studies and expanded the theories of structural control to 
Congress-court interactions. There is an inherent sensibility in this extrapolation. 
Congressional power to establish the federal court system includes the power to 
define, and even deny, courts’ jurisdiction (Gunther 1984). The extent and nature of 
this authority is the subject of a voluminous theoretical literature by legal scholars, in 
no small part driven by concerns that if Congress has the unfettered ability to remove 
courts from the review of congressional or presidential actions a significant check on 
legislative and executive power will be lost. Control over court jurisdiction also 
implicates the degree to which Congress can insulate policymaking from judicial 
oversight, an action which allows administrative agencies greater latitude. And, 
although often given short shrift in the literature, it affects citizen’s ability to challenge 
government action through the courts. While the seminal case law in this area is over 
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100 years old,1  in recent years, the debate over congressional authority to strip federal 
court jurisdiction resurfaced in the context of military tribunals at Guantanamo Bay, 
proposed legislation opposing same-sex marriages, and arguments over federalized 
rights to school-prayer (Pfander 2007).2  
There is no consensus on the scope of Congress’s plenary authority over court 
jurisdiction (Sager 1981). Some scholars argue that essential functions of 
constitutional review must remain, at least with respect to certain primary 
constitutional protections (Friedman 1990; Hart 1953), while others argue that the 
language of the Constitution clearly allows complete congressional discretion over 
most court jurisdiction, particularly the lower federal courts (Bator 1982; Cherminsky 
1989; Gunther 1984).3 Still other theorists assert that constitutional structure and 
language allows Congress to curtail, but not eliminate, federal jurisdiction even with 
respect to the lower federal courts (Ratner 1960; Sager 1981; Tribe 1981). Regardless 
of perspective, one general consensus does emerge: Congress rarely eliminates judicial 
review (Fallon et al. 2003; Gunther 1984; Peretti 1999; Resnik 1998).4  Despite (or, 
                                                 
1
 Ex Parte McCardle, 74 U.S. 506 (1868) involved congressional repeal of a statute granting 
jurisdiction to federal courts to hear certain appeals, an action taken because Congress was concerned 
that the Supreme Court would overturn certain provisions of the Reconstruction Acts.  McCardle, a 
newspaper publisher, wrote editorials critical of Reconstruction. He was imprisoned by the military, and 
sought a writ of habeas corpus claiming that the Reconstruction Acts that allowed his arrest and 
confinement were unconstitutional. In United States v. Klein, 13 Wall 128 (1872), Congress passed 
legislation removing the Supreme Court’s jurisdiction to hear a case involving presidential pardons to 
confederate sympathizers. The legislation further dictated that any recitation in the pardon that an 
individual had been involved in an insurrection against the United States disqualified that person from 
reclaiming property seized during the war. 
2
 Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006) and Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S.Ct. 2229 (2008) both 
address whether and how the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005 can remove judicial review from Article 
III courts with respect to certain issues arising in connection with Guantanamo Bay military 
commissions. The Marriage Protection Act of 2004, which passed the House but not the Senate, was 
designed to prevent courts from insisting that gay marriages performed in one state be recognized 
throughout the country. The Act was reintroduced as the Marriage Protection Act of 2007, and referred 
to the House Committee on the Judiciary without further action. 
3
 With the exception of Supreme Court appellate review over areas specifically listed in Article III of 
the Constitution. 
4
 This view is held despite a fairly extensive administrative law literature addressing the Administrative 
Procedure Act which abrogates the presumption of judicial review where the “statute precludes judicial 
review” Administrative Procedure Act, U.S. Code 5 (2000) §701(a)(1)-(2). 
 16 
 
perhaps, because of) the assumed rarity of these cases, while there is a substantial 
theoretical literature addressing congressional authority and motivation to remove 
federal court jurisdiction, little systematic, empirical attention is paid to these 
congressional actions, commonly known as “jurisdiction stripping.”  
From an institutionalist perspective that relies on ideology as a key explanatory 
factor, congressional manipulation of court jurisdiction turns on the ideological 
proximity of Congress, courts, and agencies, with Congress choosing rules which 
result in greater discretion to either court or agency depending on which entity aligns 
best with congressional preferences.  The underlying principle is that that when court 
system goals are in opposition to Congress, the legislature is less likely to rely on 
procedural controls of agencies, based on the theory that Congress cannot rely on the 
judiciary to enforce legislative terms in a way satisfactory to congressional preferences 
(Gely and Spiller 1990; Hill and Brazier 1991).  
According to strategic institutionalism, jurisdictional removal, when it does 
occur, therefore is driven by a desire to limit the courts’ ability to influence policy. 
When Congress removes jurisdiction it eliminates the court entirely from the strategic 
dynamic of policy implementation. Smith (2006) finds Congress expands and 
contracts citizen suit provisions in response to court ideology. Spiller and Tiller (1997) 
model the cost-benefit trade-offs inherent in agency or court decision making and 
conclude that Congress strategically manipulates the costs associated with agency 
policy formation or judicial review to assure that greater policy control sits with 
whichever actor most closely aligns with Congress. Shipan (1997, 2000) argues that 
Congress shapes judicial review provisions by anticipating the agencies’ and courts’ 
preferences and legislating broader latitude in judicial review when Congress believes 
the courts will protect congressional interests.  
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Problems with Congressional Control of the Courts 
 There are several primary problems with applying agency theories and related 
models of strategic control mechanisms to the interactions between Congress and the 
federal judiciary, particularly when it comes to the revocation or allocation of 
jurisdiction. First, unlike agencies, which have relatively identifiable jurisdictional 
parameters and organizational arrangements that allow for some direct hierarchical 
control, the judiciary is a diffuse and structurally generalized organization, with 
multiple actors, and a weak system of hierarchical control. In a model where strategic 
behavior is premised upon identifying salient institutional policy preferences, this 
poses a significant problem, since it is difficult for Congress to identify one primary 
judicial actor, or group of actors, whose ideology either represents or controls the 
courts. Second, even if Congress could identify the salient court - and most studies 
assume that this is the Supreme Court an assumption challenged by its limited docket - 
enormous countervailing forces, primarily self-selective, result in the vast majority of 
disputes leaving the court system long before judges express any ideological 
preference. If and when Congress does remove jurisdiction from the federal courts, the 
lack of one court to react to and the high pre-trial disposition rate for most filed cases, 
strongly suggests that the impetus behind jurisdictional controls is not ideological.  
 Congress Cannot Identify a Primary Judicial Actor.  Courts cannot act until 
a case is filed. Unlike Congress, the executive, or agencies, no court can independently 
act on government policy, nor can a court choose a particular policy to challenge. 
Litigants determine both the parameters of a dispute, and, with certain limitations 
generally outside government control, what court actor is involved.5 Federal court 
                                                 
5
 Some policy areas are assigned by Congress to specialized courts, such as Court of Federal Claims 
which hears money claims against the federal government, but as a general matter all other issues 
appropriately before the federal courts may be heard in any district or circuit, subject to certain venue 
rules. 
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jurisdiction, which is largely constrained to issues arising under the Constitution, 
statutes, or treaties of the United States,6 or disputes between citizens of different 
states above a minimum value,7 equally applies to each of the 94 district courts, and 
678 related judgeships, which are the first points of entry into the federal judicial 
system. Appeals from district court decisions are taken in the appellate court 
geographically connected to the initial district court filing. Currently there are thirteen 
such courts of appeals, and 179 judgeships.8 Final appeal may be had, if accepted, by 
the Supreme Court, of which, of course, there is only one. Until a case is filed, 
Congress does not know which district court in the federal system will hear a 
particular policy challenge or which appellate court will receive any appeal. 
 This would be less of a road block to ex ante congressional controls if the 
judges, Justices, and therefore the courts they serve, were all ideologically uniform. 
This is not the case. These numerous federal courts vary not only in location, but - 
using the terms and measures favored by many institutionalists - in ideological make-
up as well. For example, The Judicial Common Space scores developed by Epstein, 
Martin, Segal, Westerland (2007), range from -1 (liberal) to 1 (conservative). The 
current Supreme Court’s median member is Anthony Kennedy, a Republican 
appointee with a Judicial Common Space score of 0.03, which identifies him as a 
moderate and centrist. The median Common Space score for the 4th Circuit in 2006 
was 0.31, a conservative ranking.  The 9th Circuit’s 2006 median score was -0.22, 
considered liberal. The U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia has 15 
authorized and 12 sitting  trial court judges, any one of whom could hear a case filed 
in that district.  The Chief Judge, Royce C. Lamberth, a Reagan appointee, has a very 
                                                 
6
 U.S. Constitution, art. 3, sec. 2; Judiciary and Judicial Procedure, U.S. Code 28 (2004) §1331. 
7
 U.S. Constitution, art. 3, sec. 2; Judiciary and Judicial Procedure, U.S. Code 28 (2004) §1332. 
8
 Including the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit which hears patent cases and monetary 
claims against the federal government. 
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conservative Common Space Score of 0.567, while Emmet G. Sullivan, a Clinton 
appointee serving on the same court, has a Common Space score of -0.441, identifying 
him as strongly liberal.  The wide range and variety of these ideological ratings, at the 
appellate level, is set forth in Table 1.1, below. 
 
Table 1.1.  Appellate Court Median Ideological Scores, 2004 
 
Circuit Common Space Median 
Ideological 
Characterization Party Median 
First 0.26 Conservative Republican 
Second -0.28 Liberal Democrat 
Third 0.03 Moderate Republican 
Fourth 0.31 Conservative Republican 
Fifth 0.39 Conservative Republican 
Sixth 0.01 Moderate Neither party 
Seventh 0.31 Conservative Republican 
Eighth 0.31 Conservative Republican 
Ninth -0.27 Liberal Democrat 
Tenth 0.25 Conservative Republican 
Eleventh 0.33 Conservative Neither party 
D.C. 0.47 Conservative Republican 
Source. Epstein, 2008, “Judicial Common Space Scores,” 
http://epstein.law.northwestern.edu/research/JCS.html 
 
 
Uncertainty as to which court or trial judge will control the policy outcome of 
a case might not be an issue if all cases ultimately ended up in the Supreme Court. 
Strategic modeling often focuses on the Supreme Court because it is assumed to be the 
court most likely to provoke congressional and executive action (Epstein, Segal, and 
Victor 2002; Eskridge 1991a, 1991b). However, the Supreme Court has authority over 
its own docket, and accepts very few cases for review, despite a voluminous number 
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of litigant petitions. During the Court’s 2007 term, the Court issued written opinions 
in 67 cases. The cert pool, or number of cases requesting Supreme Court 
consideration, in 2007 was 8,241 (Roberts 2008). In the last 50 years the Supreme 
Court’s plenary docket ranged from between 75 to 150 cases per annum (Cordray and 
Cordray 2001), making the Court a sporadic participant in policy oversight and 
implementation at best. This leaves the appellate courts, with their largely mandatory 
appellate jurisdiction and their widely divergent political and ideological make-up, as 
the true courts of last resort. This means, that in crafting a response to the judiciary, 
Congress cannot tell which court or courts will be involved until litigation is under 
way. This makes ex ante structural controls a highly inefficient strategic choice.  
 Few Cases Result in Judicial Policy Expression.  Congress cannot predict 
whether a particular policy challenge will generate a judicial expression of preference, 
even if Congress could anticipate which court will hear a case. This is because vast 
numbers of cases leave the judicial system both well before significant court 
involvement and well before appeal (Diamond and Bina 2004; Higginbotham 2002; 
Yeazell 1994). Close to 98% of federal civil cases filed either settle9 or are dismissed 
prior to trial (Clermont 2008; Shavell 2003). The incidence of pre-trial disposition is 
growing over time, with the number federal civil cases resolved by trial seeing a 60% 
decline since the mid-1980s (Galanter 2004).10  
Even if a case does go to trial, very few are appealed. Only about one in eight 
tried cases advance to the appellate courts (Eisenberg 2004; Galanter 2004). This is a 
                                                 
9
 Settlements rates are high, but do vary by district and case type (Clermont and Schwab 2008; 
Eisenberg and Lanvers October 1, 2008; Galanter and Cahill 1994) 
10
 In can be argued that Congress can predict which cases will result in a judicial decision, by applying 
the various  cost benefit assessments just as litigants do when deciding whether to proceed or settle. In 
this way Congress could react only to the cases it knows are likely to stay in court. The specifics of this 
assessment are discussed later in the dissertation. The counter to this point it that these calculations are 
very fact specific, depending, among other things, on litigant resources, legal doctrine, and potential 
judicial preferences. The litigant involved knows these intimately. It is unlikely that Congress has 
access to the same kind of information, or that the information could be broadly summarized in a way 
that makes it applicable to a large group of cases. 
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function of the cost of appeal, the likelihood that a litigant will prevail, and explicit 
economic calculations made by the losing party. Appeals courts tend to defer to trial 
court decisions (Eisenberg and Miller 2008; Guthrie and George 2005). The 
affirmance rate in federal court, the rate at which the appellate court supports the 
decision of the trial court, is approximately 80% (Clermont 2008), making it 
economically irrational in most cases for a losing litigant to expend the resources to 
continue a case. This is particularly true if the prevailing party at the trial level is the 
government, since appellate courts tend to rule in the government’s favor (Crowley 
1987; Songer, Sheehan, and Haire 1999).  
In sum, these facts challenge the ideological explanation for congressional 
manipulation of court jurisdiction in three ways. First, it is difficult to predict which 
issues will make it to appeal since close to 88% of the tried cases stop at the district 
court level, making ex ante jurisdictional manipulation at the appellate level an overly 
broad and inefficient tool to use in an attempt to control ideological behavior. Second, 
of the small number of cases that do proceed to an appeal, the appellate court is very 
likely to express a preference that does not deviate from the court below, a fact that 
undercuts the argument that the appellate court is behaving ideologically. Third, 
appellate courts tend to side with the government, an outcome that the government 
should favor rather than curtail. If Congress chooses to remove jurisdiction, either 
entirely or partially through exclusive jurisdictional grants, reaction to judicial 
ideology is not a satisfactory causal explanation, given the uncertainty as to which 
court will be engaged in litigation and the precipitous drop off between filed and tried 
cases.   
 Another approach, then, is needed to understand why Congress might remove 
judicial review: one which draws upon strategic institutionalism’s insights about the 
rational and strategic nature of institutional actors, but avoids the difficulties presented 
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when institutional behavior is seen primarily as an expression of ideological 
preference. Chapter Two argues that law and economics satisfies these conditions by 
offering an alternative motivation to ideology, a motivation based on the costs and 
delay imposed by litigation against the government. These costs cut across institutions 
and create broad-based incentives for Congress to eliminate access to the courts. In 
this model, the relationship between government actors is often less adversarial than it 
is accommodating, with Congress, courts, and agencies all reacting, in one form or 
another, to interference with their duties by the public. This is a state centered view, 
where competition between branches and strategic behavior certainly can exist, but 
very often the strategic actor on one side is the government and on the other is society.  
From this perspective, it is possible to see that actions, such as jurisdiction stripping, 
which might otherwise be cast as congressional constriction of the courts, are in fact 
actions designed to insulate agency policy and court resources from litigants using the 
judiciary as a mechanism to burden and delay the business of government. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
 
JURISDICTION STRIPPING AND LITIGATION ECONOMICS 
Institutional theories that focus on judicial ideology as expressed through final 
court decisions are an unsatisfactory basis for understanding jurisdiction stripping. 
This is because they ignore a critical feature of the judicial system: denying court 
review denies litigants a judicial forum, an action with ramifications for caseload 
pressures, litigation costs, and congressional behavior, in ways only diffusly related to 
institutional ideology or final case disposition. When Congress removes jurisdiction 
from the federal courts it is likely doing so in reaction to litigation costs imposed on 
the federal system, and not court ideology. These costs include not only the direct 
economic impact of defending lawsuits, but also policy delay, resource diversion, and 
litigation avoidance behavior by institutional actors, all of which interfere with the 
government’s ability to implement and carry out public policy. Two key features of 
the litigation process are salient to this perspective of jurisdiction stripping: the 
significant increases over time in federal court case filings, particularly civil filings 
against the United States, and the attendant costs these increases visit on all branches 
of the federal government. Institutional actors exhibit numerous behaviors designed to 
avoid or reduce this litigation related cost and interference, including the structural 
manipulation of procedure to reduce a plaintiff’s incentives to file suit. The law and 
economics literature on case selection provides a theoretical basis for understanding 
these behaviors, in particular, jurisdiction stripping and exclusive jurisdiction grants. 
Increasing Caseloads  
Caseloads in federal court fall into two basic categories: cases brought by the 
federal government, primarily criminal prosecutions and regulatory actions, and civil 
cases brought by private actors. Civil litigation instigated by parties outside the 
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government includes disputes between private parties, litigation challenging state 
action, and litigation against the federal government. Of these case types, only one, 
suits against the federal government, imposes costs directly on federal actors in ways 
that cannot easily be controlled by the government. The first category, government 
instigated criminal or regulatory actions, depend upon an affirmative decision by 
federal actors to either prosecute or file a regulatory enforcement action. This kind of 
litigation, and the costs it imposes on government institutions, can be controlled 
directly by changing the number of prosecutions, an act wholly within the purview of 
the Department of Justice and various regulatory agencies. Within the second 
category, civil actions instigated by private parties, the sub-categories of state action 
challenges and private litigation do not directly impact federal actors, nor do they 
impose costs on all three branches, although these cases do affect the judiciary by 
taking up court time and resources. The final category, litigation against the federal 
government, is the one area that both imposes costs directly and broadly across 
governmental institutions, and, because the decision to litigate is made by third parties, 
the attendant costs and delay cannot be easily circumscribed before the fact by 
government actors. It is this area, suits in which the federal government is a defendant, 
which invites structural institutional responses, such as jurisdiction stripping.  
Federal court caseloads increased exponentially over the past several decades.  
From 1940 to 2004, annual district court case filings in the federal system rose from 
68,135 to 352,360.11 The reasons for this growth are myriad, including the advent of 
notice pleading, increased legislative output, private attorney general laws passed in 
the 1970s, the rise of rights-based litigation, and increased use of litigation by interest 
groups as an alternative to engaging the legislative process. Civil case filings increased 
                                                 
11
 Administrative Office of the United States Courts, Proceedings of the Judicial Conference of the 
United States, Annual Report of the Director (Washington, D.C., 1940-200) (“AO Reports 1940-
2008”). 
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during this period in every case category, rising from 34,734 filings in 1940 to 
281,338 filings in 2004. This increase occurred despite an attendant decline in trials, 
and at a rate that cannot be explained by general population growth (Galanter 2004). 
Civil filings in which the United States was a defendant, the category that includes 
challenges to government policy that are not easily curtailed through government 
action, increased nineteen-fold between 1940 and 2004, from 2,171 to 38,391.12 
Figure 2.1 shows these trends.      
 
 
Source. Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts (1940-2004).  
Notes. U.S. Civil Defendant Filings on Secondary Axis. 
 
Figure 2.1.  Annual U.S. District Court Caseloads, 1943-2004: 
Total Case Filings, Civil Filings, U.S. Civil Defendant Filings 
                                                 
12
 Ibid.  
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 The number of lawyers in the United States also grew during roughly the same 
time period. According to statistics kept by the American Bar Foundation (1988, 
2000), the number of practicing attorneys, in all areas of the law, was 221,605 in 1951 
and 909,019 in 2000.13 Overall percentages of lawyers in various practice areas has 
remained stable over time, with between 9% and 10% of the bar working for the 
government (both state and federal) from 1960 to 2000. However, in absolute terms, 
this means the number of government attorneys went from about 28,000 in 1960 to 
almost 82,000 in 2000. Table 2.1 below, shows these trends. 
 
 
Table 2.1.  Attorneys Practice Area Employment, as a Percentage of Total 
Attorney Population, 1960 to 2000 
 
 1960 1970 1980 1990* 2000 
Private Practice 72 68 68 73 74 
Judicial 3 3 4 3 3 
Government 10 10 10 9 9 
Private Industry 10 11 10 10 9 
Other 1 2 3 1 1 
Retired 5 6 5 5 5 
Total 285,933 355,242 542,205 805,872 909,019 
Source. American Bar Foundation 1988, 2000.  Notes. *1991 data. 
 
 
Institutional Costs and Responses 
Increasing caseloads where a federal actor is a named defendant create costs 
and delay across all branches of the government. Institutional litigation costs, in terms 
of time, resources, and policy interference, attach at the time a case is filed in federal 
                                                 
13
 Although, as a ratio of the overall United States population, these numbers dropped from 696 to 1 in 
1951 down to 264 to 1 in 2000, with the decline starting in earnest in the early 1980s. 
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court.14 For the judiciary these costs stem from its role as a dispute resolution system. 
For agencies, usually the targets of litigation when the federal government is a named 
defendant, the costs arise from their status as litigants. For Congress, litigation against 
the government creates disruption to legislative bargains and resource demands from 
the other branches.  
Each institution crafts a variety of individualized responses to these costs. Each 
institutional reaction alters underlying litigation incentives. Courts encourage 
settlement or push cases out of the system prior to trial, thereby making the value of 
many lawsuits a function of early stage litigation positioning and strategy as opposed 
to trial outcomes. Agencies seek to avoid litigation, actions that often encumber policy 
implementation and create incentives for policy opponents to threaten suit to instigate 
protective and dilatory agency response. Congress, because of its unique ability to 
affect the structure and procedure of litigation, responds by both providing more 
resources to agencies and courts as well as placing structural limitations on litigation. 
Jurisdiction stripping is one such structural constraint. 
Courts and Litigation. The number of federal court judges has not increased 
apace with case filings, resulting in a significant rise over time in judicial workload 
coupled with a significant erosion in judicial salaries.15 The American Bar Association 
and Federal Bar Association Report (2001) conducted for the federal judiciary’s 
Administrative Office, estimates that the average district court judge’s caseload 
increased from 339 to 526 cases per year between 1969 and 1999. The average 
                                                 
14
 Cases can also be filed in state court. The only change in the analysis is that, should a case against the 
government remain in state court, the costs accrued do not include those visited on the federal judiciary. 
However, given a defendant’s right to remove cases brought in state court that could have been 
originally filed in federal court, and this includes all cases brought against the federal government, 
virtually all such cases proceed in the federal system. 
15
 There is some contention that if the federal judiciary’s benefits, including retirement and pension, are 
factored in to the equation then judicial compensation is comparable to private sector legal occupations. 
This is in some dispute, and regardless, the federal judiciary itself has long taken the position before 
Congress that judicial pay should be higher. 
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appellate judge’s caseload increased from 123 to 363 cases. During roughly the same 
time, the report estimates an average judicial salary reduction in purchasing power of 
about 25%.  Chief Justice Roberts’ Year-End Report on the Federal Judiciary (2008) 
reiterated the need for judicial cost of living salary adjustments, a plea that appears in 
almost every such year-end report since the 1980s. These trends, increasing per judge 
caseload and decreasing real salary levels, continue unabated (Galanter 2004, Roberts 
2008). 
 Courts, by their very nature, are constrained in their ability to adjust output in 
response to increasing caseloads because there is a limit in time and energy to the 
number of cases a single judge can manage. Due to the judicial system’s structure, 
unlimited increases in  the number of judges, particularly at the appellate level, creates 
significant organizational problems, making panel hearings cumbersome, and 
interfering with the system’s ability to produce legal uniformity across – or even 
within – the circuits (Nihan and Rishikof 1994; Posner 1996). In addition, although 
adding new judges to the system may ease workload, it is often perceived by the 
sitting judiciary as an action that will dilute the current judiciary’s professional stature 
(Meador 1983; Posner 1993; Richmond and Reynolds 1996).  
The judiciary’s response to caseload pressures is both practical and policy 
based. The federal courts increasingly emphasize active case management and 
disposition by motion prior to trial (Cecil, Eyre, Miletich, and Rindskopf 2007). Some 
scholars note a greater use of judicially imposed barriers to litigation, including 
ripeness and mootness standards (concepts which define when a case is appropriately 
mature and an injury appropriately concrete to sustain litigation), along with the 
increased application of summary judgment and other pre-trial measures to reduce 
case load pressures (Burbank 2004; Hadfield 2004; Miller 2003).  Case termination 
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through judicial grants of summary judgment and 12(b)(6)16 motions continue to rise 
steadily, making up no small portion of pretrial terminations (Cecil, Eyre, Miletich, 
and Rindskopf 2007). In 2005, roughly 21% of federal civil cases were disposed of 
pretrial through summary judgment or Rule 12 (Clermont 2008). From 1960 to 2000 
the summary judgment rate increased from 1.8% of filed civil cases to 7.7% (Burbank 
2004).17 Judges also use case management techniques to encourage settlement and 
quick disposition prior to trial, including alternative dispute resolution, mandatory 
pretrial conferences, discovery limitations, and a growing reliance on magistrates to 
handle pretrial matters (Robel 1993; Stern 2003). 
On the policy front, federal courts have long called for Congress to restrict 
federal jurisdiction as a way of controlling the judiciary’s growth and workload 
(Judicial Conference 1995; Nihan 1995; Nihan and Rishikof 1994; Resnik 1998). This 
approach is both comprehensive and efficient. Unlike pretrial disposition and 
settlement, when a court has no jurisdiction cases either are not filed, or exit the 
system very early, well before any substantial time or resource investment by the 
judiciary. Indeed, the federal courts’ support for the creation of the Federal Judicial 
Center in 1967 was strongly related to the need for objective statistical information on 
caseloads that could be used to both increase organizational efficiency and bolster 
arguments before Congress that the federal courts needed some form of manpower or 
jurisdictional reprieve from caseload pressures (Fish 1973).  
Agencies and Litigation. The mere initiation of a lawsuit against an agency 
can affect policy by delaying ongoing policy formation and implementation and 
imposing litigation costs in terms of agency time and resources (Levin 1996; Meltzer 
                                                 
16
 Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 12(b)(6), is failure of the nonmoving party to state a claim that 
can be legally adjudicated. 
17
 Summary judgment rates are variable across district and case types (Burbank 2004; Eisenberg and 
Lanvers 2008). 
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1998; Wald 1996). These costs attach despite the high litigation success rates of 
government parties (Crowley 1987; Songer, Sheehan, and Haire 1999), since it is 
participation in, and reaction to, the litigation process that is at issue. While it is 
difficult to assess litigation’s full impact on the government, it is possible to measure 
the magnitude of litigation through case filings. Scholars estimate anywhere from 26% 
to 80% of agency rulemaking is subject to court challenge, depending on the agency in 
question and the nature of the rule (Coglianese 2002; Prizker and Dalton 1990; Wilson 
1989).18 Appeals from administrative adjudications filed in the federal circuit courts 
increased from 800 in 1940 to 10,382 in 2007, although this underestimates litigation 
levels as many challenges to agency action can be filed directly in federal district 
court.19  
 An agency’s status as defendant requires agency staff and agency counsel to 
devote time and resources to court processes, including responding to discovery 
requests and providing the information necessary to craft motions, pleadings and pre-
trail settlement negotiations. This diversion of resources towards litigation and away 
from other agency mandates creates “agenda disruption” (Cross 2000; McGarity 
1992). With very few exceptions, it appears that this is part of a zero sum resource 
game. Agencies, for example, do not get additional resources to deal with judicial 
decrees (O’Leary 1993).20 Case studies of various agencies indicate participation in 
                                                 
18
 Some scholars dispute the existence of rising challenges to regulatory policy (Shapiro 1968), but their 
focus is often more specific than general case filings as discussed here, analyzing, instead, 
administrative appeals or judicial decisions neither of which capture the full impact of  litigation against 
the federal government. 
19Absent a specific legislative directive, district courts have initial appellate jurisdiction over challenges 
to administrative action. As a percentage of overall appeals filed in the federal system administrative 
appeals have varied considerably over time, constituting 23.2% of all appeals filed in 1940, dropping to 
a low of 5.3% in 1996, and then rising again to 19.5% in 2004, and 17.8%  in 2007 (Administrative 
Office of the U.S. Courts 1940-2008) . 
20
 However, some studies find that state agencies use the threat of litigation as a way to increase their 
share of the state budget (Hanssen 2000). 
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court hearings are often viewed as a significant inconvenience by agency workers, 
although how onerous these costs are may depend on the agency.21  
Nor are litigation costs, imposed by suits against the government, the agencies' 
alone. The Department of Justice (“DOJ”) is responsible, in varying degrees 
depending on the agency and the issue, for representing agencies in court, with United 
States Attorneys and Assistant United States Attorneys conducting and coordinating 
agency litigation (Johnston 2002; Sisk 2006).22 The DOJ’s Environmental and Natural 
Resources Division defends federal agencies and agency programs in connection with 
the management of federal land and federal resources, including defense of the U.S. 
Fish and Wildlife Service, and National Marine Fisheries Service determinations of 
endangered species. The DOJ’s civil division defends the government actors in civil 
suits spanning almost the entire range of government activities. The Federal Programs 
Branch represents roughly 100 federal agencies in legal challenges to the 
administration of agency programs, including, among many, the departments of 
Veterans Affairs, Health and Human Services, Education, Interior, Energy, 
Agriculture, and Housing and Urban Development. As a result, the DOJ is involved in 
suits defending government obligations to public housing authorities, and claims of 
discrimination in federal employment. The Office of Consumer Litigation acts as 
defense counsel (and civil prosecutor) in connection with consumer based government 
programs administered by the Food and Drug Administration, Federal Trade 
Commission, Consumer Product Safety Commission, and the Department of 
Transportation’s National Highway Traffic Safety Administration. The Office of 
Immigration Litigation responds to all suits involving the regulation of aliens both in 
                                                 
21
 There is some evidence, that the Environmental Protection Agency, for example, cooperates with 
interest group litigation against the agency in order to streamline the rulemaking process (Coglianese 
1996). 
22
 Limited authority over litigation is granted to specific independent agencies, such as the Consumer 
Product Safety Division (Berger and Edles 2000; Sisk 2006). 
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admission and removal from the United States. The Tort Branch represents the 
government when claims are brought under the Federal Tort Claims Act. These suits 
not only demand damages, but often are a method for challenging government policies 
that give rise to the legal claim. Litigation such as suits against the Mine Safety and 
Health Administration for failure to implement stringent enough inspection procedures 
fall into this category.  As these examples make clear, suits against agencies are part of 
the DOJ’s business and accordingly impact resource allocation for DOJ lawyers 
(United States Department of Justice 2009, “DOJ Agencies”). 
 DOJ involvement creates additional issues for agency control over policy, 
since litigation outcomes, either through negotiated settlement or judicial case 
disposition, are at least partially controlled by DOJ attorneys (Devins 2003).  These 
outcomes can create policy precedent that is not fully in line with agency mandates or 
wishes, increases implementation costs, skews future policy development, or 
diminishes agency and executive power (Herz and Devins 2000; Zorn 2000).23 As a 
result, while agency out-of-pocket litigation costs may be reduced by DOJ 
participation, these savings are offset by the need to monitor, oversee, and assist in 
litigation in order to ensure that agency policy interests are represented (Harvey 1996; 
Olson 1984). The presence of multiple lawyers from both the agency and DOJ results 
in inefficiencies, task duplication, and process delay (Devins 2003; Habicht 1985). 
In response to judicial (and litigant) access to review, agencies often adopt 
highly inefficient and cumbersome means of regulating (Pierce 1988; Tiller and 
Spiller 1999; Wilson 1989). This can result in delay and distortion of policy (de 
Figueiredo and de Figueiredo, Jr. 2002). Scholars credit defensive agency behavior, 
such as extensive procedure, documentation, and fact-finding, with causing the virtual 
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 Sisk (2006, 57-59) notes that even settlement approval required by the DOJ may result in different 
(broader) policy perspectives than might be the case if the outcome was determined by the line attorney 
alone. 
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“ossification” of notice and comment rulemaking (McGarity 1992). Alternatively, 
agencies may dispense with rulemaking altogether, taking action instead in the form of 
“guidances” (Mendelson 2007). Accordingly, agency attempts to avoid litigation can 
result in static and unresponsive policy, often contrary to Congress’s broad delegatory 
intent (Breyer 1993; Hamilton and Schroeder 1994). Exacerbation of the 1990s 
electricity crises, and inefficiencies in agency oversight of vehicle safety standards, for 
example, are both attributed, in part, to agency reaction to litigation (Mashaw and 
Harfst 1987; Pierce 1991). 
The case of the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration’s (“NHTSA”) 
choice in the late 1970s to switch emphasis from vehicle safety rulemaking to 
individualized automobile recalls illustrates this dynamic. The National Traffic and 
Motor Vehicle Safety Act was intended to turn the agency away from case by case 
decision making and toward the creation of broad, industry wide rules that would 
result in the production of safer automobiles. As the agency began promulgating rules, 
the rules were challenged in court and periodically overturned. For example certain 
rules requiring re-treaded tires meet specific performance standards were challenged 
by the tire industry, and struck down in court.24 Of particular concern to the agency, 
were court decisions striking down or delaying rules requiring manufacturers to adopt 
technologically advanced safety mechanisms, and the prospect of continued litigation 
in this regard (Mashaw and Harfst 1987). This kind of rulemaking received close 
scrutiny by the courts and, because of its proactive and technical nature, was often 
difficult to defend by the agency as a solution to safety issues.25 Case by case recalls, 
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 H & H Tire Co. v. Department of Transportation,471 F.2d 350 (7th Cir. 1972). 
25
 Chrysler Corp. v. Department of Transportation, 472 F.2d 659 (6th Cir. 1972); PACCAR, Inc. v. 
National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, 573 F.2d 632 (9th Cir. 1978) cert denied 439 U.S. 862 
(1979); National Tire Dealers and Retreaders Ass’n v. Brinegar, 491 F.2d 31 (D.C. Cir. 1974). 
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on the other hand, while still generating some litigation, were easier to defend in court, 
in part because they were premised on demonstrable safety hazards, and did not 
require the agency to solve the problem by demanding a specific type of technology be 
put in place by all manufacturers. As a result, NHTSA shifted its behavior from 
rulemaking to recalls (Bagley and Revesz 2006; Cross 2000; Mashaw and Harfst 
1987, 1990).26 
Congress and Litigation 
To the extent Congress wishes legislative bargains to adhere, agencies to 
function smoothly, and courts to process cases with alacrity, Congress has reasons to 
damp excess litigation against the government. The political time and resources 
expended to pass legislation give Congress an interest in not being forced to revisit 
policy arrangements as a result of litigation. Nor does Congress wish to see legislative 
bargains disrupted through the diversion of resources that attend defending lawsuits, 
response to legal rulings, or agency attempts to avoid litigation. These changes in 
policy happen outside the congressional system, hence bypassing the dynamics and 
gains to congressional members that derive from constituent service.27  
Congress is both aware of and subject to political pressures concerning 
litigation’s costs and policy disruption through a variety of sources. Pressures arise 
from other institutional actors, including the judiciary, agencies, and the Department 
of Justice, as well as interest groups negatively affected by the various inefficiencies 
and policy changes engendered by litigation and caseload increases. And Congress 
does take systematic action designed to reduce litigation against the government, 
                                                 
26
 But also see Coglianese (2002) who argues that litigation may not have had as dire an effect on 
agency behavior as some scholars claim. 
27
 Congress’s attitude toward policy litigation is not necessarily one of universal discontent. It is likely 
that in some instances Congress views litigation as a way to gauge a policy’s effect (Smith 2006). 
Congress also may use the courts to flesh out the specifics of legislation either because full articulation 
comes at too high a political cost, or as a way to avoid responsibility for later constituent dissatisfaction 
(Arnold 1987). 
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although the congressional picture is a complex one, with new legislation increasing 
the public’s access to the courts at the same time that other legislative provisions 
discourage such litigation.28  
 The legislative histories of some jurisdiction stripping statues, analyzed in 
more detail in Chapters Three through Five, evidence concerns expressed by and 
before Congress with the policy cost and delay caused by litigation. For example, in 
legislation designed to allow the Federal Housing Administration (“FHA”) to correct 
structural defects in property bought with FHA insured loans, provisions were added 
to remove judicial review of certain FHA decisions. At issue were “fears expressed 
that agencies will be inundated, that claims will be phony,”29 resulting in “tremendous 
pressures which would be directed at the Congress and the FHA to tap the FHA 
insurance fund for the means to correct defects or other major and minor shortcomings 
in residential property. There would be no end to the controversies generated.”30 
Similar concerns arose in connection with the Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980 
designed to allow the waiver of certain regulatory rules’ application to small 
businesses. The analyses prepared in anticipation of these waivers were not subject to 
judicial review so that, as one congressmember noted, agencies would “not be bogged 
down with lawsuits before the agencies have even finished their rulemaking.”31 A 
second member observed that the cost of such policy delay meant that “[m]any valid 
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 Statutes, such as the National Environmental Protection Act, are often enacted that increase the cost 
of agency action. NEPA, which requires environmental impact statements for major government 
actions, is the source of considerable litigation against government agencies and is discussed in greater 
detail in Chapter Five.  
29
 Carey Winston, President of the Mortgage Bankers Association of America, speaking before the 
Senate Subcommittee of the Committee on Banking and Currency, Housing Legislation of 1964: 
Hearing Before the Subcommittee of the Committee on Banking and Currency, 88th Cong., 2nd sess., 
1964, 585. Testimony was in opposition to the provision. 
30
 Statement of Senator Javets speaking before the Senate Subcommittee of the Committee on Banking 
and Currency, Housing Legislation of 1964: Hearing Before the Subcommittee of the Committee on 
Banking and Currency, 88th Cong., 2nd sess., 1964. Statement in opposition to the jurisdictional 
removal. 
31
 Congressmember Bedell, speaking on the Regulatory Flexibility Act on September 16, 1980, 96th 
Cong., 2nd sess., Cong.Rec. 126, pt. 8456, Daily ed. (Sept. 8, 1980): H8461.  
 36 
 
regulations are tied up in years of litigation, and small businesses often cannot afford 
the legal costs to participate. The judicial review standard in this bill is carefully 
designed to avoid needless litigation.”32 
 Budget Pressure. The appropriations and budget process provides litigation 
information to Congress in the form of budgetary demands from agencies, the 
Department of Justice, and the judiciary. Whether Congress is responsive to fiscal and 
budgetary constraints given other political imperatives, including the desire to 
distribute benefits to constituents, is a matter of some contention (Ferejohn 1974; 
Maass 1951; Schick 1980). It is clear, however, that the demands of funding 
government operations are a matter of congressional concern, if only because political 
economy dynamics limit appropriations (Alvarez and Saving 1997; Fisher 1983; 
Ferejohn and Krehbiel 1987).  
Operational costs for the federal judicial system have grown at a rate above 
federal budgetary growth in the last several decades.  From 1985-1995 both the 
judiciary’s and the DOJ’s budgets each increased approximately 170%, about four 
times the overall rate of the federal budget during that same period (Judicial 
Conference 1995; Longan 1997). Although Congress may be aware of the financial 
needs of the judiciary and the burdens of rising caseloads, increased funding is often 
remedial at best.  Additional budgetary appropriations did little to alleviate shortfalls 
in judiciary operational funding, with budget deficits  ranging from $100 million to 
$400 million between 1988 and 1994, and similarly significant shortfalls continuing 
thereafter resulting in hiring freezes, non-judicial staff reductions, delayed facilities 
repair, suspension of certain court related post-conviction programs, and other cost 
cutting actions. These deficits are part of a longstanding pattern (George 2006; Longan 
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 Congressmember Rodino, speaking on the Regulatory Flexibility Act on September 16, 1980, 96th 
Cong., 2nd sess., Cong .Rec. 126, pt. 8456, Daily ed. (Sept. 8, 1980): H8474. 
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1997; U.S. Supreme Court, Chief Justice 1988-2004), suggesting that if Congress 
responds to caseload demands, increased funding to the judiciary is a constrained, and 
perhaps not favored, option. 
Judicial Pressure. The judiciary regularly interacts with Congress regarding 
both the effects of increased caseloads and the potential legislative responses, urging 
Congress to take legislative action, specifically advocating restrictions on federal 
jurisdiction to reduce litigation flowing into the federal courts, as well as requesting 
increases in the judiciary’s financial resources. These contacts come from the 
Administrative Office of the United States Courts (“Administrative Office”), the Chief 
Justice’s year-end report, and congressional appearances by members of the Judicial 
Conference, the judicial organization that represents the federal courts’ interests. To 
this end, the Administrative Office and the Judicial Conference coordinate regular 
testimony by members of the judiciary before congressional committees. The judiciary 
communicates its positions on a broad range of topics this way, including court work 
load, case filing patterns, jurisdictional issues, court efficiency and judicial system 
costs. These contacts are not sporadic. In the roughly 20 years covered by one study, 
Judicial Conference committee members appeared before or reported to Congress 211 
times. Of these interactions, 59 were procedural rules-based reports and amendments 
transmitted for congressional approval and 152 represent committee member 
testimony before Congress on pending legislation or other legislative matters, in 
particular budgetary, workload, and jurisdictional issues (Chutkow 2008).33  
The Judicial Conference actively supports restrictions in federal jurisdiction, 
urging Congress exhibit jurisdictional restraint in new legislation. In this regard, the 
Judicial Conference took positions on such widely divergent legislative issues as 
                                                 
33
 These statistics underestimate the number of times Congress is lobbied by the judiciary, since the data 
only includes appearances by member of the Judicial Conference. 
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restrictions on social security claims, diversity jurisdiction, class action rights, 
NAFTA, asbestos related claims, habeas jurisdiction, medical privacy issues, 
governmental taking of private property, and animal research (Administrative Office 
1994, 1999, 2005; Nixon 2003; Resnik 2003). Diversity jurisdiction, where disputes 
between private citizens of different states may be heard in federal court, has been a 
subject of judicial dissatisfaction since at least the 1950s (Resnik 2003). 
Agency Pressure. Agencies and Congress continuously interact, through 
informal contacts, legislatively dictated reports, and congressional hearings and 
testimony. One study, for example, found that congressional committees engaged with 
the Environmental Protection Agency between 92 and 213 times a year (Lazarus 
1991). Agencies are an important source of both technical and policy-based 
information for Congress and the relevant committee overseeing agency action (Balla 
and Wright 2001; Banks and Weingast 1992; Ripley and Franklin 1990). This includes 
not only are budgetary concerns, but also a wide variety of other subjects that relate to 
policy implementation and agency operation, including legal challenges to agency 
policy.  
As organizations, agencies seek to maximize their budgets, their resources, and 
their control over policy (Macey 1992; McChesney 1990), and are incented to lobby 
Congress for increases in each. To the extent that federal litigation against agencies 
increases uncertainty over policy outcomes, by interjecting a potential third party 
arbiter, the courts, depletes resources, and does not contribute sufficiently to budget 
increases, agencies have an interest in pushing Congress for a respite from litigation. 
Agencies support streamlined agency-based adjudication procedures outside of the 
cumbersome processes required by the Administrative Procedure Act for just these 
reasons (Funk 1993; Howarth 2004; Levy and Shapiro 2003). In addition, any 
congressional action that increases the barriers to suit accomplishes some of this task. 
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These are discussed in more detail in the next section in the context challenging policy 
through litigation or lobbying. By way of initial example, sovereign immunity, the 
principle that the government cannot be sued while conducting government business, 
has been waived in multiple statutes thereby allowing administrative, tort and contract 
challenges to agency action. Congress could reinstate sovereign immunity in selected 
areas through legislation. And, due to their extensive contacts with agencies, 
congressional committees are kept informed of the policy and monetary implications 
when agencies are forced to defend lawsuits.  
Interest Group Pressure. Actors with political access and sufficient resources 
to influence legislation have a strong incentive to lobby Congress for jurisdictional 
removal over a policy area if the legislative bargain struck is in their favor.  This is 
particularly true if subsequent litigation disrupts (or is likely to disrupt) an 
advantageous policy arrangement. Controlling court access prevents other interest 
groups from using litigation threats, case filing costs, and potential case outcomes as a 
strategy to manipulate or delay policy.  
Interest groups often use litigation either in conjunction with, or as an 
alternative to, lobbying. The calculus behind this choice is a function of interest group 
incentives and turns on resources, the costs of lobbying versus litigation, and the 
chances of a positive outcome given the chosen approach (Rubin, Curran, and Curran 
1999). In this dynamic, politically disadvantaged groups often view litigation as a cost 
efficient alternative to the political process (de Figueiredo and de Figueiredo 2002; 
Scheppele and Walker 1991; Schlozman and Tierney 1986). This alternative can be 
used to change policy through court order, or to impose litigation costs and delay 
thereby gaining leverage over how a policy is implemented. For resource-rich groups, 
the costs to an agency of defending lawsuits can be an effective bargaining tool at the 
rulemaking stage (de Figueiredo and de Figueiredo, Jr. 2002).  Or agencies and 
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interest groups can cooperate to reduce the number of actors with influence over 
agency policy by engaging in court action, thus limiting participation to the parties 
before the court (Coglianese 1996). If a group is able to successfully influence 
legislation in its favor, removing jurisdiction over specific policy areas protects that 
group’s interests by removing the costs of threatened litigation from the arsenal of 
potential adverse interests seeking to change or delay policy implementation.  
Table 2.2 sets out examples of policies that affect interest group decisions to 
litigate rather than lobby for policy change. Actions that restrict access to the judiciary 
are often those that either foreclose review entirely, or increase the costs of review. 
Jurisdiction stripping is one of these. Sovereign immunity is another, as are 
requirements that a litigant exhaust all administrative remedies before challenging 
agency policy in court. These exhaustion provisions, common in many administrative 
statutes, mean that the potential plaintiff must expend time and resources to seek 
review with the agency decision maker and any available agency tribunal before filing 
in federal court.  
Policies that make litigation an attractive method for challenging government 
action operate in the opposite manner by reducing barriers to entry and reducing 
litigation costs. Federal courts operate under the concept of notice pleading,34 which 
means filing a complaint in federal court requires little more than a statement of facts 
that can support a legal claim, an explanation of court jurisdiction, and a demand for 
relief. The Administrative Procedure Act waives sovereign immunity over agency 
actions. The Federal Tort Claims Act allows tort suits against government actors. The 
Tucker Act  authorizes the court to hear contract disputes between public and private 
parties. Fee shifting provisions, such as the Equal Access to Justice Act, alleviate 
plaintiff litigation costs under certain circumstances when the government is sued. 
                                                 
34
 Rule 8, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 
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And broad statutes like the National Environmental Policy Act, coupled with court 
decisions such as Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural Resource Defense Council (1984),35 
provide the legal basis, and court access, for litigants to mount administrative 
challenges. 
Similar principles operate with respect to lobbying. Anything that places entry 
barriers on lobbyists or limits the amount of money that can be donated to 
congressmembers operates to restrict lobbying access. This includes campaign 
contribution limits, disclosure requirements, and limits on lobbying by past 
government employees.36 On the other hand, policies that allow the transfer of money 
or encourage contacts between trade associations or interest groups and members of 
Congress all make lobbying an attractive method for policy change. These latter 
include the unlimited activity of issue organizations (formed under section 527 of the 
Internal Revenue Code), notice and comment procedures adopted by agencies during 
rulemaking or other actions, and congressional reliance on interest groups for 
expertise and information regarding policy formation.  
Congressional Response to Litigation  
 Congressional response to these multiple pressures, budgetary, inter-branch 
lobbying, and interest group constituents, results in a complex picture in which 
Congress legislates in reaction to increasing levels of litigation in the federal system, 
while at the same time passing public laws that by their very nature provide expanded 
public access to the federal courts. Given the nature of court jurisdiction, the default 
position is that virtually any piece of legislation can act as the basis for a lawsuit.37  
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 Allows for review of agency action with level of deference depending on the language of the 
authorizing statute. Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural Resource Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984). 
36
 Lobbying Disclosure Act of 1995, as amended by the Honest Leadership and Open Government Act 
of 2007, Public Law 110-81, U.S. Statutes at Large 121 (2007): 735; Ethics in Government Act of 1978, 
U.S. Statutes at Large 92(1978):1824. 
37
 The judicial power in Article III includes all cases and controversies arising under federal statutes, the 
Constitution, and treaties (U.S. Const. art. III). Broad waivers of sovereign immunity in the 
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Accordingly, patterns of increased legislative activity, including the growing use of 
omnibus legislation (Krutz 2001; Mayhew 1991; Oleszek 1996; Sinclair 1997), create 
new avenues for litigation. In response to political demands from constituents, 
Congress often explicitly increases federal jurisdiction. The influence of corporate 
interests and recent amendments to class action rules that favor federal court filings 
are one obvious example (Burbank 2008; Purcell 2008).38   
 
Table 2.2.  Policies Affecting Litigation and Lobbying Choices 
 
 Restricts Access Opens Access 
Litigation 
 
Jurisdiction Stripping 
Sovereign Immunity 
Statute of Limitations 
Diversity Requirements 
Standing Requirements 
Government Privileges 
Exhaustion Admin Remedies 
 
Notice Pleading 
Fee Shifting (EAJA) 
Sovereign Immunity Waivers  
Chevron 
Citizen Suit Provisions 
Class Action Rules 
Broad Statutory Language (NEPA) 
Lobbying 
 
Campaign Contribution Limits 
(McCain-Feingold Act) 
Federal Election Commission 
Internal Congressional Ethics Rules 
Past Gov Employee Lobby Limits 
Lobbying Disclosure Act 
 
Campaign Contribution Loopholes 
(Soft Money Transfers -527 Orgs) 
(Political Action Committees) 
(Party Committee Donations) 
Agency Notice and Comment  
Congress Reliance Info/ Expertise 
 
                                                                                                                                            
Administrative Procedure Act, Federal Tort Claims Act, and Tucker Act, to name a few, contribute to 
jurisdiction over government actors. 
38
 The legislative fight over the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 was long and complex, and while, as 
a general matter, business interests and the plaintiff’s bar were on opposite sides of many aspects of the 
bill, in particular regarding federal jurisdiction, there were also many other provisions that represented a 
“win” for the plaintiff’s side.  
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And there are many reasons why Congress might prefer to allow court and 
litigant involvement in policy-making: to avoid electoral consequences or take later 
political advantage of unpopular court decisions (Arnold 1990; Spence 1997), as an 
enforcement mechanism (Grant 1997; Spence 1999), or to provide information on how 
a policy actually operates once it is put in to effect (Smith 2006).  However, it is clear 
that, despite reasons to expand court jurisdiction, Congress also acts in a number of 
ways designed to alleviate litigation’s impact on government actors. These actions fall 
in to two general categories: resource expansion and procedural limitation.  
Expanded Adjudication Resources. As the federal court’s work load 
increases, Congress provides the judicial system with additional financial and 
personnel resources, as well as crafting dispute resolution alternatives that move cases 
out of the federal courts and into non-Article III adjudications, such as those 
conducted by magistrate, bankruptcy, or administrative law judges. Direct financial 
support for the Article III judiciary continues to grow.39 Judiciary spending (in 2002 
dollars) increased from about $56 million in 1962 to roughly $5 billion in 2002, an 
increase, as a percent of overall government spending, from 0.40% to 1.91% (Galanter 
2004). Appropriations for the federal judiciary, exclusive of supplemental 
appropriations, reflect this trend, rising from $1.192 billion in 1987 to $6.246 billion 
in 2008.40 
The creation of non-Article III judges to resolve disputes is in many ways a 
cost savings device for Congress, as well as a way to alleviate work load pressures on 
the federal judiciary. Resnik (2002) estimates, for example, that the initial cost for a 
new district court trial judge, including salary, staff, facilities, and security is about 
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 Although, these increases still fail to cover the full financial needs of the courts system, as evidenced 
by  persistent budgetary shortfalls. 
40
 Administrative Office of the United States Courts, Annual Reports of the Director, 1987-2008, 
(Washington 2007). 
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$849,572, with annual continuing costs of $758,653. A newly appointed magistrate 
judge is a less expense alternative to handle litigation demand, estimated to cost 
$684,834 initially, with annual maintenance expenses of $596,751. The political 
capital required for creating non-Article III positions is also less, since life tenure is 
not part of the equation (Resnik 2002). 
In 1968, Congress passed the Federal Magistrates Act, in an attempt to address 
federal judges’ burgeoning workloads, and in response to lobbying from the Judicial 
Conference and the Administrative Office (Robbins 2002; Silberman 1989). The 
Magistrates Act allowed judicial officers who were not Article III judges to take over 
some of the ministerial work of district courts, including pre-trial matters, motions 
work, discovery, and, with the parties’ consent, certain civil disputes. From 1990-
2007, authorized, full-time magistrate positions increased 53.5% from 329 to 505.41 
The creation of bankruptcy courts also was a response to crowded federal court 
dockets, and political economy concerns. While bankruptcy referees were a part of the 
judicial landscape since 1898, the increasing volume of civil bankruptcy proceedings 
in the late 20th century resulted in a significant expansion of the bankruptcy judges’ 
authority and autonomy (Countryman 1985; Resnik 2002).42 In the last decade alone, 
the number of authorized bankruptcy judges grew 21%, from 291 to 352.43  
Congress also created numerous Article I, administrative courts to handle 
disputes between the public and the government over regulations, policy, and benefits, 
although the scope and legitimacy of these courts gave rise to rather murky case law.44 
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 Administrative Office of the United States Courts, Annual Report of the Director, Judicial Facts and 
Figures, “Table 1.1: Total Judicial Officers, Courts of Appeals, District Courts, and Bankruptcy courts, 
1990-2007,” (Washington 2007) (“AO 2007 Report”).  
42
 Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Public Law 95-598, U.S. Statutes at Large  92 (1978): 2657, 2549; 
Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, U.S. Statutes at Large 98 (1984):333. 
43
 AO 2007 Report, Table 1.1. 
44
 Generally, legislative courts are legitimate when adjudicating public rights, but what those rights 
entail is not always clear. See, for example, Northern Pipeline Construction Co. v. Marathon Pipeline 
Construction Co., 458 U.S. 50 (1982), Thomas v. Union Carbide Agricultural Products Co., 473 U.S. 
568 (1985), Granfinaciera, S.A. v. Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33 (1989). 
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As the administrative state grew, so did the use of administrative law judges and other 
bureaucratic actors to resolve disputes over public law. In 2001, there were 1,370 
administrative law judges as compared to 590 active district court judges and 281 
senior court judges.45  That year, administrative law judges in the Social Security 
Administration, Immigration and Naturalization Services, Board of Veterans’ Appeals, 
and Equal Employment Opportunity Commission cumulatively disposed of close to 
720,000 disputes (Galanter 2004; Resnik 2004). Frye (1992) estimates that by 1992,  
roughly 2700 administrative adjudicators, other than administrative law judges, 
handled about 343,000 cases covering such wide ranging topics as immigration 
disputes, social service benefits, and veterans’ affairs. 
Congress also increased the judicial system’s workforce, at the judgeship, 
senior judge, and staff levels.46 Authorized district court judgeships were 193 in 1943 
and 678 in 2007, a 351% increase. Authorized appellate judge positions also increased 
roughly three times, from 58 in 1943 to 179 in 2007. At the same time, the use of 
senior judges expanded. These are judges who relinquish their seats on an appellate or 
district court, but continue to hear cases. In 1990 there were 201 active senior judges 
at the district court level, and by 2007 that number increased 54.2% to 310. The same 
increases occurred at the appellate level, where the number of senior judges increased 
69.8% between 1990 and 2007, from 63 to 107. So too, Congress increased non-
judicial support staff. In 1962, there were 18.9 non-judicial employees per Article III 
district court judge. By 1992, there were 45.9 such employees for each district court 
judge. There are no accurate figures after 1992 (Galanter 2004). 
                                                 
45
 Administrative Office of the United States Courts, Annual Report of the Director, Judicial Facts and 
Figures, “Table 1.1: Total Judicial Officers, Courts of Appeals, District Courts, and Bankruptcy 
Courts,” (Washington 2005). 
46
 All figures on authorized judges and senior judges are from the Federal Judicial Center, 
http//:www.fjc.gov, (accessed January 21, 2009), or from the AO 2007 Report. 
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The problem with responding to increased workload in the federal courts by 
increasing resources, personnel, and creating alternative decision-makers is that it 
costs the government money. And as a strategy, while it may relieve court congestion, 
it does little to alleviate the costs, both policy-based and economic, imposed on 
agencies and Congress, by litigation that targets the federal government as a 
defendant.  
Procedural Limitations. Procedural and structural impediments to litigation 
against the federal government (or advantages to government actors) offer an 
attractive alternative to greater resource allocation. First, they are largely revenue 
neutral ways to provide strategic or practical advantages to government defendants. 
Second, they can specifically target litigation against the federal government, and even 
specific policy areas. The operative strategy is to institute changes to the system that 
leverage off a potential litigant’s incentive structure. This is well studied at the 
individual level in the law and economics literature, but can be applied with equal 
force as an institutional strategy. 
An individual’s decision to file a lawsuit against the government is a function 
of the plaintiffs’ litigation costs, perceived probability of a trial, chances of winning, 
anticipated judgment value (be it economic or policy change), and the government’s 
defense costs (Gould 1973; Landes 1971; Posner 1973; Priest and Klein 1984). A 
plaintiff becomes increasingly less likely to file suit against the government as her 
costs go up, as the chances of a trial increase, and as her chances of winning, the value 
of the judgment, and the government’s defense costs go down (Eisenberg and Farber 
2003).  
The law and economics literature examines this dynamic with respect to 
individual litigation decisions in numerous contexts. Litigation rates and case filings 
are affected by changes in plaintiff’s costs associated with counsel expense and 
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contingency fee arrangements (Dana and Spier 1993; Danzon 1983; Hay 1996; Miller 
1987; Rubinfeld and Scotchmer 1993), fee shifting (Hughes and Snyder 1995; Kritzer 
1984; Shavell 1982; Snyder and Hughes 1990),47 and the provision of counsel to 
indigent criminal defendants (Schwab and Eisenberg 1988). Information asymmetries 
affect a plaintiff’s calculus and can both decrease the chances of litigation by 
increasing the outcome uncertainty or can result in more litigation where the true 
range of settlement options is distorted (Bebchuk 1984; Hylton 1993; Reinganum and 
Wilde 1986; Schweizer 1989; Spier 1992). And control over the forum can decrease a 
party’s litigation costs, and  increase both a party’s chances of winning and judgment 
size, conferring a significant tactical advantage (Algero 1999; Bassett 2006; Clermont 
2008; Clermont and Eisenberg 1995, 1998; Eisenberg and LoPucki 1999; Juenger 
1989; Maloy 2005). 
Congress exploits this same dynamic with respect to litigation against the 
government in a variety of ways. Government actors are often favored in litigation 
through a series of piecemeal actions by Congress, including retention of basic 
immunities and privileges, relaxed procedural rules, jury trial limitations, 
administrative exhaustion requirements, statutes of limitations, and exemptions from 
legal liability.48 Some of the procedural advantages for the government are rules 
derived from the common law, which Congress, by virtue of inaction, or only limited 
action, keeps in place. Government actors are entitled to a variety of privileges that 
prevent private litigants from obtaining information normally available at trial. From a 
                                                 
47
 Schwab and Eisenberg (1988) find, however, that fee shifting statutes do not appear to increase civil 
right filings. 
48
 Much like increased legislative activity, these restrictions offer a complex and often contradictory 
picture in which Congress expands federal government liability generally, while removing or curtailing 
it in specific areas. The Administrative Procedure Act (U.S. Code 5 §701) expressly authorizes private 
action against government agencies. Numerous broad based waivers of sovereign immunity, including 
the Federal Tort Claims Act, open the government to suit in tort and contract (Jackson 2003; Sisk 
2006). Actions under writs of mandamus, issued by the courts and directing action by government 
actors, also afford private citizens litigation rights. 
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plaintiff’s perspective, this both increases discovery costs and decreases the chances of 
a positive outcome. These include executive communications of the president, 
insulation of senior government officials and agency heads from discovery requests 
covering their policy deliberations, and nondisclosure of national security or state 
secrets (factors confounding those challenging military tribunals at Guantanamo) 
(Amar and Katyal 1995; Kennedy 2005; Sisk 2005).   
By the same token, government actors generally are immune from suit when 
acting in their official capacity, unless Congress expressly waives that immunity.49 
One underlying rational for this principle stems from a desire to limit public 
interference with policy through the use of litigation (Chemerinsky 2001; Jackson 
2003; Krent 1992; Randall 2002). Despite this protective default position, political 
expediency compelled Congress specifically to allow suits in a broad range of issue 
areas including tort, employment, and contract claims against the government 
(Jackson 2003; Sisk 2006).50 With respect to agency policy-making and action, the 
Administrative Procedure Act anticipates judicial review absent congressional 
abrogation, and many agency enabling statues and later amendments contain “sue or 
be sued” provisions that explicitly provide private citizens with access to federal 
courts to challenge agency policy (Pfander 1997).  
However, these governmental immunity waivers often include restrictions on 
how litigation may proceed, which, at least in specific policy areas, increase plaintiff 
costs as compared to litigation not involving the federal government. As a general 
matter, no jury trial is allowed when a statute provides for civil litigation against the 
government (Sisk 2006), a condition which some scholarship suggests may advantage 
                                                 
49
 For claimed constitutional violations this immunity extends if the government actor was performing a 
discretionary governmental function and was acting at the time within a clearly established rule of 
conduct (Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982)). 
50
 Federal Torts Claim Act, U.S. Code 28 (2004), § 1346(b); Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 
1972, U.S. Code 42 (2004), §2000; Tucker Act. U.S. Code 28 (2004), §1491. 
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the government due to judicial predilections in its favor (Songer, Sheehan, and Haire 
1999).51  Many administrative challenges cannot be brought to federal court until all 
administrative review options are exhausted first, a requirement which vastly increases 
a plaintiff’s overall litigation costs if they lose at the administrative level. This applies 
to Social Security disability claims, which constitute a significant source of litigation 
against the federal government (Sisk 2006). Statutes of limitation for bringing the 
government in to court are often short, as is the case with the Federal Tort Claims Act, 
which requires filing within two years.  
Finally, some statutes create government exemptions from areas in which the 
government might otherwise be susceptible to suit. The Americans with Disabilities 
Act of 1990 and Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 both exempt the 
federal government from the definition of “employer.” This has a variety of 
ramifications, not least of which are limits on suits against the government under civil 
rights statutes (Sencer 2004). 
The Litigation Economics Model 
Litigation pressures created by lawsuits against the federal government cause 
Congress to respond in ways designed to mitigate litigation’s impact. Altering the 
structure and process of litigation in a way that changes the incentive structure 
underlying a plaintiff’s decision to file suit is one, economically efficient, 
congressional response. When Congress passes legislation that completely strips 
federal court jurisdiction over a specific policy area, a plaintiff’s expected value of 
filing suit approaches zero.52  In this regard, jurisdiction stripping is a strategic 
behavior in which Congress manipulates the rules of litigation in a way intended to 
                                                 
51
 Other scholars find the effect unclear (Eisenberg and Farber 1997). 
52
 Depending on the language of the statute, or perhaps despite the language, a plaintiff may still file a 
constitutionally based challenge over government action. This is explored in more detail in Chapter 5. 
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discourage certain suits against the federal government.53 This dynamic can best be 
understood by first looking at the models that explore a plaintiff’s incentives to engage 
in litigation and a defendant’s incentives to settle, and then applying the insights to 
factors specific to legal action against the United States.  
Case Selection. The basic case selection model presented here is drawn from 
Eisenberg and Farber (2003) which expands on the litigation models developed by 
Landes (1971), Gould (1973), Posner (1973), and Priest and Klein (1984), modified 
slightly to place the United States as defendant. This model posits that a plaintiff will 
not file a lawsuit unless the plaintiff’s expected value of that suit, E(Vp), exceeds zero. 
For the purpose of the model described here, it is assumed that the plaintiff and 
defendant are able to ascertain these values and are not operating under conditions of 
asymmetric information.54 Litigation’s expected value to the plaintiff is a function of 
the probability of winning, costs, and the value of the suit’s outcome, as expressed in 
the following formula: 
E(Vp) = Vp(pi, J, Cp , Cd)        (1) 
Where pi is the probability that the plaintiff will win at trial, J is the value of the 
judgment for the plaintiff (whether it is monetary damages, delay of agency policy, or 
some other modification to the government action being contested), Cp is the 
plaintiff’s litigation costs, and Cd is the United States defendant’s costs of litigation. 
 The expected value of a lawsuit to the plaintiff is also a function of the 
probability that a case will go to trial (P) or settle (1-P) and the anticipated trial 
outcome (Yt) or settlement outcome (Ys). In other words, 
E(Vp) = PYt + (1-P)Ys         (2) 
                                                 
53
 Again, whether it is effective in doing so is a separate question, and is reserved for later study. 
54
 For models incorporating other conditions see Bebchuk (1984), Daughety and Reinganum (1994), 
Hylton (1993), Priest and Klein (1984), Reinganum and Wilde (1986), Shavell (1996), and Spier 
(1994). 
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 Plaintiff’s Anticipated Trial Outcome. In order to complete equation (2), one 
must determine P, Yt, and Ys.  Both the plaintiff and the defendant will have their own 
unique assessments of the probability that the plaintiff will win at trial. These are 
denoted as pip and pid.55  Calculation of Yt is fairly straight forward for the plaintiff.  It 
is the plaintiff’s assessed likelihood of a trial win multiplied by the expected judgment 
(J) and reduced by plaintiff’s litigation costs. 
Yt = pipJ - Cp          (3) 
 Plaintiff’s Anticipated Settlement Outcome.  The plaintiff’s expected value of 
settlement (Ys) is a function of  what is often called the “contract set,” or settlement 
zone, which identifies the minimum value a plaintiff must be offered and the 
maximum value a defendant is willing to provide in order to make settlement more 
attractive than trial for both parties. These values, in turn, are a function of the 
potential trial judgment (J), each party’s assessment of the probability the plaintiff will 
win at trial, and each party’s costs of litigation (Cp for plaintiff and Cd defendant). For 
the plaintiff this means that the minimum settlement offer must be equal to or greater 
than what she believes she can get at trial, pi
 pJ - Cp.56 For the U.S. defendant the 
maximum amount the defendant is willing to forgo in order to settle must be less than 
or equal to the defendant’s expected loss at trial, pidJ + Cd. The settlement zone is 
depicted in Figure 2.2 below. 
 
 
                                                 
55
 Eisenberg and Farber (2003) note that the probabilities of trial or settlement are actually a function of 
the agreed upon probabilities plus an idiosyncratic assessment of the probabilities that is individual to 
the defendant and plaintiff. This can be due to asymmetric information, or other varying risk assessment 
factors. Since the idiosyncratic aspect of perceived probability arguably is unknowable, unless 
otherwise noted, this analysis treats perceived probability as a unitary concept, with the understanding 
that the differences in a defendant’s or plaintiff’s perception of probability is likely attributable to a 
variety of factors including possible asymmetric information, experiential differences, and idiosyncratic 
components. 
56
 This analysis assumes that the cost of settlement is zero. See Hylton (1993). 
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Plaintiff Minimum               Defendant Maximum 
/_______________________Settlement Zone_________________________/ 
     pi
 pJ - Cp              pi dJ +Cd 
Figure 2.2.  Settlement Zone 
 
In order for settlement to take place, the settlement zone must be weakly 
positive. Conversely, if the settlement zone is empty (less than or equal to zero) the 
plaintiff will choose to go to trial.  
Ys must be within the settlement zone, therefore 
0 < pi
 pJ - Cp ≤ Ys ≤ pi dJ + Cd        (4) 
Solving for Ys is a bargaining game using threat points of litigation and a Nash 
solution that maximizes settlement value for both parties. The solution (Eisenberg and 
Farber 2003) is  
Ys  =  pi pJ + ( Cd - Cp )/ 2        (5) 
This means that the maximum value of an efficient settlement rises as plaintiff’s 
assessment of her trial chances and potential judgment rise, as defendant’s costs of 
litigation rise and as plaintiff’s costs of litigation fall. 
 Plaintiff’s Anticipated Probability of Trial. Given the location of Ys in 
equation (4), we can derive the components (and their directionality) that comprise 
plaintiff’s assessment of the probability of trial (the last term needed to determine the 
expected value to plaintiff of filing suit). Since Ys must be a positive number for 
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settlement to occur, the plaintiff will find trial more attractive than settlement under 
the following conditions.57 
J (pi
 d  -  pi p) + (Cd + Cp) < 0          (6) 
This formula can be used to identify the components (and their directionality) that 
comprise plaintiff’s assessment of the probability of trial (P). Assuming the plaintiff 
knows her own assessment of winning at trial, rearranging  equation (6) provides the 
plaintiff’s with a formula for estimating the defendant’s assessment of plaintiff’s 
chances for trial success (a necessary piece of information for plaintiff to decide 
whether or not to litigate). From plaintiff’s perspective, a trial will occur when the 
following condition is satisfied. 
pi
 d  < pi p - (Cd + Cp)/J         (7) 
The probability (P) of a trial therefore becomes a function of pi
 p - (Cd + Cp)/J, with P 
increasing as plaintiff’s individual assessment of winning (pi
 p) increases, the potential 
judgment (J) increases, and the costs of litigation to both plaintiff and defendant 
decrease. 
 Plaintiff’s Expected Value of Filing Suit.  Returning to plaintiff’s litigation 
decision, modeled in equation (2), the formulas for plaintiff’s expected value of trial 
(equation 3) and expected value of settlement (equation 5), we find the following 
E(Vp) = PYt +(1-P)Ys         (8) 
=P(pi
 pJ - Cp) + (1-P) (pi pJ +( Cd - Cp)/ 2) 
= pi
 pJ  +  (Cd - Cp)/ 2  - P ( Cd + Cp)/ 2     (9) 
Holding P constant, plaintiff’s expected value of trial, and  the probability that a 
plaintiff will instituted litigation, decreases as plaintiffs assessment of potential 
success decreases, as the potential judgment decreases, as defendant costs decrease, 
                                                 
57If  pi
 dJ + Cd   -  (pi pJ - Cp) < 0  then no settlement and trial. Rearranging the equation, pi dJ -  pi pJ + Cd  + 
Cp < 0; (pi d -  pi p) J < - (Cd  + Cp); pi d -  pi p< - (Cd  + Cp)/J 
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and as plaintiff costs rise.58 Table 2.3 shows the factors that influence a potential 
plaintiff’s decision to file suit. 
Table 2.3.  Factors in Plaintiffs Decision Not to File Suit 
 
Factor Symbol 
Increase in 
Factor   
= ↓ E(Vp) 
Decrease in 
Factor 
 = ↓ E(Vp) 
Plaintiff’s assessed chances of 
winning at trial pi p  x 
Anticipated Judgment Value J  x 
Plaintiff’s Litigation Costs Cp x  
Defendant’s Litigation Costs Cd  x 
Probability of Trial P x  
Notes. E(Vp) is plaintiff’s expected value of litigation such that pi
 pJ  +  (Cd - Cp)/ 2  - P ( Cd + Cp)/ 2 
 
Case Selection and Complete Jurisdiction Stripping  
Congressional actors know that reducing the chances of success in a lawsuit 
against the government reduces a plaintiff’s incentives to sue. As the prior section 
demonstrates, a plaintiff’s decision to file suit is affected by the parties’ litigation 
                                                 
58
 If P is not held constant, equation (7) shows that there are indirect effects of case characteristics on 
the probability of trial (P) and hence on plaintiff’s expected value of filing suit. In particular, as J 
increases and Cp decreases the effect is to increase P. However, equation (9) shows that when P 
fluctuates, if all other terms are held constant, an increase in P will reduce E(Vp). When the other terms 
are taken in to consideration, this only poses an issue with respect to Cp and J. Their direct effect on the 
equation (9) results in a countervailing increase in the expected value of litigation to the plaintiff. 
Eisenberg and Farber (2003) make the assumption that the indirect effects of Cp and J are not large 
enough to undermine their direct effects or alter the basic dynamic of the equation. The same 
assumption is made here. 
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costs, the plaintiff’s assessment of both the chances of a trial and her chances for 
success, and the value of the potential judgment. A plaintiff’s incentives to litigate 
decrease as a plaintiff’s belief in a winning trial outcome decreases, or the judgment 
value decreases.  Jurisdiction stripping operates in a straightforward manner: if 
legislation removes court jurisdiction, it removes the statutory basis for suit in federal 
court, leaving, as the only plausible jurisdictional basis, the constitutional claim that 
the removal itself violates some constitutional right, most likely due process.59 As will 
be discussed in more detail in Chapter Five, the constitutional argument has not been 
successfully raised with respect to the jurisdiction stripping statutes in the dissertation 
databases.60  
If a non-constitutional case is filed, the most likely disposition can be assumed 
to be a 12(b) dismissal motion for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, or failure to state 
a claim, an action that is increasingly successful in federal courts for ending non-
meritorious suits (Burbank 2004; Cecil, Eyre, and Rindskopf 2007).61 12(b) motions 
take place after the plaintiff’s pleading, but before discovery or the government 
defendant’s answer. As a result, they are an exceedingly low cost way to dispose of 
litigation from a defendant’s perspective, particularly when the defendant is an 
experienced and repeated litigator, as is the government. These motions are also less 
costly to the court, in terms of time and resources expended, since the standard 
practice is that pre-trial motions are handled by a magistrate judge.62 
                                                 
59
 Suits in federal court must be both constitutionally and statutorily authorized. They must also fit 
within the limited jurisdictional province of federal courts. When the federal government is the 
defendant this jurisdiction must be based either on the Constitution, or a federal statute or treaty. 
60
 Some of these cases survived to the appellate stage, but the court holdings deny the validity of the 
constitutional claim. See, Biodiviersity Associates (1999); Bowen v. Michigan Academy of Family 
Physicians (1986). 
61
 Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 12(b)(1), Rule 12(b)(6). 
62
 While jurisdiction stripping reduces the likelihood of suit in specific policy areas, paradoxically other 
government actions in response to increased caseload, like adding additional magistrate judges and 
staff, may increase case filings by streamlining and speeding up the litigation process. 
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These various factors operate on the plaintiff’s expected value of suit by 
reducing the probability of success at trial (pi
 p) to near zero, the potential judgment to 
near zero, the probability of the trial itself (P) to near zero, and at the same time 
keeping the defendant’s costs (Cd ) nominal in terms of both resource outlay and 
delay.63 Applying the foregoing assumptions to the expected value of suit in equation 
9 gives the following result: 
E(Vp)  = pi pJ  +  (Cd - Cp)/ 2  - P ( Cd + Cp)/ 2     (9) 
 = ~Ø + (↓Cd - Cp)/ 2  - ~Ø (↓Cd + Cp)/ 2 
 = (↓Cd - Cp)/ 2          (10) 
This means that a rational plaintiff will be incented to file suit under these conditions 
only if the defendant’s litigation costs exceeded the plaintiff’s litigation costs, a 
condition where some form of settlement might have a positive value for both the 
defendant and the plaintiff. This is an unlikely scenario, given the size and scope of 
the government’s resources, its status as an experienced litigator, and the likely rapid 
disposition of the case through a pre-trial motion.  The plaintiff would need to be a 
resource rich and experienced litigator, a possibility with certain interest group 
plaintiffs. However, the value of the suit is still comparatively small, most likely 
taking the form of some kind of settlement, but bounded as it is by the costs of the 
defendant, as set forth in equation 10.  In sum, by stripping court jurisdiction, 
                                                 
63
 This presumes that courts will adhere to the jurisdictional removals, a dynamic explored further in the 
case study presented in Chapter 5. As a general matter, courts do honor jurisdiction stripping 
legislation. Courts can find jurisdiction over a policy area despite the explicit legislative language, but 
this occurs in two ways. First, the plaintiff may claim that the jurisdictional removal is a constitutional 
due process violation. This argument has not been successfully raised with respect to the jurisdiction 
stripping statutes in the database. Second, the plaintiff must find another statutory provision on which to 
base jurisdiction. If Congress strategically removes jurisdiction to dampen litigation, it is most likely to 
do so with respect to government actions that serve as the most common basis for suit, forcing plaintiffs 
to find other, presumably less advantageous, avenues to anchor litigation. The case study presented in 
Chapter 5 strongly suggests that Congress is targeting jurisdiction stripping at the statutory provisions 
most commonly used to support certain types of litigation against the government. 
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Congress alters the litigation incentives and makes filing a lawsuit against the 
government an inefficient endeavor.64 
Case Selection and D.C. Circuit Exclusive Jurisdiction  
When Congress assigns jurisdiction solely to the D.C. federal courts, it 
engages in a hard-wired form of forum shopping. The economic model predicts that 
Congress does this to provide the government with a distinct litigation advantage. 
Concentrating jurisdiction in the District of Columbia federal courts reduces a 
plaintiff’s expected value of suit, and accordingly her incentive to sue the government, 
by increasing plaintiff’s litigation costs, and decreasing both a plaintiff’s assessed 
chances of a favorable judgment and the government’s defense costs.   
Forum shopping is a tactical strategy in which plaintiffs chose to file suit in a 
court and a location that favors the plaintiff’s case, whether due to a sympathetic 
judge, advantageous legal rules, plaintiff litigation cost savings, or defendant litigation 
cost increases. With respect to cases that can be heard in federal court, the strategic 
concerns include an assessment of defendant’s rights of removal and venue, concepts 
that determine whether a case can be moved from a state to a federal forum, and 
whether a particular court is the appropriate forum within the federal system. Picking 
the location and court for litigation is an important tactical advantage that can 
positively impact case outcomes (Algero 1999, Bassett 2006; Clermont 2008, 
Clermont and Eisenberg 1998). Unlike a private actor, Congress can force litigation 
into a specific forum by passing legislation that strips jurisdiction from all courts but 
one. When Congress removes a plaintiff’s ability to forum shop, it removes one of the 
                                                 
64
 It is possible that a plaintiff could file suit against the United States in state court. Depending on the 
nature of the suit, this runs up against several problems. First, by statute, monetary and tort claims 
against the United States must be filed in federal court (Federal Tort Claims Act, Tucker Act). Second, 
claims against any agency or federal officer may be removed by the defendant to take the case out of 
state court and put it into the federal system (Judiciary and Judicial Procedure, U.S. Code 28 (2004), 
§1442). Finally, jurisdiction stripping statutes purport to strip jurisdiction from all courts, presumably 
both state and federal.  
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ways that plaintiffs attempt to increase the odds of a favorable result. In doing so, 
Congress discourages litigation against government actors in the affected policy areas. 
Forcing litigation into the D.C. federal courts decreases a plaintiff’s expected 
value of suit in a variety of ways.65  First, if forum shopping provides plaintiffs with a 
tactical litigation advantage, as the literature and practice so strongly assert, then 
taking away the ability to select a forum should reduce pi
 p, a plaintiff’s assessment of 
her chances for success at trial.66  Second, being forced to try cases in Washington, 
D.C. increases a plaintiff’s litigation costs (Cp). Unless a plaintiff is physically located 
in the District of Columbia, pursuing a case in the D.C. courts imposes all the costs of 
conducting litigation from afar, including the costs of local D.C. counsel, and the 
coordination issues and expense of bringing witnesses and evidence to a distant court. 
This is particularly true if the government action being challenged is specific to a 
certain locale, for example cases filed against the Department of Agriculture for crop 
quarantines, or if the case involves individual-based claims, such as those created by 
social benefit programs. In such instances, either the evidence is strongly local, or the 
plaintiff is an individual for whom the impact of long distance litigation may be 
significant. 
Government defense costs (Cd) also are likely to go down when the litigation is 
consolidated in one location, particularly when that location is Washington, D.C. As 
an initial matter, if all challenges to a certain government action must take place in one 
court, this allows both agencies and the Department of Justice to take advantages of 
efficiencies of scale. As opposed to multiple government actors handling litigation in 
                                                 
65
 This is considered from a macro level. It is likely true that certain plaintiffs might be advantaged by 
litigating in the D.C. courts, particularly if they maintain a presence in Washington, D.C. The argument 
presented here addresses only the broad based impact. 
66
 Unless, of course, plaintiffs always select to litigate against the government in the D.C. courts. This is 
clearly not so. Any cursory perusal of the federal court filings and reported cases provides ample 
evidence that suits against the government are brought in multiple courts across the federal system. 
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courts throughout the country, or a single group of actors commuting to various courts 
to litigate on the government’s behalf, forum assignment to the D.C. federal circuit 
allows for one court, and potentially one primary, local set of actors, to handle 
lawsuits. Although various agencies have satellite offices throughout the country, and 
U.S. Attorneys’ offices are also regionally located, the main offices and policy 
decision-makers for federal actors are in Washington D.C. This means that when 
litigation occurs in the D.C. courts, costs and inefficiencies associated with conducting 
and coordinating litigation from a distance likely are reduced.67   
The selection of a single circuit to hear specified policy challenges also creates 
expertise and specialization by the forum court. This advantages the government in 
several ways.  First, it reduces uncertainty about both court posture and outcome. The 
parties will be confronted with a smaller pool of judges (and potential judicial 
preferences) and the legal precedent at issue will be concentrated in a single circuit. 
This affects both parties to the litigation, but matters more to the defendant, who is 
sued because of taking some challenged action. Less uncertainty means that, because 
the likely outcome of litigation is better known, regardless of what that outcome is, a 
government defendant can better organize its actions to avoid litigation. Second, there 
is a greater “repeat player” advantage to the government, who is always the defendant, 
than there is to the numerous potential plaintiffs. This effect is exponential since 
multiple exclusive jurisdictional statutes direct litigation into the D.C. circuit. This 
dovetails, to some extent, with the disadvantage created by not allowing the plaintiff to 
pick her home forum. 
Congress, as a strategic actor, can use any of these factors, individually or in 
concert, to reduce the likelihood of a suit against the government.  
                                                 
67
 Although not completely removed, as regional offices where a case arose may also be part of the 
process. 
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If plaintiff’s assessed chances of winning (pi
 p) declines, then the expected value of suit 
in equation 9 also declines.  
E(Vp)  = ↓(pi pJ) +  (Cd - Cp)/ 2  - P ( Cd + Cp)/ 2     (11) 
As equation 9 demonstrates, the costs of litigation play a significant role in 
determining a plaintiff’s expected value of suit. Removing plaintiff’s choice of forum 
places an even greater emphasis on these costs. And even if plaintiff’s assessment of a 
winning litigation outcome (pi
 p) is held constant, fixing the forum in the D.C. federal 
courts still affects litigation costs in a way that discourages suit. This is because as 
plaintiff’s litigation costs (Cp) increase, the incentive to file suit diminishes. An 
increase in Cp decreases (Cd - Cp)/ 2 and increases P (Cd + Cp)/ 2. In the context of the 
full formula this operates to lower the suits expected value as follows: 
E(Vp)  = (pi pJ) +  ↓ [(Cd - Cp)/ 2]  - ↑[P ( Cd + Cp)/ 2 ]    (12) 
 By the same token, if defendant’s litigation costs decrease, the expected value 
of plaintiff’s suit also decreases, even if none of the other factors have an effect. When 
Cd is lowered (Cd - Cp)/ 2 lowers. P (Cd + Cp)/ 2 also decreases but by a lesser degree 
(P Cd/2), since P is a value between 0 and 1 that represents the chances a case will go 
to trial. In the context of the full formula this operates to lower the suit’s expected 
value as follows: 
E(Vp)  = (pi pJ) +  ↓ [(Cd - Cp)/ 2]  - ↓[P ( Cd + Cp)/ 2 ]     
 = (pi
 pJ) +  ↓ [(Cd - Cp)/ 2  - P ( Cd + Cp)/ 2]     (13) 
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 Fixing the forum in the D.C. federal courts allows Congress to use its powers 
over court jurisdiction to decrease the incentives for a plaintiff to file suit against the 
federal government, while at the same time potentially reducing the government 
defense costs should litigation occur. On a theoretical level, this is a rational, 
institutional response to litigation costs. What remains unanswered is whether these 
jurisdictional manipulations occur as predicted, and whether this type of legislation 
does in fact target causes of action in which the federal government is named as a 
defendant. These questions are explored in Chapters Three and Four. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
 
JURISDICTION STRIPPING STATUTES  
 The economic model clearly points to jurisdiction stripping as a potential 
strategic congressional response to case filings against the federal government, but do 
these statutes exist and if so, what do they look like? Most scholars assume that 
Congress rarely eliminates judicial review (Gunther 1984; Peretti 1999; Resnik 1998). 
Because of the assumed rarity of these actions, despite a lively theoretical debate over 
the scope of congressional authority over the courts, little systematic, empirical 
attention is paid to jurisdiction stripping legislation. This chapter addresses that gap in 
the scholarship by examining whether jurisdiction stripping occurs and, if so, under 
what conditions. It considers all instances between 1943 and 2004 in which Congress 
expressly removes all court review. Two explanations are considered for why 
Congress might eradicate judicial review. The litigation economics model predicts that 
removing court jurisdiction is a response to litigation measured by burgeoning court 
filings against the federal government. Institutional scholars view jurisdiction 
stripping as a congressional mechanism to control court influence over policy when 
court and congressional ideology differs. A similar analysis of legislation granting 
exclusive jurisdiction to the D.C. federal courts is considered in Chapter Four. 
The results show that Congress regularly, and with increasing frequency, strips 
jurisdiction from federal courts. When Congress takes such action, it appears to do so 
in response to operational concerns, particularly those associated with federal court 
case filings where the government is a defendant, and not in response to ideological 
differences between institutions. These findings strongly support the litigation based 
economic model of institutional response. Jurisdiction stripping appears to be less 
about Congress trying to control courts and more about mutual congressional, court, 
 63 
 
and agency concerns with the delay and interference ongoing litigation brings to 
governmental business and strained court dockets. 
Descriptive Analysis 
 In order to examine jurisdiction stripping behavior, public laws with 
provisions that expressly remove all jurisdiction from the courts were identified from 
all public laws passed during the sixty-two year time span running from the first 
session of the 78th Congress (1943) through the second session of the 108th Congress 
(2004).68 Much of the theoretical literature is limited by defining jurisdiction stripping 
solely as a congressional response to conflict with the Supreme Court over the 
constitutionality of congressional action. This study defines jurisdiction stripping to 
include any statutory language stating that courts shall have no power of review, 
without predetermining why Congress chose to act and regardless of subject matter, or 
whether a statute is new or amended legislation. Relevant legislation was identified 
from Westlaw and Congressional Universe using keyword searches for all public laws 
including any of the following terms: “court,” “judicial,” “review,” “jurisdiction,” or 
“conclusive.”  
Contrary to conventional wisdom, Congress explicitly and regularly removes 
court jurisdiction. As expected, jurisdiction stripping legislation is designed 
exclusively to insulate government actors from litigation. Since 1943, Congress passed 
248 public laws containing 378 provisions expressly denying the federal courts any 
power of review. The bulk of the legislation identified prevents court review of 
                                                 
68
 Public laws were selected as the unit of analysis because they represent a final expression of 
legislative intent, whereas bills passed but not reaching the status of law arguably reflect various stages 
of strategic, interim position taking and signaling that may or may not be sincere. Less extreme 
restrictions such as cause of action limitations, relief, statutes of limitation, and procedural requirements 
for filing a claim are not included.  These represent a continuum that culminates with jurisdiction 
stripping, and while litigation or ideology also may affect their frequency, the effect should manifest 
most starkly when the strongest form of jurisdictional manipulation (jurisdiction stripping) is examined. 
It is also possible that lesser court constraints exhibit dynamics independent of jurisdiction stripping 
which argues for studying them separately. 
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administrative decision making.69 And while this study is concerned with the federal 
system, the statues are not directed at the federal judiciary alone. Rather, the 
legislation purports to strip the power of review from all courts, whether state or 
federal. Typical legislative language simply states that “no court shall have power or 
jurisdiction to review” the specified action (Atomic Energy Act and Atomic Weapons 
Rewards Act Amendments 1974). For example, the 2002 Supplemental Appropriations 
Act contains a provision that authorizes the Secretary of Agriculture to treat certain 
forests in Colorado for insect infestation and to begin forest thinning programs in the 
area. The Secretary’s actions under this legislative section are not subject to judicial 
review. The Railroad Revitalization and Regulatory Reform Act of 1976 authorizes the 
Secretary of Transportation to supply loan guarantees for railroad improvement 
projects. The asset valuation of these guarantees cannot be challenged in any court. 
Similarly, no court has jurisdiction to review the Attorney General’s decisions with 
respect to paying awards for information regarding international terrorism under the 
1984 Act to Combat International Terrorism. Table 3.1 sets forth additional examples 
of typical jurisdiction stripping provisions. 
 Three categories make up roughly 60% of all jurisdictional removals (Table 
3.2). Of these, legislation dealing with social benefits, such as Medicare/Medicaid 
reimbursement levels, social security payments, housing and food programs, or 
individual loss compensation make up the largest proportion, totaling 22% of all 
jurisdiction stripping provisions. 
  
                                                 
69
 It should be noted that none of these provisions address the courts’ right of constitutional review. 
Presumably courts may still address agency actions should they determine that the issue before them is 
constitutional in nature. This argument has occasionally been forwarded by litigants, but it appears that 
courts largely avoid abrogating these provisions on constitutional grounds (see, e.g. Biodiversity 
Associates v. Cables,357 F.3d 1152 (10th Cir.), cert. den, 125 S.Ct.54 (2004)). 
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Table 3.1. Sample Jurisdiction Stripping Provisions 
 
  
Congress Date Public Law Actions Not Reviewable by the Courts 
79 1946 548 Price Decontrol Board decisions to remove 
commodity price caps. 
81 1950 569 Determination by Secretaries of the military 
branches, Coast Guard, Geodesic Survey, or Public 
Health Service that certain personnel are entitled to 
payments due to mental incompetence. 
85 1958 857 Decisions of the Veterans Administration  
regarding benefit claims or payments. 
87 1962 415 Individual job training eligibility under Labor  
Department Training Allowance funding. 
89 1965 110 Attorney General certifications under Voting  
Rights Act triggering appointment of examiners. 
91 1970 518 Secretary of Transportation designation of a  
basic service system modernizing intercity railroad 
transport. 
93 1974 377 Attorney General rewards for information on  
introduction of illegal nuclear material into the U.S. 
95 1977 142 HEW determinations leading to suspension of  
payments to Professional Standards Review 
Organizations overseeing Medicare-Medicaid 
reimbursements. 
97 1982 384 Agriculture Department’s environmental  
roadless area review and evaluation statement. 
99 1985 88 Agriculture Department’s resale of timber from  
the Siuslaw National Forest. 
101 1989 73 FDIC decision to keep certain financial  
information on savings associations from public 
disclosure. 
103 1993 66 FCC adjustment of regulatory fees under  
amendments to the Communications Act of 1934. 
105 1997 33 Certain payment adjustments made to  
rehabilitation facilities for inpatient rehabilitation 
services. 
107 2001 11 Site choice and special use permit for World War  
II Memorial next to the Rainbow Pool in 
Washington, D.C. 
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Matters dealing with environmental regulation comprise the next largest category with 
20% of all jurisdiction stripping provisions, the bulk of which occur after the early 
1970s passage of comprehensive environmental laws such as the National 
Environmental Policy Act, the Clean Air Amendments of 1970, the Clean Water Act of 
1972, and the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970. General law enforcement 
measures account for roughly 15%, and include matters such as informational awards, 
protection of undercover agents, implementation of airport explosive detection 
systems, and determinations by the Attorney General of certain civil penalties.  
 
Table 3.2. Jurisdiction Stripping Law Categories 78th to 108th Congress 
 
Category Number of Provisions Percent of Total 
Social Benefits 
(including housing, food, loss 
compensation, social security, medical) 
84 22.22% 
Environmental Issues 76 20.12% 
Law Enforcement 58 15.34% 
Federal Administrative Matters 
(including federal land and employees) 45 11.90% 
Industry Regulation 39 10.32% 
Foreign Policy, Defense, and Veteran’s 
Affairs 28 7.41% 
Immigrations and Non-nationals 20 5.29% 
Industry Benefits 14 3.70% 
State Benefits 
(including transportation, schools, and 
urban renewal) 
14 3.70% 
(N) 378  
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 While jurisdiction stripping activity is low in the early years of this study, the 
incidence increases over time. Until the mid-1970s, an average congressional session 
produced 1.5 laws, or 0.4% of its legislation, with provisions removing court 
jurisdiction. From 1975 to 2004 that average rose to 2.3% of all legislation passed in 
each session. The most recent ten year average (104th through 108th Congress) is 3% 
of all public laws per session, the equivalent of roughly seven laws each session which 
contain provisions stripping the courts’ jurisdiction. As well, certain years exhibit 
peaks of jurisdiction stripping activity. In the 98th Congress, Second Session (1984), 
6.62% of enacted public laws contain provisions removing court jurisdiction, as 
compared to approximately 2% during the entire 97th Congress. Likewise, 6.53% of 
the 104th Congress’s second session (1996) legislation stripped jurisdiction, well over 
twice the 2.27% activity during the first session (Figure 3.1). 
  
 
Figure 3.1. Jurisdiction Stripping Legislation and Trend Line, 1943-2004 
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 The impact of omnibus legislation can also be seen. Figure 3.1 displays the 
number of jurisdiction stripping provisions passed within public laws in any given 
year. The pattern follows the overall pattern of jurisdiction stripping public laws 
passed, but with much higher increases in peak years. From 1984 to 1990, an average 
of 11 laws with 16 separate provisions were passed stripping jurisdiction. In the last 
eight years of the study, from 1996 to 2004, the annual average measure of legislation 
removing federal court review was 7 laws and 15 separate provisions per year. 
 The pattern of jurisdiction stripping activity by Congress appears to correspond 
to the levels of litigation against the federal government. Figure 3.2 sets out a scatter-
plot with each year’s incidence of jurisdiction stripping legislation on the Y-axis and 
the corresponding annual district court civil case filings in which the United States 
is a defendant (“U.S. Civil Defendant”) on the X-axis.70 There appears a clear trend, 
albeit a variable one, in which higher levels of jurisdiction stripping activity 
correspond to higher U.S. Civil Defendant levels (Figure 3.2). The data point, labeled 
“27,” represents the height of jurisdiction stripping activity, which took place in 1984, 
with 27 public laws enacted containing jurisdiction stripping provisions. A significant 
portion of these laws address environmental matters, and form the basis for the case 
study presented in Chapter Five. This legislative behavior corresponds to a peak in 
civil case filings against the U.S. government, 47,053, the highest level reported in the 
sixty-two years covered by this study.71 
                                                 
70
 A scatter-plot analysis was also done with both variables transformed into logarithm base 10 to create 
a standardized unit of measurement. That graph also shows a similar relationship between the two 
variables, although with a considerably steeper slope. The congressional-years, early on in the study, 
where there was no jurisdiction stripping were coded as 0.001 for transformation purposes, and in the 
logarithmic version of the scatter-plot these data points were significantly separate from the rest of the 
data. These points were removed and the trendlines both with and without the removed data points were 
compared. There was no significant difference between these trendlines, and, accordingly, only the non-
transformed analysis is reported. 
71
 For the multiple regression analysis reported later in this chapter, the dependent variable, jurisdiction 
stripping legislation, was transformed, using the data’s square root, to attain a normal distribution. A 
scatter-plot using the transformed variable does not significantly alter the patterns displayed in Figure 
3.2, and accordingly is not reported. 
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Source. Jurisdiction Stripping Dataset, 1943-2004.  Notes. Pearson’s correlation coefficient 0.63. 
 
Figure 3.2.  Scatter-plot of Jurisdiction Stripping Public Laws and District Court 
Case Filings with U.S. Civil Defendant, 1943-2004 
 
 U.S. Civil Defendant measures the primary area where economic pressure is 
visited on a broad range of government institutions, and, as argued earlier, it is the 
area where Congress can most effectively exert control by jurisdictional manipulation. 
It includes litigation initiated by private parties against agency actions of all kinds, 
excludes litigation engaged in solely between private parties (actions which do not 
directly implicate challenges to government policy),72 and captures actions under 
social security, labor, and environmental laws, subject areas that closely align with the 
most common categories of jurisdiction stripping legislation. District court filings 
                                                 
72
 Civil cases in which the United States was a defendant are reported in Administrative Office of the 
United States Courts, Annual Report of the Director, Judicial Facts and Figures (Washington 2005), 
Table 7 (1942), Table 6 (1943-44), Table C-2 (1945-2004). 
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were chosen rather than case decisions or appeals because filings represent the point at 
which economic costs, including policy disruption, first attach regardless of final case 
disposition and without the winnowing process that occurs both as a case progresses 
and in connection with decisions regarding whether to file an appeal. Absent a specific 
legislative directive, district courts have initial appellate jurisdiction over challenges to 
administrative action.  
U.S. Civil Defendant may be over inclusive, since it also includes tort and 
contract claims against the United States. However, given the wide range of 
jurisdiction stripping statutes and the multiple ways in which the federal government 
policy can be challenged (giving rise to jurisdiction stripping), the choice was made 
include all action against the federal government as opposed to predetermining which 
case types create the relevant litigation pressure. For example, 22% of the jurisdiction 
stripping laws involve social benefits including Medicare/Medicaid. This could 
implicate tort litigation associated with standards of care and authorized health 
providers that fall under the Federal Tort Claims Act. This choice is also an artifact of 
the variable set of case reporting categories used by the Administrative Office and the 
federal courts over the 62 years covered by this study, and the complicated nature of 
administrative law, where challenges to agency policy can take multiple forms 
(including tort and contract based actions) and can appear in agency tribunals, district 
courts, or appellate courts depending on the authorizing statute and legal nature of the 
challenge.  
 71 
 
 
Notes. Pearson’s correlation coefficient 0.63. 
 
Figure 3.3.  Jurisdiction Stripping Legislation and District Court Case Filings 
With U.S. Civil Defendant, 1943 to 2004 
 
 Jurisdiction stripping legislation and U.S. Civil Defendant also appear related 
in terms of steady growth over time as well as patterns of peak activity. Figure 3.3 
compares the incidence of jurisdiction stripping legislation in each congressional 
session-year with corresponding U.S. Civil Defendant levels. Both variables are 
increasing, albeit unevenly, over time. In addition, they appear to share variability 
patterns. The high level of jurisdiction stripping in 1984, reported as data point “27” in 
Figure 3.2, is part of a larger pattern of increases and decreases in activity that 
correspond to similar patterns in U.S. Civil Defendant case filings. The number of 
jurisdiction stripping laws rose from 1 in the prior session (1983) to 27 in 1984 and 
back down to 5 in 1985. This aligns with a peak in civil case filings against the 
government during the same time period from 35,881 (1983) to 47,053 (1984) and 
back down to 38,117 (1985).  A similar spike occurred a few years later, in 1988, 
0
5000
10000
15000
20000
25000
30000
35000
40000
45000
50000
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
19
43
19
46
19
49
19
52
19
55
19
58
19
61
19
64
19
67
19
70
19
73
19
76
19
79
19
82
19
85
19
88
19
91
19
94
19
97
20
00
20
03
U
.
S.
 
C
iv
il 
D
ef
en
da
n
t C
a
se
 
Fi
lin
gs
Ju
ri
sd
ic
tio
n
 
St
ri
pp
in
g 
La
w
s
Jurisdiction Stripping Laws U.S. Civil Defendant 
 72 
 
when jurisdiction stripping activity went from 6 to 16 and back to 6 public laws 
between the fist sessions of the 100th and 101st Congresses (1987-1989), and the civil 
case filings against the government correspondingly fluctuated from 29,369 (1987) to 
31, 348 (1988) and back down to 26,741 (1989).  
Empirical Analyses  
The descriptive evidence supports the thesis that jurisdiction stripping behavior 
by Congress is a strategic response to litigation against the government. The texts of 
these laws speak exclusively about removing court review over decisions made by 
agencies or other government actors in their policy-implementing roles. The frequency 
of jurisdiction stripping legislation is increasing over time, and appears to have a 
strong correlation to the patterns exhibited by increased litigation in which the federal 
government is a defendant. The following section explores this dynamic 
further, using multiple regression analysis to test these apparent correlations and the 
hypotheses underlying them, as well as testing the alternative explanation, based on 
ideological positioning, offered by strategic institutionalism. 
 Strategic Institutionalism Model. If varying institutional ideology matters, as 
strategic institutionalism suggests, jurisdiction stripping should relate to the 
preferences of Congress, the courts, and agencies in the following ways. As court and 
congressional preferences move apart, court review no longer acts to keep agency 
policy in line with congressional goals. Under this scenario court review operates 
against congressional interests. Therefore, if agency ideology is closer to Congress 
than court ideology, Congress prefers agency policy to court policy, and court 
jurisdiction will be removed. Conversely, as agency preferences move away from 
Congress, court review becomes an important check on agency behavior, provided the 
court’s preferences are closer to Congress than the agency’s. Accordingly, jurisdiction 
stripping should not occur. These observations give rise to the following hypothesis: 
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Ideology Hypothesis: Jurisdiction stripping occurs when agency ideology is 
closer to Congress than court ideology. 
 For each congressional session, if ideology matters, jurisdiction stripping will 
occur when the court’s ideological position is farther from Congress’s position than 
the agency’s. Once this condition is satisfied, the likelihood of jurisdiction stripping 
(x) should increase as the median court ideology (J) moves farther away from median 
congressional preferences (C) and agency ideology (A) moves closer to Congress. 
This can be expressed with the following equation:  
Px = C – J – C – A        (14) 
A positive number indicates that the court is farther away from Congress than the 
agency and jurisdiction stripping should occur. As the positive numbers increase, they 
evidence increasing distance between the court and Congress compared to decreasing 
distance between the agency and Congress. This should mean an increased likelihood 
of jurisdiction stripping. By the same token, a negative number means the court is 
closer to the Congress than the agency and, as a result, jurisdiction stripping should 
not occur. The larger the negative number, the less one would expect to find 
jurisdiction stripping.  
Litigation Economics Model. On the other hand, if the primary motivation for 
jurisdiction stripping is concern about litigation cost, delay, and interference generated 
by parties outside of the federal government’s control, one would expect to see a rise 
in jurisdictional removals correlate with a rise in federal case filings. Specifically, one 
would expect a strong correlation with civil filings where the United States is a 
defendant, cases that capture challenges to agency actions by private litigants. The 
alternate hypothesis states: 
Litigation Economics Hypothesis: Jurisdiction stripping increases as civil case 
filings in which the United States is a defendant increase.  
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Research Design. To analyze these two hypotheses, this research tests for 
correlations between the incidence of jurisdiction stripping and either federal case 
filing levels or the ideological distance among Congress, agencies, and the federal 
courts as represented by the Supreme Court and federal Circuit Courts of Appeals.73 
As these are time-series data, Prais-Winsten AR(1) regression analyses are used with 
the jurisdiction stripping measurement as the dependent variable and each 
congressional session’s litigation and ideological measurements as the independent 
variables. Prais-Winsten regression is a standard procedure used in time series 
regression modeling to address possible correlation of residuals with time resulting in 
autoregressive errors. It is a generalized least-squares linear estimator which adjusts 
for first-order autocorrelation by transforming the first observation so it is not lost 
(Yaffe and McGee 2000; StataCorp 2007). 
 Jurisdiction Stripping Variable. As described earlier, the number of public 
laws with provisions that fully remove jurisdiction from the courts were identified 
from all public laws passed during the sixty-two year time span running from the first 
session of the 78th Congress (1943) through the second session of the 108th Congress 
(2004).74 Each session of Congress is the relevant point of analysis. The dependent 
variable, Jurisdiction Stripping, is the percentage of public laws in each congressional 
session containing jurisdiction stripping provisions. A percentage measurement was 
chosen to account for variations in the total number of public laws enacted across 
different congressional sessions.  
 Litigation Variable. As set forth in the prior section, the variable, U.S. Civil 
Defendant, measures the annual number of civil cases filed in federal district courts by 
                                                 
73
 The Eleventh Circuit, established in 1981, and U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, formed 
in 1982, are not included due to insufficient data. 
74
 As stated previously, relevant legislation was identified from Westlaw and Congressional Universe 
using keyword searches for all public laws including any of the following terms: “court,” “judicial,” 
“review,” “jurisdiction,” or “conclusive.” 
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private parties naming the United States as a defendant.75 District court filings were 
chosen rather than case decisions or appeals because filings represent the point at 
which litigation disruption and court influence over policy first attach regardless of 
final case disposition and without the winnowing process that occurs both as a case 
progresses and in connection with decisions regarding whether to file an appeal.76 
Court filings are lagged one year to allow for congressional response time.77 
 Ideological Measurements. The ideological variables measure distance among 
the Congress, courts, and agencies in each congressional session using each 
institutions’ median member as the relevant actor. For all actors, preferences were 
measured using derivations of Poole and Rosenthal’s common space scores (Poole 
1998, 2005; Poole and Rosenthal 1997).78 Using one measurement system for all 
institutions, including the courts, overcomes significant validity problems which arise 
when varying measurement strategies and metrics are used to identify different 
institutional preferences. 
 Congressional measures were derived for the floor median Nominate Common 
Space score in each congressional session.79 Presidential Nominate Common Space 
scores were used as a proxy for overall agency ideology (Moe 1987; Tiller and Spiller 
                                                 
75
 Administrative Office of the United States Courts, Annual Report of the Director, Judicial Facts and 
Figures (Washington 2005), Table 7 (1942), Table 6 (1943-44), and Table C-2 (1945-2004). 
76
 Given the rather arbitrary allocation of appellate jurisdiction, caseload pressures also were measured 
by using court of appeals filings and using district court civil filings with a U.S. defendant plus 
administrative appeals in appellate courts which represent challenges to agency adjudication filed 
directly in the courts of appeals. No material difference in the results was found.  
77
 Litigation variables for the 1st, 10th, and D.C. Circuit analyses are squared to address normality issues 
with the residuals. The results are materially the same as analyses in which these variables are not 
transformed. 
78
 The first dimension was selected since it is the primary dimension along which ideological divides 
are structured in Congress (Poole and Rosenthal 1997). 
79
 Because the literature disagrees whether the relevant measure for Congress should be the floor 
median or the majority party median, both were obtained and analyzed (Aldrich and Rohde 2001; Cox 
and McCubbins 1993).  In addition, the filibuster pivot identified with each congressional session’s 
Senate majority party was also obtained and analyzed. As there was no significant difference in any of 
these results, only the results from the floor median analyses are reported. 
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1999; Wood and Anderson 1993). The score for Truman was taken from his Nominate 
Common Space score as a U.S. Senator (Binder and Maltzman 2002). 
 Appellate court Nominate Common Space scores were assigned according to 
the method developed by Giles et al. (2001, 2002), which uses norms of senatorial 
courtesy to assign appellate judges a score derived from the scores of their home state 
senators. Judicial Nominate Common Space scores for Supreme Court Justices are 
derived from the method developed by Martin and Quinn (2002, 2005) and Epstein et 
al. (2007) in which preference points for each Justice premised on changing voting 
patterns are transformed in to Nominate Common Space scores.80 
 As an alternative to Nominate Common Space score measurements, the 
majority political party for each court sitting during the relevant congressional session 
was identified by assigning each judge a political party based upon the appointing 
president’s party. This method is a remarkably reliable measure of preference across a 
wide range of studies (Pinello 1999; Sisk and Heise 2005). Majority party control of 
both the House and Senate as well as the president’s party were identified for each 
congressional session. 
 Ideology Variables. Equation (14) is calculated for both the House and Senate 
in each congressional session, resulting in the following variables: House Distance 
and Senate Distance. 
 If ideology matters, Congress will remove jurisdiction when the court’s 
majority party is different from the majority party of both the Congress and the 
                                                 
80
 Databases and documentation for court median Judicial Common Space scores are available at 
http://epstein.law.northwestern.edu/research/JCS.html (2005). Nominate Common Space scores begin 
with the 75th Congress, and some circuit judge appointments were prior to that time, leaving these 
judges without scores. No panel median member was derived without a full set of Nominate Common 
Space scores, resulting in a variation from Circuit to Circuit in the number of congressional sessions 
analyzed. This is indicated in each table by the variation in N. Judicial Nominate Common Space scores 
for the full panel of Supreme Court Justices can be derived from the second session of the 81st Congress 
through the second session of the 108th Congress.  
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agencies in a particular congressional session. Court Diff Party is coded “1” if the 
court’s majority party is different from the party controlling the unified agency and 
House or unified agency and Senate, respectively.81  
 Two models were run for each congressional session. The House Model uses 
only the House floor median and majority party to calculate congressional preferences. 
The Senate Model uses only the Senate floor median and majority party to calculate 
preferences.  Although the House and Senate should react similarly to court 
divergence, each is analyzed separately to allow for differences that may be masked 
by a unified approach and to avoid variable multicollinearity. 
  Regression Results for the D.C. Circuit and the Supreme Court 
Jurisdictional removals are analyzed first with respect to case filings and ideological 
differences among Congress, agencies and either the Supreme Court or the D.C. 
Circuit. Separation of powers modeling often focuses on the Supreme Court because it 
is assumed to be the court most likely to provoke congressional and executive action 
(Epstein, Segal, and Victor 2002; Eskridge 1991a, 1991b). The D. C. Circuit, because 
of its physical location in Washington, D.C., the geographic nature of most district 
court jurisdiction, and express statutory provisions has a docket which contains a 
disproportionate number of cases involving the federal government and governmental 
agencies (Cross and Tiller 1998; Revesz 2001).  
 Table 3.3 shows the regression results with respect to these two courts using 
U.S. Civil Defendant. Jurisdiction Stripping positively correlates with U.S. Civil 
Defendant across all models at the p < 0.05 level, consistent with the graphic  
                                                 
81
 Additional analyses coded these variables as “1” if the majority court party differed from a unified 
House, Senate, and agency. The results were consistent with those using separate House and Senate 
measurements. 
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Table 3.3.  Jurisdiction Stripping: Ideological Distance and U.S. Civil Defendant 
Court Filings, Supreme Court and DC Circuit, 1943 to 2004 
 
   Supreme Court   D.C. Circuit 
 House Senate House Senate 
     
House Distance -0.34 --- -0.41 --- 
 (0.36) --- (0.35) --- 
     
Senate Distance --- -0.26 --- -0.11 
 --- (0.51) --- (0.33) 
     
Court Diff Party -0.14 -0.14 -0.23 -0.20 
 (0.13) (0.15) (0.24) (0.16) 
     
US Civil Defendant 3.74e-05* 3.77e-05* 8.02e-10* 8.77e-10* 
 (0.42e-05) (0.57e-05) (0.95e-10) (0.97e-10) 
     
Constant 0.20* 0.22 0.56* 0.56* 
 (0.09) (0.11) (0.07) (0.07) 
     
Adj R2 0.75 0.74 0.65 0.61 
N 55 55 59 59 
Notes. *p < 0.05. Jurisdiction Stripping is the square root of the percent of legislation per congressional 
session. Separate analyses using the House floor median and the Senate floor median. Prais-Winsten 
regression. D.C Circuit litigation variable squared. Stata 10.0. 
Source. Jurisdiction Stripping Dataset, 78th to 108th Congress. 
 
description shown in Figure 3.3. As the number of case filings with the United States 
as named defendant rise, Jurisdiction Stripping rises. These are the cases in which 
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private parties sue the government and include challenges to agency policy. None of 
the ideological variables are significant for either court in either the Senate or House 
models.                                                                                                                                                                                                 
 Regression Results for the Courts of Appeals. Table 3.4 presents regression 
results for Congress, agencies, and the First through Tenth Circuit Courts of Appeals. 
Across all courts and all models U.S. Civil Defendant is significant at the p < 0.05 
level. None of the ideological variables with respect to Congress, the agencies, and the 
remaining federal courts of appeals achieve significance. The results confirm the 
Supreme Court and D.C. Circuit findings: as case filings in which the United States is 
named a defendant increase jurisdiction stripping increases.82  
Discussion. The results from both these analyses uniformly support the 
Litigation Economics Hypothesis, and the litigation based model of congressional 
behavior. There is no support for the Ideology Hypothesis generated by strategic 
institutionalism assumptions of ideological and preference based positioning between 
the branches. Jurisdiction Stripping appears related to litigation pressures, but not 
ideological differences among government institutions. The findings show a robust 
link between Jurisdiction Stripping and civil cases filed against the federal 
government. These are precisely the cases one would expect to exert the greatest 
unwanted cost and pressure on the government as a whole, as they represent litigation 
brought by private parties contesting government action, suggesting Congress does not 
remove jurisdiction to curtail government actors, but rather to curtail private parties’ 
capacity to bring the government in to court.83    
                                                 
82
 Secondary analyses regarding the affect of public support for the federal courts on jurisdiction 
stripping also were conducted from 1973-1993 using the method described in Durr, Martin, and 
Wolbrecht (2000). Public support variables neither achieved significance nor materially changed the 
findings in any model. 
83
 Secondary analyses, not reported here, included variables measuring federal criminal case filings and 
civil cases in which the United States was a plaintiff. Neither variable rose to significance, nor did their 
inclusion materially affect the reported results. 
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Table 3.4.   Jurisdiction Stripping: Ideological Distance and Court Filings, First 
Through Tenth Circuits, 1943 to 2004 
Circuit House Distance 
Senate 
Distance 
CtDiff 
Party 
U.S. Civil 
Defendant Cons 
Adj 
R2 N 
 -0.47 --- -0.04 6.54e-10* 0.61* 0.62 44 
First (0.34) --- (0.28) (1.08e-10) (0.10)   
 
--- -0.32 -0.06 7.17e-10* 0.63* 0.59 44 
 
--- (0.42) (0.17) (1.15e-10) (0.12)   
 
-0.23 --- 0.01 3.95e-05* 0.18 0.73 50 
Second (0.23) --- (0.10) (0.34e-05) (0.12)   
 
--- -0.44 -0.02 3.81e-05* 0.15 0.74 50 
 
--- (0.31) (0.10) (0.35e-05) (0.13)   
 
-0.21 --- -0.19 3.48e-05* 0.34* 0.75 60 
Third (0.16) --- (0.12) (0.45e-05) (0.08)   
 
--- -0.23 -0.18 3.44e-05* 0.34* 0.75 60 
 
--- (0.19) (0.12) (0.49e-05) (0.08)   
 
-0.15 --- 0.02 3.82e-05* 0.24 0.70 47 
Fourth (0.30) --- (0.13) (0.42e-05) (0.12)   
 
--- 0.02 0.02 3.92e-05* 0.26* 0.69 47 
 
--- (0.30) (0.11) (0.48e-05) (0.11)   
 
0.02 --- -0.33 3.63e-05* 0.37* 0.63 40 
Fifth (0.30) --- (0.29) (0.46e-05) (0.15)   
 
--- -0.07 -0.08 3.59e-05* 0.35* 0.61 40 
 
--- (0.25) (0.14) (0.47e-05) (0.13)   
 
-0.40 --- -0.25 3.92e-05* 0.17 0.79 53 
Sixth (0.22) --- (0.16) (0.30e-05) (0.09)   
 
--- -0.19 -0.25 3.98e-05* 0.22* 0.76 53 
 
--- (0.27) (0.14) (0.34e-05) (0.10)   
 
-0.38 --- -0.04 3.25e-05* 0.31* 0.75 55 
Seventh (0.22) --- (0.10) (0.51e-05) (0.09)   
 
--- -0.19 -0.03 3.63e-05* 0.28* 0.73 55 
 --- (0.26) (0.12) (0.55e-05) (0.09)   
 -0.18 --- -0.15 3.38e-05* 0.36* 0.68 44 
Eighth (0.36) --- (0.14) (0.44e-05) (0.14)   
 --- 0.01 -0.10 3.65e-05* 0.38* 0.67 44 
 --- (0.35) (0.14) (0.45e-05) (0.13)   
 -0.19 --- 0.04 3.84e-05* 0.21 0.70 47 
Ninth (0.27) --- (0.12) (0.39e-05) (0.13)   
 --- -0.22 -0.05 3.69e-05* 0.28* 0.70 47 
 --- (0.36) (0.11) (0.50e-05) (0.11)   
 -0.62 --- 0.28 6.29e-10* 0.56* 0.62 44 
Tenth (0.39) --- (0.23) (1.09e-10) (0.12)   
 --- -0.07 -0.04 7.27e-10* 0.69* 0.57 44 
 --- (0.48) (0.15) (1.16e-10) (0.13)   
Notes. *p < 0.05. Jurisdiction Stripping is legislation percent square root. House and Senate floor 
median separate. Prais-Winsten regression. First and Tenth Circuit litigation variables squared. Stata 
8.2. Source. Jurisdiction Stripping Dataset, 78th to 108th Congress.  
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Citizen suits against the government, while somewhat over inclusive, cover 
litigation over social security entitlements, labor matters, and environmental laws, all 
areas corresponding to the most common legislative categories of jurisdiction 
stripping. Many of these jurisdictional removals are ministerial in nature, for example, 
preventing review of various social aid benefit formulas, or Forest Service insect 
infestation treatment plans, or asset valuations for railroad improvement loan 
guarantees.  To the extent Congress has any interest in seeing agencies able to carry 
out basic tasks without being sued, these are the types of agency action that warrant 
protection.  
 Removal of jurisdiction in relation to specific subject areas suggests avenues 
for future study which focus on jurisdiction stripping as it relates to discrete agencies 
and their specific policy making regimes. Jurisdictional removals may play a greater 
role with respect to some agencies as opposed to others, both in terms of the nature of 
agency policy making as well as the incidence of litigation in that policy area. 
Environmental regulation is one example. It comprises 20% of all the jurisdiction 
stripping legislative provisions identified, and is also a source of considerable federal 
litigation. In such issue areas, whether ideological considerations are a factor with 
respect to Congress and the litigants, as opposed to Congress and the judiciary, is 
worth consideration. The specific ideology of these agencies, their oversight 
committees, their particular longitudinal litigation history, and the ideology of the 
most active litigant interest groups may shed light on the motivation behind 
congressional removals of court jurisdiction. These issues are explored further in the 
environmental litigation case study presented in Chapter Five. 
  Several factors may account for the ideological variables’ failure to explain 
jurisdiction stripping. Structural control models often assume perfect information 
between the actors. This is problematic, as administrative review can, and often does, 
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involve a myriad of mundane details ranging from cost of living calculations for social 
benefits, to award provisions for law enforcement information. It strains credulity to 
assert that Congress confidently predicts court response to such a wide range of issues. 
In addition, global measurement of agency preferences using the president as a proxy 
may miss some of the subtle variation between different agency ideologies. Although 
using the sitting executive to represent agency preferences is the current best practice 
(Epstein and O’Halloran 1994; Eskridge and Ferejohn 1992; Spence 1997), the 
significance of ideological differences among Congress, courts, and any one agency 
may be lost by such a uniform approach. 
 As argued in Chapter One, however, the most likely explanation is that even if 
court preferences are easily ascertained, litigation pressures do not depend on court 
disposition of a case, and in any event Congress cannot know, ex ante, which  federal 
court is the relevant actor. Although many separation of powers models use the 
Supreme Court (Eskridge 1991a; Martin 2001; Sheehan 1992), the  Court’s annual 
docket, ranging from 75 to 150 cases in the past 50 years (Cordray and Cordray 2001), 
makes it a sporadic participant in policy implementation at best. From this perspective, 
it is not surprising that ideological differences between Congress and the Supreme 
Court are not significantly related to jurisdictional removal. The courts of appeals 
might be considered the relevant actors, as their appellate jurisdiction is largely 
mandatory.84 However, each of the thirteen courts of appeals operates independently 
of the others. Absent statutes which assign jurisdiction to specific courts, Congress 
cannot tell which circuit court will be mostly likely to hear a particular challenge. This 
uncertainty argues against congressional response to any one appellate court. Congress 
could remove jurisdiction from all appellate courts if any one of them is ideologically 
                                                 
84
 Judiciary and Judicial Procedure, U.S. Code 28 (2007): §1291. 
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divergent, although this option is not supported by the ideological variables’ lack of 
significance.  
On the other hand, Congress could selectively grant jurisdiction to 
ideologically proximate courts. Some statutes do assign jurisdiction over specific 
issues to specific courts, most often to the D.C. Circuit. Various scholars have found 
links between agency behavior and D.C. Circuit ideology (Revesz 1997; Sheehan 
1992). Although this study finds removals do not correlate to D.C. Circuit ideology, a 
correlation with jurisdictional grants might exist. This is considered in the following 
chapter, where jurisdiction stripping is examined from the perspective of exclusive 
grants of jurisdiction to the federal courts in the District of Columbia. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
 
JURISDICTION GRANTS TO THE D.C. FEDERAL COURTS 
 One way that Congress can manipulate jurisdiction, that is less extreme than 
complete jurisdiction stripping, is to direct litigation to specific courts. Grants of 
exclusive jurisdiction operate on two levels. They concentrate litigation over the 
policy provisions in question into one forum, and they effectively strip the other 
federal courts of jurisdiction over these provisions. No empirical study has looked 
systematically at if and when these exclusive jurisdictional grants occur and under 
what circumstances. Because the jurisdiction stripping database discussed in Chapter 
Three is populated almost entirely by administrative matters, and because the federal 
courts of the District of Columbia hear a disproportional number of cases involving 
federal agencies as opposed to the other circuits, it makes considerable sense to first 
explore exclusive jurisdictional grants to the federal D.C. Courts.  
The benefit to Congress from this arrangement is that the assignment of 
jurisdiction solely to the D.C. courts acts as forum selection by the federal 
government. This is designed to provide relief to institutional actors (including 
Congress, agencies, the courts, and the Department of Justice) affected by the costs 
and delays created when the government is sued by reducing the potential value of 
such suits. Plaintiffs lose the advantage of forum shopping along with the increased 
likelihood of success implicated by strategic forum selection. Plaintiff litigation costs 
likely rise, due to the necessity of litigating in a court that may not be proximate to 
either the cause of action or the plaintiff’s location. And government defendant’s 
litigation costs are reduced, since all actions must be brought in Washington, D.C., the 
central location for most government actors. The economic model for these effects is 
presented in detail in Chapter Two. 
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In keeping with the two potential explanations for why Congress might 
manipulate court jurisdiction, this chapter considers whether, as litigation effects and 
economic modeling suggest, exclusive grants are designed to address operational 
concerns, in particular costs from policy disruption and resource diversion connected 
with litigation against the government, without regard to ideological considerations. In 
the alternative, the predictions generated by strategic institutionalism are also 
considered: whether this congressional behavior is a response to varying ideology 
among the courts, Congress, and agencies. 
Descriptive Analysis 
 Public laws that allocate exclusive jurisdiction to the D.C. federal courts were 
identified from all public laws enacted between 1943 and 2004. As in the full 
jurisdiction stripping analyses, public laws were selected as the unit of interest because 
they represent a final expression of legislative intent, whereas bills passed but not 
reaching the status of law arguably reflect various stages of strategic, interim position 
taking and signaling that may or may not be sincere. Relevant legislation was 
identified from Westlaw and Congressional Universe using keyword searches for all 
public laws that included the term “Columbia.” From these, only legislation that 
specified the D.C. federal courts as the sole judicial forum was included in the 
database.85 For the purposes of the empirical analysis, this variable is labeled “D.C. 
Jurisdiction Grants.” 
 Congress regularly assigns exclusive jurisdiction over certain policy areas to 
the federal courts situated in Washington, D.C. From 1943 to 2004, 91 public laws 
contained such jurisdictional grants. These covered a wide variety of policy matters 
including environmental regulation, royalty and license fee challenges, federal  
                                                 
85
 Numerous public laws add the D.C. federal courts as an additional or alternate forum for litigation, 
but these do not constitute action that locks in a single forum and, as such, are not within the dynamics 
modeled. 
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Table 4.1.  District of Columbia Federal Court Jurisdiction Grants, 1943-2004 
  
Congress Date Public Law Court Reviewable Actions 
81 1950 831 Appeals Determination that individual or organization is part of a Communist organization.  
82 1952 554 Appeals Denial by the FCC of construction permit, 
station license, transfer request.  
93 1975 629 District Act to quarantine, seize, or destroy plants deemed a noxious weed and related property.  
94 1976 283 District Federal Election Commission failure to act 
or dismissal of filed complaints. 
94 1976 553 District License revocation for phonorecord player 
establishment.  
94 1976 586 Appeals 
Challenges to validity or constitutionality of 
arrangements for construction of Alaska 
natural gas pipeline.  
96 1980 425 Appeals 
Challenges to Secretary of Transportation 
denial or approval of 5 year exemptions to 
fuel efficiency standards.  
96 1980 187 District 
Challenges to FEC decision not to pursue a 
complaint alleging violation of federal 
campaign election laws.  
99 1986 499 District 
Citizen suits against EPA, and other federal 
actors alleging failure to perform 
nondiscretionary duties under Superfund.  
100 1988 418 Appeals 
Appeals from civil penalties, sanctions, or 
denial orders imposed with respect to oil 
exports.  
100 1988 667 Appeals 
Appeals from royalty fee determinations 
under the Satellite Home Viewer Act with 
respect to satellite carrier transmissions.  
102 1992 563 Appeals 
Copyright issues in connection with the sale, 
import, distribution of digital audio recording 
units.  
104 1996 127 District 
Attorney general equitable action against the 
National Natural Resources Conservation 
Foundation.  
106 1999 102 Appeals Challenge by Board to final SEC regulation 
regarding new hybrid financial instruments.  
107 2002 171 Appeals Denial of petition to label irradiated pending final rules.  
108 2004 419 Appeals Challenge to Copyright Royalty Judges determinations.  
Source. D.C. Jurisdiction Grant Dataset, 78th to 108th Congress. 
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administrative matters, and agricultural regulation. The federal allocation of rights to 
market and import sugar could only be challenged in U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
District of Columbia Circuit under the Sugar Act. This court is also the only forum 
that can hear challenges to rulemaking of general and national applicability under the 
Federal Energy Administration Act. Any person wishing for judicial review of 
national rules for the designation for surface coal mining land suitability under the 
Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977 must file that suit in the U.S. 
District Court of the District of Columbia. The D.C. district court also has sole 
jurisdiction over certain actions against the Assistance Board in regard to programs for 
credit to farmers and ranchers under the Farm Credit Act.  And, in an example that 
received considerable recent attention, the U.S. Patriot Act of 2001 limited final 
appellate review of terrorist detentions in connection with habeas petitions to the D.C. 
Circuit. The allocation between district court and appellate court jurisdiction is fairly 
even. Of the 91 exclusive jurisdictional laws identified, 55% (50) placed jurisdiction 
in the district court and 45% (41) placed jurisdiction in the appellate court. Table 4.1 
sets out additional examples of typical exclusive jurisdictional grants. 
 These legislative provisions fall in to six general categories: environmental 
issues, federal administrative matters, industry regulation, foreign policy and defense, 
state benefits, and individualized government action that impacts a specific person or 
entity (Table 4.2).  
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 Table 4.2.  D.C. Jurisdiction Grant Law Categories, 1943-2004 
Category Number of Provisions Percent of Total 
Environmental Issues 12 13% 
Federal Administrative Matters 
(including federal land and employees) 23 25% 
Industry Regulation 6 7% 
Foreign Policy, Defense, and Veteran’s 
Affairs 2 2% 
State Benefits 
(including transportation, schools, and 
urban renewal) 
2 2% 
Individualized Government Action 
(affecting individuals or specific entities) 46 51% 
Individual 28 (61%)  
Corporate Entity 18 (39%)  
(N) 91 100% 
Source. D.C. Jurisdiction Grant Dataset, 78th to 108th Congress. 
With 46 laws, the category, Individualized Government Action, represents the 
largest number of public laws in the database, making up 51% of all exclusive 
jurisdictional grants to the D.C. federal courts. This makes considerable sense from the 
litigation economics perspective. Individualized Government Action identifies those 
laws that allow challenges to government decisions, primarily regulatory decisions, 
affecting specific individuals or corporate entities. The individuals affected by these 
provisions are, as a general matter, not primarily situated in Washington, D.C. The 
jurisdictional assignments cover subjects such as claims for property taken, destroyed, 
or diminished by the federal government,86 and denial, revocation, or alteration of 
licenses and permits to engage in government regulated activities.87 Challenges by a 
                                                 
86
 Kermit Roosevelt Fund, Public Law 79-671, U.S. Statutes at Large 59 (1945): 316; International 
Claims Settlement Act of 1949 Amendments, Public Law 84-285, U.S. Statutes at Large 69 (1945): 562; 
Federal Plant Pest Act, Public Law 85-36, U.S. Statutes at Large 71 (1957): 1442. 
87
 Ocean Thermal Energy Conversion Act of 1980, Public Law 96- 320, U.S. Statutes at Large 94 
(1980): 974; Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, Public Law 100-418, U.S. Statutes at 
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farmer or importer to the Secretary of Agriculture’s decision to quarantine, seize, or 
destroy plants deemed by the government to be noxious weeds can only be brought in 
the U.S. District Court of the District of Columbia.88 This court is also the designated 
judicial forum for suits based on the Secretary of the Interior’s leasing decisions 
regarding government land and Outer Continental Shelf locations subject to oil, gas, 
and sulfur drilling.89 If an automobile manufacturer wishes to challenge fuel economy 
exemption decisions, the suit must be brought in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
D.C. Circuit.90 Whether the plaintiff is an individually run farm, or a large 
manufacturing or oil production corporation, these laws remove the advantage of a 
local forum and require the plaintiff to bring suit in Washington, D.C. when 
challenging the designated regulatory actions. As discussed in Chapter Two, this 
decreases a plaintiff’s expected value of suit by increasing plaintiff litigation costs, 
decreasing defendant litigation costs, and decreasing the likelihood a plaintiff will 
prevail at trial. This combination of factors makes litigation against the government 
less attractive. 
The laws in the second largest category, Federal Administrative Matters, make 
up roughly 25% of the database. These laws address actions that impact the internal 
operations of the federal government, and include, for example, oversight of national 
foundations,91  information and communication requirements between agencies,92 
                                                                                                                                            
Large 102 (1988): 1107; Goals 2000: Educate America Act, Public Law 103-272, U.S. Statutes at 
Large 108 (1994): 125. 
88
 Federal Noxious Weed Act of 1974, Public Law 93-629, U.S. Statutes at Large 88 (1975): 11273. 
89
 Submerged Lands of the Outer Continental Shelf, Public Law 83-212, U.S. Statutes at Large 67 
(1953): 462. 
90
 Educate America Act, Public Law 103-272, U.S. Statutes at Large 108 (1994): 125. 
91National Fish and Wildlife Foundation Establishment Act, Public Law 98-244, U.S. Statutes at Large 
98 (1984): 107; Federal Agriculture and Improvement and Reform Act of 1996, Public Law 104-127, 
U.S. Statutes at Large 110 (996): 888. 
92
 Government in the Sunshine Act, Public Law 94-409, U.S. Statutes at Large 90 (1976):1241; Money 
and Finance Codification, Public Law 97-258, U.S. Statutes at Large 96 (1982): 877. 
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congressional investigatory committee activities,93 and federal employment matters.94 
These cases involve internal disputes among multiple government actors, whose 
decision-makers are located in the nation’s capital, making the D.C. federal courts the 
most cost efficient judicial forum from the government’s perspective.  
Another sizeable category, Environmental Issues, with 12 laws, representing 
13% of the database, also contains numerous provisions that involve suits based on 
localized conditions. Among these are citizen and interest group prompted review of 
regulations promulgated under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, 
Compensation, and Liability Act, and challenges to national rules with respect to the 
Clean Air Act, certain coal mining activity,95 or primary drinking water regulations.96 
Jurisdictional assignment to the D.C. courts is increasing over time. Omnibus 
legislation and multiple provisions within a single bill exhibit only a slight effect on 
the overall pattern of this increase. Figure 4.1 displays these trends. From 1943 until 
1970, forum assignments to Washington, D.C. were relatively sporadic, averaging one 
public law every two congressional sessions. In the 1970s the frequency increased. In 
the final 25 years of the study, from 1970 through 2004, Congress passed, on average, 
two laws containing exclusive grants to the D.C. federal courts every year. As with 
full jurisdiction stripping, jurisdictional assignments exhibit certain peak periods. In 
the seven years between 1974 and 1980, Congress passed 30 exclusive D.C. 
jurisdiction laws, an average of four per session. Again, from 1992 to 1996, the 
average passage rate rose to three laws per session.  
                                                 
93
 Ethics in Government Act, Public Law 95-521, U.S. Statutes at Large 92 (1978): 1824; Act to Confer 
Jurisdiction, Public Law 93-190, U.S. Statutes at Large 87 (1973): 736. 
94
 Civil Service Reform Act, Public Law 95-454, U.S. Statutes at Large 92 (1978): 1111; Department of 
Veterans Affairs Health Care Personnel Act of 1991, Public Law 102-40, U.S. Statutes at Large 
105(1991): 187. 
95Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977, Public Law 95-87, U.S. Statutes at Large 91 
(1977): 445. 
96
 Safe Drinking Water Act Amendments of 1986, Public Law  99-339, U.S. Statutes at Large 100 
(1986): 642. 
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Figure 4.1.  District of Columbia Federal Court Jurisdiction Grants and 
Trendline, 1943-2004 
 
 The pattern of exclusive jurisdiction grant activity over time bears some 
similarities to full jurisdiction stripping. While the peak activity is not identical, both 
types of legislation exhibit sharp increases in the late 1970s and late 1990s. In 
particular, exclusive jurisdiction grants peaked in 1980, with seven grants that year. 
Jurisdiction stripping also exhibited a peak in 1980, rising to a new high of 13 
jurisdiction stripping public laws passed. A similar pattern occurred in 1996, when 
Congress passed seven laws assigning jurisdiction to the D.C. courts and also passed 
sixteen public laws containing full jurisdiction stripping provisions. Figure 4.2 shows 
the general pattern and similar trend of these two forms of jurisdictional removal. 
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Sources. Jurisdiction Stripping Dataset, 1943-2004; D.C. Jurisdiction Grant Dataset, 1943-2004.  
Notes. Pearson’s correlation coefficient 0.54. 
 
Figure 4.2.  District of Columbia Federal Court Jurisdiction Grants and 
Jurisdiction Stripping Trends, 1943-2004 
 
Congress’s pattern of assigning jurisdiction to the D.C. courts appears to 
correspond to the levels of litigation against the federal government. Figure 4.3 sets 
out a scatter-plot with each year’s incidence of jurisdiction assigning legislation on the 
Y-axis and the corresponding annual district court civil case filings in which the 
United States is a defendant (“U.S. Civil Defendant”) on the X-axis.97 Although there 
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 A scatter-plot analysis was also created with both variables transformed into logarithm base 10 to 
create a standardized unit of measurement. That graph also shows a similar relationship between the 
two variables, although with a considerably steeper slope. The congressional-years in which there were 
no jurisdictional assignments were coded as 0.001 for transformation purposes, and in the logarithmic 
version of the scatter-plot these data points were significantly separate from the rest of the data. These 
points were removed and the trendlines both with and without the removed data points were compared. 
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is a fair amount of variation, a general trend can be seen in which higher levels of 
jurisdictional assignment activity correspond to higher U.S. Civil Defendant levels. 
 
Sources. D.C. Jurisdiction Grant Dataset, 1943-2004.  
Notes. Pearson’s correlation coefficient  0.37. 
 
Figure 4.3.  Scatter-plot of District of Columbia Federal Court Jurisdiction 
Grants and District Court Case Filings with U.S. Civil Defendant, 1943-2004 
 
Figure 4.4 compares the incidence of legislation that grants exclusive 
jurisdiction to the federal D.C. courts in each congressional session-year with the 
variable, U.S. Civil Defendant.98  Both variables show a generally similar pattern of 
                                                                                                                                            
There was no significant difference between these trendlines, and, accordingly, only the non-
transformed analysis is reported. 
98
 As described in Chapter 3, this measurement represents the annual number of civil cases filed in 
federal district courts by private parties naming the United States as defendant, a category that includes 
litigation initiated by private parties against agency actions of all kinds and excludes litigation engaged 
in solely between private parties (actions which do not directly implicate challenges to government 
policy). Civil cases in which the United States was a defendant are reported in Administrative Office of 
the United States Courts, Annual Report of the Director, Judicial Facts and Figures (Washington 
2005), Table 7 (1942), Table 6 (1943-44), Table C-2 (1945-2004). This category is, by necessity, over 
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growth over time. As with the full jurisdiction stripping analyses, civil filings against 
the federal government were chosen because they represent the primary area where 
economic pressure is visited on a broad range of government institutions, and, as 
argued earlier, is an area in which Congress can most effectively exert control by 
jurisdictional manipulation.99   
The patterns of peak D.C. court jurisdictional assignment activity by Congress, 
shown in Figure 4.4, also exhibit a moderate, although not fully consistent, alignment 
with U.S. Civil Defendant case filings. The growth in jurisdictional assignments to the 
D.C. courts between 1974 and 1980, with peaks in 1974 (six laws), 1976 (five laws), 
and 1978 (six laws), aligns with a jump in civil case filings against the government 
during the same time period from 13,603 in 1973 to 15,918 in 1974, and increasing 
again to 24,260 in 1976, and 24,277 in 1978.  A similar rise occurred a few years later, 
between 1992 and 1996, when jurisdictional assignment activity peaked at five and 
seven laws respectively in each of the associated congressional sessions, and the civil 
case filings against the government correspondingly rose from roughly 25,000 before 
the start of the period to an average of approximately 30,000 cases filed each year 
between 1992 and 1996.  
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                            
inclusive, since it also includes tort and contract claims against the United States. This is an 
unavoidable artifact of the somewhat variable set of case reporting categories used by the 
Administrative Office and the federal courts over the 62 years covered by this study, and the 
complicated nature of administrative law, where challenges to agency policy can appear in agency 
tribunals, district courts, or appellate courts depending on the authorizing statute and legal nature of the 
challenge. 
99
 As discussed in the previous chapter, district court filings were chosen rather than case decisions or 
appeals because filings represent the point at which economic costs, including policy disruption, first 
attach regardless of final case disposition and without the winnowing process that occurs both as a case 
progresses and in connection with decisions regarding whether to file an appeal. Absent a specific 
legislative directive, district courts have initial appellate jurisdiction over challenges to administrative 
action. 
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Source. D.C. Jurisdiction Grant Dataset, 1943-2004. Notes. Pearson’s correlation coefficient 0.37. 
 
Figure 4.4. District of Columbia Federal Court Jurisdiction Grants and 
District Court Case Filings With U.S. Civil Defendant, 1943 to 2004 
 
U.S. Civil Defendant captures government action in a wide array of regulatory 
contexts, including environmental regulation, royalty and license fee challenges, 
federal administrative matters, and agricultural regulation, as well as actions among 
multiple government entities. These subject areas align with the most common 
categories of exclusive jurisdiction granting legislation, and represent categories of 
litigation that impose costs across multiple government actors.  
The incidence of jurisdictional assignments to the D.C. courts does not appear 
to correspond to the ideological proximity between Congress and the U.S. Court of 
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Appeals for the D.C. Circuit, contrary to what the strategic institutionalist approach 
predicts. This ideologically based perspective assumes that Congress will favor 
jurisdiction in the D.C. courts when the preferences of those courts are similar to 
congressional preferences. Under these conditions, Congress is assured that the courts 
will oversee and review government actions, in this case policy implementation by 
agencies, in a way that keeps policy closest to the congressional ideal point. One 
would then expect that Congress chooses the D.C. federal courts over all other 
possible federal courts because the D.C. courts are most ideologically proximate to 
Congress. This is not the case, however, since in no congressional session studied was 
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit the ideologically closest circuit to the 
either the House floor or the Senate floor.100  This was analyzed by calculating the 
distance between the median Judicial Common Space score for all the federal 
appellate courts, and either the median House Common Space score or median Senate 
Common Space score in a given congressional session.101 A comparison between 
these measurements in the years 1980 and 1996 (Figure 4.5), two years in which 
jurisdictional assignments peaked, shows that, contrary to what an ideological 
explanation would suggest, the assignments to the D.C. courts increased when the 
D.C. Court of Appeals was the least proximate court to congressional ideology.102 
                                                 
100
 Throughout this study, the median Judicial Common Space scores for the appellate courts in each  
circuit are used rather than district court scores. This is because the appellate court is the functional 
court of last resort for all federal courts within each circuit. This calculation uses the median member 
Judicial Common Space score for each circuit in each congressional session considered. Not all 
congressional sessions could produce comparisons across all circuits, as the Judicial Common Space 
scores cannot be reliably calculated  for all circuits due to judicial appointments during presidential 
terms  prior to Truman (the first president for whom a Common Space Score can be calculated). 
101
 The 11th Circuit is not included as it was formed in 1980, and the first judges were appointed to serve 
in October of 1981. In all analyses presented, because the literature disagrees whether the relevant 
measure for Congress should be the floor median or the majority party median, both were obtained and 
analyzed (Aldrich and Rohde 2001; Cox and McCubbins 1993).  As there was no significant difference 
in any of these results, only the results from the floor median analyses are reported. 
102
 Distance between the median Judicial Common Space score of each circuit court and the median 
Common Space Score of the House floor was used. A similar graphic using the median Common Space 
Score for the Senate produced similar results, so only the House version is shown. 
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This pattern was tested for all congressional sessions in the database, using the 
regression analyses discussed in the following section to determine whether some kind 
of reverse ideological selection process was in effect. When the full dataset is 
considered, no effect of House or Senate ideological distance from the D.C. Circuit 
Court was found (see the “Results” section under the “Empirical Analyses” portion of 
this chapter). 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.5.  Ideological Distance Between House Floor Median and Circuit 
Courts of Appeal Medians, 1980 and 1996 
 
Even considering the D.C. federal courts in isolation, jurisdictional 
assignments to these courts do not appear to rise as the congressional chambers grow 
ideologically more proximate to the court, nor do these legislative assignments appear 
to diminish as the ideological positions of the court and Congress diverge. Figure 4.6 
compares the incidence of exclusive jurisdictional grants to the D.C. courts (X-axis) 
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with the distance, using median Common Space and Judicial Common Space scores, 
between the D.C. Circuit and the House and Senate, respectively (Y-axis). If 
ideological proximity matters, one would expect to see an inverse relationship 
between the incidence of grants and the ideological differences. A smaller preference 
distance should correspond to a greater number of laws granting jurisdiction to the 
D.C. federal courts. As Figure 4.6 shows, the scatter-plot graph does not consistently 
exhibit the expected patterns.  
 
Source. D.C. Jurisdiction Grant Dataset, 1943-2004. Notes. Pearson’s correlation coefficients, House 
0.08, Senate 0.14. 
 
Figure 4.6. Congress – Court Ideological Distance and  
District of Columbia Federal Court Jurisdiction Grants, 1945-2004 
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Empirical Analyses 
The descriptive evidence suggests that Congress assigns jurisdiction to the 
federal courts in Washington, D.C., as the economic model predicts, in response to 
litigation against the government. The frequency of this jurisdiction granting 
legislation is increasing over time, and the trajectory and patterns of this increase 
appear to correspond to patterns exhibited by civil case filings in which the 
government is brought into court as a defendant. Ideological differences between the 
branches appear unrelated to jurisdiction granting activity. This dynamic is explored 
further, using multiple regression analysis to test these apparent correlations and the 
economic hypotheses underlying them, as well as testing the alternative explanation, 
based on ideological positioning, offered by strategic institutionalism. 
Strategic Institutionalism Model. If exclusive grants of jurisdiction are a 
strategic response to institutional ideology, then one would expect these congressional 
actions to relate to the preferences of Congress, the courts, and agencies in the 
following ways. As court and congressional preferences move closer, court review 
operates to reinforce congressional interests. As agency preferences move away from 
Congress and court preferences move closer to Congress, court review becomes an 
important check on agency behavior, provided the court’s preferences are closer to 
Congress than the agency’s. Therefore, if court ideology is closer to Congress than 
agency ideology, Congress prefers court policy to agency policy, and exclusive 
jurisdictional grants will occur in order to provide court oversight of agency actions. 
These observations give rise to the following hypothesis: 
Ideological Hypothesis: Exclusive jurisdictional grants to the D.C. courts occur 
when D.C. court ideology is closer to Congress than agency ideology. 
For each congressional session, if ideology matters, exclusive jurisdictional grants will 
occur when the court’s ideological position is closer to Congress’s position than the 
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agency’s. Once this condition is satisfied, the likelihood of exclusive jurisdictional 
grants (x) should increase as the median court ideology (J) moves closer to the median 
congressional preferences (C) and agency ideology (A) moves farther away from 
Congress. This can be expressed with the following equation: 
Px = C – A – C – J        (15) 
A positive number indicates that the court is closer to Congress than the agency and 
jurisdictional grants to the D.C. federal courts should occur. As the positive numbers 
increase, they evidence increasing distance between the agency and Congress 
compared to decreasing distance between the court and Congress. This should mean 
an increased likelihood of congressional assignment of jurisdiction to the court. By the 
same token, a negative number means the agency is closer to the Congress than the 
court and, as a result, jurisdictional assignments should not occur. The larger the 
negative number, the less one would expect to find jurisdiction assignment legislation. 
 It could also be the case that as both the agency and court approach 
congressional ideology, Congress may wish to lock in the D.C. federal courts as the 
courts of review to protect agency policy-making from actions of other, less proximate 
courts. However, when the relative positions for all other circuit courts were 
calculated in each congressional session, it was never the case that the D.C. court was 
the ideologically closest to either the House or Senate.103 At best, this suggests that 
something other than ideology is operating in the jurisdictional selection of the D.C. 
federal courts. At worst, it militates strongly against the position that Congress is 
protecting agencies by assigning jurisdiction to the ideologically best possible court. 
Regardless, it results in a series of observations that, due to their lack of variation, 
cannot be included as variables in the analysis. 
                                                 
103
 As described earlier in this section, these calculations were made using the median Judicial Common 
Space and Common Space scores for the relevant Circuit Courts of Appeal, and the respective 
congressional chamber floors.  
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Litigation Economics Model. On the other hand, the primary motivation for 
jurisdictional assignment may be congressional concern with litigation cost, delay, and 
interference generated by parties outside of the federal government’s control. 
Exclusive grants of jurisdiction may be a strategic congressional manipulation of the 
classic cost-benefit calculations that arise in connection with government’s role as a 
defendant.  If so, one would expect to see a rise in jurisdictional grants to the D.C 
courts correlate with a rise in federal case filings. Specifically, one would expect a 
strong correlation with civil filings where the United States is a defendant, cases that 
capture challenges to government actions by private litigants. The alternate hypothesis 
states: 
Litigation Economics Hypothesis: Exclusive jurisdictional grants to the D.C. 
federal courts increase as civil case filings in which the United States is a 
defendant increase. 
Research Design. To analyze these two hypotheses, this research tests for 
correlations between the incidence of jurisdictional grants and either federal case filing 
levels or the ideological distance among Congress, agencies, and the Court of Appeals 
for the D.C. Circuit. As these are time-series data, Prais-Winsten AR(1) regression 
analyses are used with the jurisdictional grant measurement as the dependent variable 
and each congressional session’s litigation and ideological measurements as the 
independent variables.104  
 D.C. Courts Exclusive Jurisdiction Variable. The number of public laws with 
provisions that assign jurisdiction exclusively to the federal courts in the D.C. circuit 
were identified from all public laws passed during the sixty year time span running 
from the first session of the 79th Congress (1945) through the second session of the 
                                                 
104
 A more detailed description of Prais-Winsten regression is set out in the “Research Design” section 
of Chapter Three. 
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108th Congress (2004).105 Each session of Congress is the relevant point of analysis. 
The dependent variable, D.C. Jurisdiction Grant, is the number of public laws in each 
congressional session containing provisions that grant jurisdiction to the federal 
courts, either district or appeals, of the D.C. circuit. Data from the 78th Congress 
(1943-1944) were not included, because full ideological measurements for the 
appellate court were unavailable due to the appointment of some judges during 
presidential terms prior to Truman, the first president for whom a standardized 
ideological measurement is available. The dependent variable is not normally 
distributed, however, this can be corrected by measuring the variable as the percent of 
exclusive jurisdictional grants per congressional session and then transforming the 
variable into its square root, a standard transformation for this issue. All analyses were 
run using this transformed dependent variable as well as the untransformed measure. 
There was no material difference in the results. For ease of interpretation, the 
untransformed regression analyses are reported. 
 Litigation Variable. The variable, U.S. Civil Defendant, measures the annual 
number of civil cases filed in federal district courts by private parties naming the 
United States as a defendant.106 District court filings were chosen rather than case 
decisions or appeals because filings represent the point at which litigation disruption 
and court influence over policy first attach regardless of final case disposition and 
without the winnowing process that occurs both as a case progresses and in connection 
with decisions regarding whether to file an appeal.107 Court filings are lagged one year 
to allow for congressional response time. 
                                                 
105
 As stated previously, relevant legislation was identified from Westlaw and Congressional Universe 
using keyword searches for all public laws including the term “Columbia.” 
106
 Administrative Office of the United States Courts, Annual Report of the Director, Judicial Facts and 
Figures (Washington 2005), Table 7 (1942), Table 6 (1943-44), Table C-2 (1945-2004). 
107
 Given the rather arbitrary allocation of appellate jurisdiction, caseload pressures also were measured 
by using court of appeals filings. No material difference in the results was found. Administrative 
appeals reported by the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts were not used as a variable for two 
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 Ideological Measurements. The ideological variables measure distance among 
the Congress, courts, and agencies in each congressional session using each 
institutions’ median member as the relevant actor. For all actors, preferences were 
measured using derivations of Poole and Rosenthal’s common space scores (Poole 
1998, 2005; Poole and Rosenthal 1997).108 Using one measurement system for all 
institutions, including the courts, overcomes significant validity problems which arise 
when varying measurement strategies and metrics are used to identify different 
institutional preferences. 
Congressional measures were derived for the floor median Nominate Common 
Space score in each congressional session.109 Presidential Nominate Common Space 
scores were used as a proxy for overall agency ideology (Moe 1987; Tiller and Spiller 
1999; Wood and Anderson 1993). The score for Truman was taken from his Nominate 
Common Space score as a U.S. Senator (Binder and Maltzman 2002). 
 Appellate court Nominate Common Space scores are usually assigned 
according to the method developed by Giles et al. (2001, 2002), which uses norms of 
senatorial courtesy to assign appellate judges a score derived from the scores of their 
home state senators. As the courts of the D.C. Circuit are not located within a state, the 
appointing president’s common space score was used unless there was a long term and 
clear affiliation between the judge in question and a particular state political apparatus, 
in which case the Giles method was used.110  
                                                                                                                                            
reasons. First, reliable data are unavailable for the full time span of the study, and second, 
administrative appeals fail to capture challenges that do not require exhaustion of administrative review 
or appear first in district court.  
108
 The first dimension was selected since it is the primary dimension along which ideological divides 
are structured in Congress (Poole and Rosenthal 1997). 
109
 Because the literature disagrees whether the relevant measure for Congress should be the floor 
median or the majority party median, both were obtained and analyzed (Aldrich and Rohde 2001; Cox 
and McCubbins 1993).  As there was no significant difference in any of these results, only the results 
from the floor median analyses are reported. 
110
 Databases and documentation for court median Judicial Common Space scores are available at 
http://epstein.law.northwestern.edu/research/JCS.html (2005). Nominate Common Space scores begin 
with the 75th Congress, and some circuit judge appointments were prior to that time, leaving these 
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 As an alternative to Nominate Common Space score measurements, the 
majority political party for each court sitting during the relevant congressional session 
was identified by assigning each judge a political party based upon the appointing 
president’s party. This method is a remarkably reliable measure of preference across a 
wide range of studies (Pinello 1999; Sisk and Heise 2005). Majority party control of 
both the House and Senate as well as the president’s party were identified for each 
congressional session. 
 Ideology Variables. Equation (15) is calculated for both the House and Senate 
in each congressional session, resulting in the following variables: House Distance 
and Senate Distance.111 In addition, if ideology matters, Congress will grant 
jurisdiction when the agency’s majority party is different from both the majority party 
of the Congress and the court in a particular congressional session. The variable, 
Agency Diff Party, is coded “1” if the agency’s majority party is different from the 
party controlling the unified court and House or unified court and Senate, 
respectively.112  
 Two models were run for each congressional session. The House Model uses 
only the House floor median and majority party to calculate congressional preferences. 
The Senate Model uses only the Senate floor median and majority party to calculate 
preferences.  Although the House and Senate should react similarly to court 
divergence, each is analyzed separately to allow for differences that may be masked 
by a unified approach and to avoid variable multicollinearity. 
                                                                                                                                            
judges without scores. No panel median member was derived without a full set of Nominate Common 
Space scores, as a result the analysis begins in 1945.  
111
 A separate analysis was run using the median Common Space distances between the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the D.C. Circuit and both the House and Senate floor as separate variables within the same 
regression. Neither of these variables rose to a level of significance. 
112
 Additional analyses coded these variables as “1” if the majority agency party differed from a unified 
House, Senate, and court. The results were consistent with those using separate House and Senate 
measurements. 
 105 
 
Control Variables. It may be the case that the increase in exclusive 
jurisdictional grants is simply a function of the number of public laws passed in a 
particular congressional session. This was controlled for in the jurisdiction stripping 
analysis by using a dependent variable that was a percent of the overall public laws 
enacted in any year. Since the incidence of exclusive jurisdictional grants is much 
lower in each congressional session, the changes in public law passage in the current 
analyses was controlled for by including the control variable, Total Public Laws, 
which measures all public laws enacted in each congressional session-year.  
Results. Table 4.3 displays the multiple regression results for both the House 
and Senate models using D.C. Jurisdiction Grant as the dependant variable and U.S. 
Civil Defendant, House Distance, Senate Distance, Agency Diff Party, and Total 
Public Laws as the independent variables. Both models strongly support the Litigation 
Economics Hypothesis. U.S. Civil Defendant is positive and significant at the 0.01 
level. This means that as case filings in which the government is named a defendant 
increase, jurisdiction grants to the D.C. federal courts increase. As expected, the 
control variable, Total Public Laws, is also significant, indicating that the overall level 
of legislative activity in a particular congressional session positively correlates to the 
number of D.C. Jurisdiction Grants enacted. None of the ideological variables tested 
achieve significance, providing no support for the Ideological Hypothesis. 
As noted in the dependent variable description, the residuals were somewhat 
skewed thereby exhibiting problems with normal distribution. This was corrected by 
changing the dependent variable to a percentage of public laws passed in each session, 
transforming the dependent variable by taking its square root, and removing the 
control variable “Total Public Laws” from the analysis. A new regression analysis was 
run using the transformed dependent variable. The resulting regression residuals were 
normally distributed. The regression results from the new analysis were not different 
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in any material respect from the original results (no ideological variables rose to 
significance and the case filing variables in both models were highly significant). 
Accordingly the untransformed results are reported below, as they are easier to 
interpret.  
 
Table 4.3.  D.C. Jurisdiction Grants: Ideological Distance and  
Court Filings, 1945 to 2004 
 
 House Model Senate Model 
House Distance 0.89 --- 
 (1.27) --- 
   
Senate Distance --- 1.52 
 --- (1.36) 
   
Agency Diff Party -0.27 0.08 
 (0.44) (0.45) 
   
U.S. Civil Defendant 6.22 e-05** 6.37e-05** 
 (1.61e-05) (1.58e-05) 
   
Total Public Laws 5.04e-03** 5.04e-03** 
 (1.80e-03) (1.84e-03) 
   
Constant -1.26 -1.48* 
 (0.67) (0.68) 
   
R2 0.19 0.20 
N 60 60 
Notes. *p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01. Separate analyses using the House floor median and the Senate floor 
median. Prais-Winsten regression. Stata 10.0. 
Source. D.C. Jurisdiction Grant Dataset, 1943-2004. 
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Discussion.  Both the descriptive and empirical analyses support a litigation 
based explanation for Congress’s selective jurisdictional assignment to the D.C. 
federal courts, an action that effectively removes jurisdiction from all other courts in 
the federal system. Ideological differences among the branches do not appear to 
influence this type of congressional behavior. As civil cases in which the government 
is named as a defendant increase, so does the incidence of legislation naming the D.C. 
courts as the required forum. As the costs and interference of litigation rise, driven by 
the rising number of cases against the government, Congress appears to take strategic 
action to make such lawsuits less palatable to plaintiffs. The economic model predicts 
that costs of litigation play an important role in the expected value of suit, and 
accordingly in the likelihood that a plaintiff will have adequate incentive to litigate 
against the government. Congress can manipulate litigation costs in the government’s 
favor by requiring certain challenges be brought in courts, such as those in the District 
of Columbia, most proximate to government litigators and decision makers. This has 
the benefit of reducing government costs of suit and, for those litigants not situated in 
Washington, D.C., of increasing plaintiff costs by selecting a non-local forum. The 
presence of a single, specialized, and expert court reduces outcome uncertainty and, 
among other benefits, allows the government to adjust its behavior to avoid litigation. 
These dynamics are borne out by the textual nature of the jurisdictional 
assignments identified in this study. Decisions affecting individuals and individual 
corporations make up the largest category of actions that must be brought in D.C. 
federal courts. These include property claims, status determinations, and licensing and 
permitting decisions. The majority of plaintiff’s affected by these decisions, such as 
entities deemed foreign terrorist organizations,113 farmers challenging plant 
                                                 
113
 Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Public Law 104-132, Statutes at Large 110 
(1996): 1214. 
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quarantines,114 or radio and television stations denied construction permits,115 are not 
located in Washington, D.C.  Another sizeable category, that containing 
environmental matters, also involves numerous provisions that, by the very nature of 
regulating the environment, implicate local and regional air, land, and water 
conditions.   
It may be the case, however, that the individualized regulatory scheme and 
litigation history of particular policy categories either deviate from this larger pattern 
or contain specialized or competing incentive structures when it comes to court 
review. The potential plaintiffs affected by the D.C. jurisdictional grants, while 
concentrated in some categories, taken as a whole cover a wide spectrum of  
individuals and entities, both regional and national in their contacts. Examining 
smaller, more discrete policy-areas within the database is not suited to the broad based 
empirical analyses conducted here, because the number of public laws assigning D.C. 
court jurisdiction in a particular policy area are not numerous enough, even over time, 
to provide a sufficient number of data points. This argues for additional, qualitative, 
case-based examination of these public laws. 
The fact that jurisdictional assignment occurs primarily in regulatory laws 
suggests strongly that the selection of certain areas for jurisdictional grants might be a 
function of industry group or interest group activity. Interest groups, not part of the 
original enacting coalition often attempt to use litigation as an alternate way to achieve 
their policy goals. The jurisdictional manipulations by Congress may be driven by the 
enacting coalition’s reaction to, or anticipation of, subsequent litigation and policy 
interference. This manifests in two ways. First, for interest or industry groups with 
influence over the legislative process and either sufficient litigation resources, or an 
                                                 
114
 Federal Noxious Weed Act, Public Law  93-629, Statutes at Large 88 (1974): 2148. 
115
 Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938 Amendments, Public Law 82-554, Statutes at Large, 65 (1951): 65. 
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established business presence in Washington D.C., setting the forum for certain 
regulatory challenges in the D.C. federal courts operates as a tactical advantage over 
smaller, more regional competitors. The resource rich groups are less likely to be 
dissuaded from challenging individualized regulatory decisions in the D.C. courts, 
whereas their smaller competitors may acquiesce to unfavorable regulatory decisions 
because of the added cost of filing a challenge in a non-local forum. Second, regulated 
industries often cooperate and help craft the regulatory process in order to create 
barriers to entry and mold inevitable regulations to a form as favorable as possible to 
industry. Litigation can damage this policy balance. Creating jurisdictional barriers in 
reaction to such litigation can serve regulated industry interests, by maintaining the 
policy status quo.  
  Peak increases in the 1970s and 1990s of both jurisdiction stripping measures 
studied suggest that jurisdictional assignments may operate in conjunction with other 
court control mechanisms, including complete jurisdictional removal. A broader 
investigation of court jurisdiction generally, including removal of entire areas to 
specialized courts (such as money claims against the federal government), and other 
cost manipulations, including requirements that administrative remedies be exhausted 
first, all might benefit from an analyses using the economic models presented here.  
The specifics of what motivates jurisdiction stripping in various policy areas is 
best approached from a more case-based, contextual analysis that focuses on the 
interested actors and their interactions with each other and the legal system.  Chapter 
Five addresses this need for additional qualitative analysis, taking up the task with 
respect to full jurisdiction stripping and environmental regulation in National Forests. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
 
JURISDICTION STRIPPING AND NATIONAL FOREST MANAGEMENT 
The jurisdiction stripping laws identified in Chapter Three cover a wide array 
of administrative policies, ranging from Medicare Benefits to federal loan guarantees. 
Both theory and initial empirical testing strongly suggest that Congress enacted these 
provisions to foreclose litigant access to the courts in response to the policy disruption 
and resource displacement created by litigation against the federal government.  The 
empirical analyses presented in Chapters Three and Four use case filings as a general 
measure of the degree of litigation pressure exerted on government actors and find that 
increased litigation pressure corresponds to an increased incidence of jurisdiction 
stripping. This chapter narrows the inquiry to examine specific jurisdiction stripping 
legislation in a single policy area. In doing so, the examination moves beyond the 
rough proxy of case filings, to identify how litigant access to the court system 
generates pressure on government actors, and how litigation incentives, legal rules, 
and strategic behavior result in costs and delay with respect to agency policy which 
prompt Congress to remove court review.  
This chapter considers a series of public laws (“State Wilderness Acts”), 
passed predominantly in the mid-1980s, that removed federal court review of certain 
National Environmental Policy Act (“NEPA”) claims against the United States Forest 
Service (“Forest Service”). When the underlying litigation incentives, political 
dynamics, policy issues, and congressional record are considered, it is clear that, in 
keeping with both the theory and the generalized empirical results, Congress included 
jurisdiction stripping provisions in the State Wilderness Acts to insulate itself, the 
Forest Service, and the Department of Agriculture from the policy disruption and 
related costs created by interest group litigation aimed at halting commercial timber 
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activities and public access in national forests. This is not to say that specific court 
decisions, or judicial preferences regarding case outcomes, were irrelevant. Instead, 
the history and context of the jurisdiction stripping legislation examined reinforce the 
main assertion presented in this dissertation: congressional manipulation of the 
structure and procedure of court jurisdiction cannot be understood without accounting 
for the incentives and strategies inherent in litigation against the federal government. 
 This chapter first presents the general characteristics of the State Wilderness 
Acts, and then considers the political and interest group dynamics affecting these Acts, 
along with the relevant legislation that helped shape forest management decisions by 
the Forest Service. The litigation strategy engaged in by opponents to timber 
harvesting and any other non-preservationist activity in the national forests is then 
examined, along with the costs that this litigation imposed on the Forest Service and 
Congress. Finally, the congressional decision to strip jurisdiction is discussed as a 
strategic response to the policy disruption created by NEPA-based litigation against 
the Forest Service. 
State Wilderness Acts 
Matters dealing with environmental regulation make up nearly 20% of all 
jurisdiction stripping provisions identified in Chapter Three.116 Of these 76 
environmentally related laws, nearly half (33) address the wilderness designation of 
certain lands in the National Forest System. These State Wilderness Acts were passed 
during a thirteen year period from 1980 to 1993, with the majority of the legislative 
activity taking place in 1984.117 Each piece of legislation is designed to cover the 
national forest lands of a specific state, although one of the initial provisions passed in 
                                                 
116
 (Table 3.2). 
117
 Because these acts contain similar language and were passed primarily in 1984, the analyses in 
Chapter 3 were re-run with the Wilderness Act legislation eliminated. There was no substantial change 
to the empirical results. 
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1980 covers federal forest lands in a multi-state region.118 The Acts include 36 of the 
50 states, and cover the full span of the continental United States from Florida119 to 
Oregon.120  
State Wilderness Acts explicitly identify certain land in a state that qualifies as 
“wilderness,” where access is very limited and commercial activity, such as logging, is 
prohibited. Land in the national forest system not expressly set aside for protection by 
the Acts is subject to ongoing management and assessment by the Forest Service, and, 
depending on forest management plans created by the agency for each affected area, 
may be subject to commercial and recreational use. The Acts are a state by state 
replacement for an earlier nationwide attempt to make these wilderness designations, 
based on a Forest Service survey of all national forest land (RARE II), and supported 
by an environmental impact statement, issued in 1979, explaining the methods used to 
identify the protected acreage and detailing the potential environmental effects of 
agency designation decisions. Key to this process, and important to the later political 
and legal contentions, is that in naming some land as protected, both the Forest 
Service roadless area survey, and the State Wilderness Acts that reference that survey,  
leave a significant portion of national forest land open to possible public and 
commercial use, depending on subsequent determinations by the Forest Service.  
  
                                                 
118
 The Colorado Wilderness Act of 1980, Public Law 98-560, Statutes at Large 94 (1980): 3256, 
addresses national forests located in Colorado, South Dakota, Missouri, South Carolina, and Louisiana.  
119
 Florida Wilderness Act of 1984, Public Law 98-430, Statutes at Large 98 (1984): 1665. 
120
 Oregon Wilderness Act of 1984, Public Law 98-328, Statutes at Large 98 (1984): 272.  
 113 
 
 
Table  5.1.  State Wilderness Acts, 1980 to 1993 
 
Public Law Year Passed State Covered Sponsor 
96-487 1980 AK Rep. Udall (D-AZ) 
96-560 1980 CO, SD, MO, SC and LA Rep. Johnson (R-CO) 
96-550 1980 NM Rep. Lujan (R-NM) 
97-384 1982 IN Sen. Lugar (R-IN) 
97-407 1983 MO Sen. Eagleton (D-MO) 
97-466 1983 WVA Rep. Benedict (R-WVA) 
98-321 1984 WI Rep. Obey (D-WI) 
98-322 1984 VT Rep. Jeffords (R-VT) 
98-323 1984 NH Rep. Gregg (R-NH) 
98-324 1984 NC Rep. Clarke (D-NC) 
98-328 1984 OR Rep. Weaver (D-OR) 
98-339 1984 WA Sen. Gorton (R-WA) 
98-406 1984 AZ Rep. Udall (D-AZ) 
98-425 1984 CA Rep. Burton (D-CA) 
98-428 1984 UT Sen. Garn (R-UT) 
98-430 1984 FL Rep. Fuqua (D-FL) 
98-508 1984 AR Sen. Bumpers (D-AR) 
98-514 1984 GA Sen. Nunn (D-GA) 
98-515 1984 MS Sen. Cochran (R-MS) 
98-550 1984 WY Sen. Wallop (R-WY) 
98-574 1984 TX Rep. Bryant (D-TX) 
98-578 1984 TN Rep. Duncan (R-TN) 
98-585 1984 PA Rep. Clinger (R-PA) 
98-586 1984 VA Rep. Boucher (D-VA) 
99-197 1985 KY Rep. Perkins (D-KY) 
99-490 1986 TN Rep. Quillen (R-TN) 
99-504 1986 NE Sen. Exon (D-NE) 
100-184 1987 MI Rep. Kildee (D-MI) 
100-499 1988 OK Rep. Watkins (D-OK) 
100-547 1988 AL Rep. Flippo (D-AL) 
101-195 1989 NV Sen. Reid (D-NV) 
101-401 1990 ME Sen. Mitchell (D-ME) 
103-77 1993 CO Rep. Skaggs (D-CO) 
Source. Chutkow Environmental Jurisdiction Stripping Database, 2009. 
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The structure and language of the State Wilderness Acts are largely uniform. 
Specific federal lands within a state are identified and designated as wilderness under 
the National Wilderness Preservation System. The Acts then declare that: (1) the 
Department of Agriculture has completed a national roadless area review evaluation of 
all federal lands in the National Forest System (“RARE”); (2) Congress has conducted 
its own review of these roadless areas in the respective state and of the related 
environmental impacts; and (3) for federal forest lands located in the state in question, 
the final environmental impact statement generated by the Forest Service and 
Department of Agriculture in connection with RARE is not subject to judicial review. 
General information about each Act, including the state covered and the primary 
congressional sponsor appears in Table 5.1. 
Litigation Pressure and Case Filings 
 The empirical inquiries in Chapters Three and Four capture litigation related 
pressure on federal actors through the rough proxy of case filings. Environmental 
claims are the subject matter of the State Wilderness Acts’ jurisdiction stripping 
provisions. As an initial matter, the dynamic found in the empirical analyses, where 
increased case filings correspond to increased jurisdiction stripping, appears to hold 
true in the context of environmental litigation against the federal government. Figure 
5.1 below shows the annual trends in jurisdiction stripping public laws related to 
environmental policy and cases filed (as represented by annual case dispositions)121 
against the federal government based on environmental laws.122 Both measures exhibit 
an upward trend over the period examined, with the onset of litigation preceding the 
                                                 
121
 While case dispositions lag case filings, on average 88% of the cases in this category were disposed 
of pre-trial. As a result, the assumption is made that disposition dates and case filing dates probably 
differ on average by about six months.   
122
 Federal Judicial Center. 2005. Federal Court Cases: Integrated Data Base, 1970-2000, Ann Arbor, 
MI: Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research,  ICPSR No., 
http://www.icpsr.umich.edu. 
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onset of legislative activity. The spike in jurisdiction stripping public laws during the 
1983-1984 time period is attributable to the State Wilderness Acts. It corresponds to a 
slight dip in the environmental litigation activity during that same time period which 
may represent a litigation reduction in response to the high concentration of laws 
removing court review. The correspondence between State Wilderness Act passage 
and cases filed against the Forest Service challenging environmental impact 
statements (the specific focus of State Wilderness Act jurisdiction stripping 
provisions) exhibits and even stronger relationship, as shown in Figure 5.2, and is 
examined in detail below in the section discussing NEPA claims against the Forest 
Service. 
 
 
Source. Chutkow Environmental Jurisdiction Stripping Dataset, 2009; Federal Court Cases: Integrated 
Data Base, 1970-2000, Federal Judicial Center, Civil Terminations. 
 
Figure 5.1.  Annual U.S. Civil Environmental Defendant Case Dispositions and 
Environmental Jurisdiction Stripping Public Laws, 1970-1990 
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Litigation and State Wilderness Acts 
The State Wilderness Acts’ passage, and the included jurisdiction stripping 
provisions, occurred during a period in which environmental interest groups 
strategically used the court system to disrupt Forest Service timber harvesting 
arrangements in national forests.123 The following factors affected litigation incentives 
in this issue area, and in doing so made the use of the judicial process, along with the 
attendant costs it imposed on government defendants, an attractive way for interest 
groups to achieve their policy goals. The issue area in question, forest management 
and timber harvesting, was a contentious one, with well defined interests on both 
sides. One interest group, environmentalists, was unsuccessful in achieving its policy 
goals through the legislative process. Delay in policy implementation and/or 
settlement with the government were both “wins” for environmental interests. These 
goals were accessible through the courts due to the open-ended language of NEPA 
which created compliance uncertainty for government actors and afforded litigants a 
legal basis for delaying forest management plans and their attendant timber harvest 
authorizations. In addition, the favorable legal rules governing preliminary injunctions 
in cases involving alleged environmental harm gave plaintiffs an effective way to 
disrupt Forest Service actions well in advance of final case disposition.  
Interest Groups and the National Forest System 
The National Forest System consists of federally owned forest lands overseen 
by the United States Forest Service, an agency within the Department of Agriculture. 
                                                 
123
 Suits against timber harvesting were part of a larger strategy to prevent any use of national forests, 
including recreational use and its related commercial development. Timber harvesting was often the 
forerunner for other commercial ventures, due to the roads, staging areas, and other development that 
accompanied logging. For this reason, environmental groups were keenly interested in preventing 
timber companies from either gaining a foothold or continuing activities in national forests. A second 
concern, was that logging would establish the roads and access that would disqualify land from being 
categorized as pristine, a requirement, as discussed later, for placing it within the protection of certain 
wilderness preservation statutes. 
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The creation of the National Forest System dates back to 1876 when the federal 
government began withdrawing public lands from general homesteading access out of 
concerns that the natural forest resources of the United States, as well as their related 
economic value, required some form of protection and preservation (Steen 1976; 
Wilkinson and Anderson  1987). Currently, the Forest Service manages approximately 
193 million acres of forests and grasslands in 43 states.124 States with the highest 
number of national forest acres are: Alaska, California, Idaho, Montana, Oregon, 
Colorado, and Arizona, although 17 other states also have a national forest presence 
that exceeds one million acres (Table 5.2).125  
In the course of this management, the Forest Service must make decisions 
about forest access and use, including use for sport, recreation, and commercial 
activity, such as timber harvesting. Commercial timber activity in particular often 
leads the way for other forest uses, by creating roads and access to otherwise 
inaccessible land. In this regard timber harvesting is not only the forerunner of greater 
public use, but is also the lightening rod for objections to national forest access. 
Because use and preservation of forest land are often mutually exclusive, the degree to 
which national forests are available for human activity of any kind is the source of 
tension between two distinct interest groups: the timber industry coalition and 
environmentalists. 
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 United States Forest Service. “Table 6, NFS Acreage by State, Congressional District and County,” 
United States Forest Service, http://www.fs.fed.us/land/staff/lar/2008/TABLE_6.htm, (accessed  March 
30, 2009). 
125
 Ibid. 
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Table 5.2.  Largest National Forest Acreage States 
 
State Acreage 
1.  Alaska 21,969,228 
2.  California 20,812,121 
3.  Idaho 20,463,385 
4.  Montana 16,966,146 
5.  Oregon 15,668,052 
6.  Colorado 14,519,108 
7.  Arizona 11,264,579 
8.  New Mexico 9,413,655 
9.  Washington 9,284,302 
10. Wyoming 9,241,184 
11. Utah 8,203,168 
12. Nevada 5,763,868 
13. Michigan 2,874,842 
14. Minnesota 2,840,753 
15. Arkansas 2,598,672 
16. South Dakota 2,017,367 
17. Virginia 1,664,305 
18. Wisconsin 1,532,044 
19. Missouri 1,492,073 
20. North Carolina 1,255,163 
21. Florida 1,175,926 
22. Mississippi 1,173,901 
23. North Dakota 1,106,034 
24. West Virginia 1,043,028 
 
Source. United States Forest Service. Table 6, NFS Acreage by State, Congressional District and 
County.  Notes. Figures also include nominal amounts of national grassland. 
 
Timber Industry Coalition. National forests contain a significant amount of 
the undeveloped forest land in the United States, according to some estimates as much 
as one third of the total undisturbed forest stock (Coggins, Wilkinison, and Leshy 
1993). These forest stocks are of considerable interest to the timber industry, which 
contracts with the government for harvesting rights on federal land. In the mid-1980s, 
when most State Wilderness Acts were passed, 136 million acres, roughly 28% of all 
the available timber-producing land was publicly owned, with the vast majority of that 
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land situated in national forests (U.S. Department of Agriculture 1989). During the 
1970s and 1980s, approximately half of the softwood timber, essential to the 
construction industry, was on federal land (Waddell, Oswald, and Powell 1987). In 
some states, particularly in the northwest, this percentage was even higher. 1n 1983, 
the federal government owned 57% of commercial timber in Oregon.126 Timber 
harvested on public land was worth $307,609,817 in 1970, $729,829,429 in 1980, and 
$1,187,384,520 in 1990.127 The timber industry itself generates jobs, both directly and 
indirectly, broadly across the U.S. economy, including not only logging and mill 
employment, but also wood product preparation for the commercial and residential 
construction industry. Table 5.3 shows the nationwide value of timber harvested and 
the number of timber related jobs from 1972 to 1993. The direct category includes 
timber logging and mills. The indirect category represents millwork, building, lumber, 
and construction products, residential wood products, and construction industry 
employment.  
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 Victor Atiyeh, Governor of Oregon, speaking before the Senate Subcommittee on Public Lands and 
Reserved Water of the Committee of Energy and Natural Resources on August 16, 17, Hearing on 
S.2805 and S.2818, Adjustments to Timber Sales Contracts on National Forest System Lands and 
Public Lands, 97th Cong., 2nd sess.,1983, 14.  
127United States Forest Service, “National Forest Service Management Reports,” United States Forest 
Service, http://gis.fs.fed.us/forestmanagement/reports/sold-harvest/documents/1905 -
2008_Natl_Sold_Harvest_Summary.pdf, (February 25, 2009). 
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Table 5.3. Timber Related Jobs (1000s) and Value of National Forest Timber 
Harvested, 1972-1993 
 
Year Direct Employment 
Indirect 
Employment 
Total 
Employment 
Timber Harvest 
Value 
1972 251.00 3249.3 3500.30 $381,956,590 
1973 261.80 3447.6 3709.40 $479,233,003 
1974 272.00 3316.8 3588.80 $508,615,356 
1975 243.10 2874.1 3117.20 $365,951,687 
1976 265.90 2979.4 3245.30 $492,029,190 
1977 273.50 3274.4 3547.90 $732,556,790 
1978 277.10 3575.8 3852.90 $854,682,200 
1979 284.90 3700.1 3985.00 $967,923,445 
1980 265.70 3545.2 3810.90 $729,829,429 
1981 250.50 3428.7 3679.20 $714,922,395 
1982 223.50 3278.4 3501.90 $339,214,989 
1983 243.20 3443.4 3686.60 $649,622,237 
1984 254.00 3884.4 4138.40 $759,577,198 
1985 244.60 4145.2 4389.80 $720,636,166 
1986 242.40 4334.2 4576.60 $786,881,222 
1987 249.10 4544.6 4793.70 $1,015,995,028 
1988 253.80 4701.2 4955.00 $1,235,734,207 
1989 250.10 4734.9 4985.00 $1,316,841,207 
1990 244.70 4650.7 4895.40 $1,187,384,520 
1991 226.70 4235.3 4462.00 $845,694,147 
1992 223.30 4145.6 4368.90 $934,504,178 
1993 226.30 4353.3 4579.60 $914,646,052 
Source. Employment, Bureau of Labor Statistics, 60,63; Timber value, National Forest Service 
Management Reports,1905-2008. 
 
The economic impact of timber production on communities and states, 
particularly those with significant national forest presence, created a coalition of 
business and community interests united by the desire to see timber harvesting 
continue in national forests at levels that supported their economic interests (Culhane 
1981, Hirt 1994, Hoberg 2004).  This group included businesses directly supporting 
the extraction of timber such as road clearing and construction companies, engineers, 
sawmill operators, lumber brokers, pulp processers, tool suppliers, transport 
companies, and construction material suppliers. Middle and end product users such as 
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floor and pallet makers and residential and commercial construction companies also 
were affected. 
In addition, the timber industry’s interests dovetailed with other commercial 
and non-commercial enterprises that valued access to national forests. Grazing rights 
were important for farmers and livestock rangers located on the periphery of national 
forestland. Wilderness designations and other restrictions threatened to foreclose 
mineral exploration, a situation which particularly concerned the mining industry 
because of companionate restrictions being considered by the Department of the 
Interior and the Bureau of Land Management for lands under their control. 
Recreational use in national forests was an individual concern for citizens of 
proximate communities who used the lakes, streams, and clearings for vacations and 
weekend entertainment. Recreational use was also a major concern for businesses 
engaged in tourism or related enterprises. The Forest Service did not begin collecting 
systemized data on recreational use until 2000, with the launch of the National Forest 
Visitor Use Monitoring Project. However, in that year, the Forest Service estimates 
257 million site visits nationally with 14.3 million visits to limited wilderness areas.128 
Real estate developers, food and entertainment enterprises, consumer goods stores, 
and camping, hunting, fishing, hiking, and skiing related groups and business all 
opposed restricting national forest access.  
State, county, and municipal actors whose tax base depended on the revenue 
generated by logging and related commercial activity in and around national forests 
also had a strong interest in keeping the land available for multiple use (Atiyeh 1983; 
Helmick 1982). If forestland cannot be accessed for commercial activity, business 
                                                 
128United States Department of Agriculture, “National Visitor Use Monitoring Results, August 2001, 
USDA Forest Service Region 5, Modoc National Forest,” United States Forest Service, 
http//www.fs.fed.us/recreation/programs/nvum/reports/year1/R5_Modoc_final_082001.doc, (May 27, 
2009). 
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revenues drop and regional governments are affected. In addition, national forestland 
does not provide a direct tax base for the communities in which it is located (being 
federal land). Timber harvesting revenues collected by the Forest Service not only 
supplement the agency’s budget, but also are shared with local governments. These 
revenues are vital in supporting government infrastructure and public services such as 
schools, roads, and fire and safety personnel in the affected communities.  
Environmental Groups. On the other side of the access and use issue were 
environmental organizations. Groups interested in protecting forest land in the United 
States have long been part of the political landscape. The environmental movement 
grew in strength and scope during the 1960s and 1970s, with organizational numbers 
and membership increasing exponentially, and the passage of multiple environmental 
laws in the early 1970s as a testament to the movements’ increased political power 
(Berry 1997). These organizations, which included both nationally based not-for-
profits, such as the Sierra Club and the Wilderness Society, and loosely organized 
groups of local residents, primarily were interested in preserving national forests in 
their pristine, natural state (Hays 1998). Environmental advocates acted at various 
times both independently and in concert. A typical list of plaintiffs, for example, taken 
from a single lawsuit against the Forest Service, includes Siskiyou Regional Education 
Project, Klamath-Siskiyou Wildlands Center, Oregon Natural Resources Council 
Fund, Sierra Club, American Lands Alliance, The Wilderness Society, Pacific Rivers 
Council, and Defenders of Wildlife (Siskiyou Regional Education Project v. Goodman 
2007).  
With respect to Forest Service management of these national assets, the 
environmentalist position was to stop all timber harvests and leave the land 
undisturbed (Jones and Taylor 1995; Mortimer 2002). Some scholars also note that 
environmental groups with a national presence were structurally incented to continue 
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challenging Forest Service oversight of the national forests to justify fundraising and 
generate the revenues needed to support their organizational overhead (Mortimer 
2002). For purposes of this analysis, global references to environmental interests 
groups, environmentalists, or preservationists means that varying group of actors that 
engaged in lobbying and litigation aimed at the Forest Service and designed to stop or 
slow timber harvesting and any other commercial or public activity in national forests. 
 Legislative Winners and Commercial Timber Activity 
The history of conflict between the timber coalition and environmental groups 
over national forest management is well documented (Clary 1986; Hirt 1994, Hays 
1996).  Preservationists, however, were unsuccessful by the mid-1970s in getting 
Congress to pass legislation that expressly limited commercial activity on public 
lands, despite the resounding success of environmental organizations on a national 
level in passing broad-based environmental laws such NEPA, Clean Air Amendments, 
Endangered Species Act, and Clean Water Act. By one estimate, nearly 49 
environmental laws were passed during this period that affected national forests 
(Thomas 2005). While some of this legislation can be quite explicit regarding 
expected levels of environmental protection,129 the statutes that set the stage for the 
State Wilderness Acts, directed specifically at forest management, spoke in vague 
generalities that left considerable discretion with the Forest Service.  
This was due to the fact that, between 1967 and 1990, the years of interest 
regarding the State Wilderness Acts,130 representatives from states with the greatest 
stake in ongoing commercial timber activity and other multiple uses in national forests 
                                                 
129
 The Endangered Species Act of 1973 affects commercial activity in national forests through its 
definition of endangered species and critical habitats under the direction of the Fish and Wildlife 
Service. This can also be a source of litigation challenging commercial or timber activity. 
130
 Throughout these analyses, where data availability permits, 1970 to 1990 are treated as the years of 
interest with respect to the State Wilderness Acts. This is because NEPA was signed into law in January 
of 1970. The year 1990 is used as a cut date, because the Colorado Wilderness Act of 1993 was, in 
substance, a continuation of the Colorado Wilderness Act of 1980. 
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controlled the committees with jurisdiction over the Forest Service and most 
wilderness related legislation. In the House, this was the Committee on Insular and 
Interior Affairs131 and in the Senate this jurisdiction was split between the Committee 
for Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry132 and the Committee for Energy and Natural 
Resources.133 In the House, of the ten states that placed the largest number of 
representatives on the committee from 1967 to 1990, six had 59% or more of their 
timberland stocks on federal land and four ranked in the top ten timber employment 
states. When states with the highest percentage of their representatives serving on the 
committee are considered, to control for the differing number of representatives per 
state, eight of the top ten had 59% or more of their timberland stocks on federal land. 
The situation in the Senate oversight committees was largely the same.134  
 During this same time period, the United States Forest Service was seen by 
environmental activists, with ample justification, as hostile to the concerns of the 
environmental movement (Dana and Fairfax 1980; Jones and Taylor 1995; Twight 
1983). Numerous studies support this perception, with scholars noting that the Forest 
Service, with its widespread regional offices and professionalized staff, developed 
close ties to timber companies (Nienaber and McCool 1996) and favored timber 
production over environmental and preservationist concerns (Biber 2009; Hirt 1994; 
Wilkinson 1992). 
 These concerns were exacerbated by the considerable discretion the Forest 
Service, and its parent agency, the Department of Agriculture, enjoyed over the 
management of national forests. This level of control was ceded to the agency in the 
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 Renamed the Committee on Natural Resources in 1993, and then the Resources Committee in 1995. 
132
 Called the Committee on Agriculture and Forestry prior to 1977.  
133
 Also called the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs. 
134
 Chutkow Environmental Jurisdiction Stripping Database, 2009; timber data from United States 
Forest Service. “Table 6, NFS Acreage by State, Congressional District and County,” United States 
Forest Service, http://www.fs.fed.us/land/staff/lar/2008/TABLE_6.htm, (accessed  March 30, 2009). 
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late 1800s and confirmed by the Supreme Court in United States v. Grimaud (1911).  
The Forest Reserve Act of 1891 directed the president to identify and set aside land for 
the public domain. The Forest Management Act of 1897 authorized the Department of 
Agriculture, and its forestry division which later became the United States Forest 
Service, to develop rules and regulations detailing how national forest land was to be 
used and preserved. In combination, these two Acts set the legislative stage for the 
Forest Service. The agency not only was integral in helping identify land placed 
within the national forest system, but it also commanded wide latitude in determining 
how, and by whom, those lands were used. This discretion was challenged as an 
unconstitutional delegation of legislative power in the Grimaud in connection with 
penalties levied for violation of Department of Agriculture rules. The Supreme Court 
upheld the agency’s broad powers over national forests, noting “In the nature of 
things, it was impracticable for Congress to provide general regulations for these 
various and varying details of management. Each reservation had its peculiar and 
special features, and, in authorizing the Secretary of Agriculture to meet these local 
conditions, Congress was merely conferring administrative functions upon an agent, 
and not delegating to him legislative power.”135 
The result of all these factors was a pattern of  legislation that spoke in general 
terms about preservation, but as a practical matter, left the definition and 
implementation of forest conservation (and by the same token forest 
commercialization) to the Forest Service. The Multiple Use Sustained Yield Act of 
1960 (“MUSYA”) instructs the Forest Service to maintain public lands for a wide range 
of uses including commercial timber and mining operations, public recreation, and 
wildlife and ecosystem protection.  The National Forest Management Act of 1976 
(“NFMA”), designed to provide additional management guidance to the Forest 
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 United States v. Grimaud, 220 U.S. 506 (1911), 516. 
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Service, requires the formation of a management plan for each national forest. These 
management plans must take into account a list of general criteria aimed at balancing 
both use and conservation goals defined with the help of public participation. In 
combination, while these Acts prescribe a process for the Forest Service to follow, 
their reliance on vague definitions of conservation and multiple-use offer little 
guidance as to how national lands should be managed (Daniels 1987; Murphey 1996; 
Mortimer 2002).  
Congress also passed a national Wilderness Act in 1964 in an effort to appease 
growing preservationist concerns that the multi-use dictates of the MUSYA 
implemented by the Forest Service were depleting the wilderness ecosystems in public 
lands (Hoberg 2004; Jones and Taylor 1995; Twight 1983). The national Wilderness 
Act created a National Wilderness Preservation System (“Wilderness Preservation 
System”). Once land was deemed a wilderness area and placed within the Wilderness 
Preservation System, multiple uses, in particular logging and timber harvesting 
activity were significantly restricted in order to maintain the area’s “wilderness 
character.”136 The Act specified approximately 9.1 million acres of federal land as 
wilderness and instructed the Secretary of Agriculture to survey the remaining federal 
forest lands within ten years and recommend to the President and Congress which 
additional national lands should be added to the Wilderness Preservation System. The 
Act defines “wilderness” as undeveloped federal land, “retaining its primeval 
character,” devoid of man-made improvements, and which has the following, four 
characteristics: it “(1) generally appears to have been affected primarily by the forces 
of nature, with the imprint of man’s work substantially unnoticeable; (2) has 
outstanding opportunities for solitude or a primitive and unconfined type of 
recreation;” (3) is at least 5000 acres; and (4) may also have other features that make it 
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 Wilderness Act of 1964, U.S. Code 16 (1964), §1131(a). 
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worthy of preservation.137 In these vague terms, the Act sets up a categorical system in 
which some land (wilderness) is left fallow and other land (not found to be wilderness) 
is available for commercial and recreational use. The task of applying these general 
directives to the millions of acres of national forest land fell to the Forest Service.  
Strategic Litigation and RARE 
The catalyzing events that ultimately led to the State Wilderness Acts’ 
jurisdiction stripping provisions began in 1967, when the Forest Service undertook an 
inventory of the public lands under its management to determine which qualified for 
inclusion in the Wilderness Preservation System. These evaluations, called remote 
area roadless evaluations or RARE, dovetailed with the Forest Service’s management 
obligations later codified in NFMA. Under NFMA, the inventory of public lands and 
identification of wilderness areas requiring heightened protection were necessary first 
steps in the development of forest management plans for the national forests. A 
portion of each management plan (subsequently required by NFMA for each national 
forest) was to detail the nature and extent of timber harvesting activity allowed within 
a particular national forest, both in the wilderness areas shielded by the Wilderness 
Preservation System as well as those lands not designated as wilderness. The Forest 
Service approached this analysis by first identifying forest land as either roaded or 
roadless. If land already contained roaded access, it generally failed to satisfy the 
Wilderness Preservation System requirement that included land be primeval and 
undeveloped. Next, if the land was roadless, the Forest Service determined whether, 
despite the absence of roads, the land fell within the general statutory definition of 
“wilderness.” If the land was wilderness, it was identified for inclusion in the 
Wilderness Preservation System. The Forest Service used these categories as part of 
its management plan for the national forest in question, allocating, among other things, 
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overall acceptable commercial timber activity among the various parcels depending on 
the level of protection required.138 
The RARE process was conducted with at least some input and oversight from 
both interested members of the public and Congress. The Forest Service, in its Final 
Environmental Impact Statement released in 1979,139 detailed its process for surveying 
and categorizing forest land under RARE. Among the criteria considered were 
renewable resource use (including timber harvesting), non-renewable resources 
(including commercial mining products such as natural gas and minerals), wilderness 
quality (using the Wilderness Act’s  generalized standards, with ratings conducted by 
forest service professionals, including industry and environmental group 
representatives), and public input (signatures received by the Regional Forester for or 
against certain designations). Some scholars suggest that the public input portion of 
this process (signature collection and wilderness ratings) was used to identify areas of 
high preservation interest which could be designated as wilderness thus diverting 
attention from other areas (Mohai 1987).  
Congressional representatives were fully aware of the land allocation process, 
and the specific RARE allocations, as evidenced, for example, by the Forest Service’s 
handling of the related environmental assessment. The draft environmental impact 
statement supporting RARE was issued to the public on June 15, 1978, and public 
comment was invited until October 1978. Some 264,093 comments were received. A 
short two months later the final impact statement was issued, but only circulated to 
Congress and certain agencies. The President (Carter) approved the wilderness 
allocations with minor changes and forwarded them to Congress for final action. 
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 For a general discussion of this process, see Hoberg 2004 and Mortimer 2002. 
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 United States Forest Service, “RAREII: Final Environmental Statement – Roadless Areas Review 
and Evaluation (Jan. 1979),” United States Forest Service, 
http://roadless.fs.fed.us/data/pdfdocs/rare2.pdf. (November 14, 2008). 
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Congressional approval was delayed primarily because of  lawsuits challenging the 
process.140 Some scholars suggest that the Forest Service had its own independent 
preference for commercial use percentages that differed slightly from congressional 
preferences (Booth 1991). This evidence shows that when congressional delegations 
were monitoring the process, but not as actively involved (RARE II), the Forest 
Service allocated less land to wilderness without any obvious congressional objection. 
The wilderness acreage allocations increased slightly, but only after the RARE II 
process was challenged in court, and, as described in the next section, Congress 
addressed the issue on a state by state basis.  
This situation was untenable for environmental groups, who saw the Forest 
Service’s actions as the first step in wider access for commercial use of national forest 
land. As legislative options appeared unproductive, these interest groups opted instead 
for the strategic use of the court system. The goal was to prevent timber harvesting 
activity in national forests, and, by forcing new environmental assessments, forestall 
any commercial or recreational use of the land. Since the completion of RARE was a 
necessary step to free up non-wilderness land for commercial activity, environmental 
interests could achieve their goal through any court action that delayed the RARE 
process, timber sales, or the promulgation of forest management plans. Although a 
final court decision on the merits could achieve this end, the litigation goal could also 
be met by creating pre-trial delays, and imposing litigation costs on the agency 
sufficient to create a self-imposed agency halt to RARE and any intermediate timber 
harvesting. This strategic approach relied on three factors. First, the passage of NEPA 
gave litigants a legal way to impose process-based costs and delays on an agency. 
Second, favorable rules governing preliminary injunctions in environmental cases 
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allowed litigants to stop timber harvesting before and during trial. Finally, court 
decisions in two key cases created uncertainty over outcomes with respect to RARE 
and the development of forest management plans.  
The role of uncertainty is important in this type of policy-based litigation. This 
is because the defendant is a government entity with continuous and ongoing policy 
interactions with the public. This provides numerous ways in which the agency is 
vulnerable to suit. The plaintiff’s strategy is to file multiple suits challenging the 
contested policy, and to continue to do so even if the particular strain of litigation is 
not decided definitively either for or against the plaintiff. In this way, a plaintiff can 
diversify her chances across the court system. Multiple suits increase uncertainty, in 
no small part because they often result in multiple different case dispositions.141  
It is also in the plaintiff’s interests to take legal risks and continuously refine 
case form and content depending on judicial and agency reactions. The more suits, the 
wider the variation in claims, the more costs plaintiff can impose on the defendant, 
and the more likely it is that the plaintiff might obtain some kind of positive court 
action. This need not be a decision on the merits, although it can be. The disruption of 
a single positive case outcome, including an intermediary injunction, settlement, or 
decision on the merits compounds this dynamic, not only because it may affect 
ongoing cases, but also because it helps the plaintiff refine her arguments and target 
her litigation in future cases.  
This strategy is particularly effective when, as was the case here, there is wide 
discretion afforded to an agency and insufficient statutory guidelines as to how this 
discretion should be exercised. This leaves the agency vulnerable to legal challenges 
claiming the agency is not following its statutorily proscribed duties, since the 
statutory directions leave so much room for alternative interpretation. In the case of 
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the Forest Service, these directions were both vague and sometimes conflicting: 
manage public land for multiple uses and preserve wilderness (unhelpfully defined as 
land “affected primarily by the forces of nature”).142  The presence of open-ended 
legislation, such as NEPA, added to this dynamic by providing the plaintiffs with a 
legal basis for challenging agency action and imposing significant process-based 
delays premised on rules and parameters that also appeared to change on a case by 
case basis.  
There are, as a result, strong incentives for the defendant to be risk adverse and 
attempt to dampen litigation when faced with multiple suits in such an ill-defined 
statutory context. Litigation successes, even sporadic ones, reinforce the risk for the 
defendant that out of the many cases filed some may result in a legal strategy or court 
ruling that permanently changes policy. Any indication in the litigation process that 
the plaintiff might have a viable litigation strategy, whether or not that strategy 
appears likely to prevail in the end, can make avoiding litigation more and more 
attractive for the defendant.143 On the other hand, less litigation means less 
diversification and fewer cases in the system that might pay off for the plaintiff.  
 NEPA and Environmental Impact Statements.  Environmental interest 
groups were handed a litigation gift with the passage of NEPA which was signed into 
law in January 1970. NEPA, which is at the heart of much litigation involving national 
forest management, applies to all federal agencies, and requires the preparation of 
either an environmental assessment or an environmental impact statement (“EIS”) for 
all “major federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the human 
environment....”144 An EIS is not a substantive requirement, but rather one designed to 
                                                 
142
 Wilderness Act of 1964, U.S. Code 16 (1964), §1131(a)-(c). 
143
 In some ways this is a bit of a paradox, because injunctions  or other pre-trial motion outcomes may 
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inform agencies and the public about the environmental impacts and potential 
alternative actions related to important agency policy implementation.  
 The generality of the Act’s language quickly became the basis for litigation 
against the government, often aimed at delaying implementation of agency policy by   
claiming that an EIS either was not prepared, or was inadequately prepared, thereby 
forcing multiple impact reviews of an agency’s action (Mandelker 2008). In concept, 
these procedural requirements were not intended to be an onerous or time consuming 
process for the involved agencies, however, the litigation generated by the Act created 
agency behavior designed to avoid the costly and time consuming process of 
defending an EIS in court. In response, agencies produced EIS that grew in length and 
complexity over time in an attempt to anticipate and avoid litigation (Karkkainen 
2002; Mandelker 2008). Current regulations issued by the Council on Environmental 
Quality, charged with implementing NEPA procedures, state that an EIS should 
usually be about 150 pages, with an expected 300 page maximum for very complex 
government actions.145 However, by 2000 the Council on Environmental Quality 
reports that the average EIS was 742 pages, with many commentators attributing this 
growth to overcautious agencies seeking to avoid EIS legal challenges.146 This means 
that as a litigation tool, NEPA allows litigants to inject delay in the policy process, 
although the outcome may not be altered, as any revisitation of an EIS results in 
multiple agency hours and resources expended generating the necessary documents 
and studies to support agency action. 
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 The Forest Service was a particular target for this type of litigation (Ackerman 
1990; Jones and Taylor 1995; Mason 2008; Thomas 2005).  The first NEPA-based 
case aimed at stopping an approved timber harvest was filed in 1970, within months of 
the Act’s passage.147 Between 1970 and 2008, 282 cases were filed against the Forest 
Service challenging timber sales, based on NEPA claims, and generating some kind of 
reported decision by a federal judge (Environmental Jurisdiction Stripping Database, 
2009, hereinafter “Environmental Database”).148 Between 1970 and 1990, the dates of 
primary interest here, 57 such cases were reported. Of these, the government 
ultimately prevailed in 36 cases (63%), in keeping with other studies finding that the 
government has a high likelihood of litigation success in federal court (Crowley 1987; 
Songer, Sheehan, and Haire 1999). 14 actions in the database (25%) specifically 
mentioned roadless areas, of which the government won 60% (8).  
 The number of NEPA cases identified in the Environmental Database is, no 
doubt, a vast underestimation of the actual number of cases that appeared in federal 
court, since, by some estimates, roughly 98% of federal civil cases filed either settle149 
or are dismissed prior to trial (Clermont 2008, Shavell 2003). While this percentage 
includes civil litigation between private parties, whose interest in monetary settlement 
may create an upward skew that undermines a direct application to litigation against 
the government as well as substantive pre-trial dispositions which are reported, 
nonetheless it is clear that the vast majority of filed cases fail to go to trial, and 
correspondingly fail to generate a reported judicial decision. Reports by the Federal 
Judicial Center (“FJC”) strongly suggest that this dynamic applies to environmental 
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 Sierra Club v. Hardin, 325 F. Supp. 99 (Alaska 1970). 
148
 Cases were collected based upon a Westlaw search in the category “allfeds” using the search terms 
NEPA or national environmental policy act, timber or log, and national forest or forest service. Cases 
were then screened for appropriate content and to account for appeals and remands. 
149
 Settlements rates are high, but do vary by district and case type (Clermont and Schwab 2008; 
Eisenberg and Lanvers October 1, 2008; Galanter and Cahill 1994) 
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cases against government defendants as well.  The FJC reports that between 1970 and 
1990, federal courts disposed of 5,021 cases based on environmental challenges 
against the government.150 The FJC database includes all case dispositions, whether or 
not they resulted in a written action by a judge. Of these, roughly 88% were disposed 
of before trial.151 This percentage is in keeping with the overall proposition that 
reported cases underestimate actual litigation activity and suggests strongly that the 
actual number of NEPA cases against the Forest Service between 1970 and 1990 was 
far higher than the 57 cases appearing in the Environmental Database. If the 88% 
pretrial disposition applies, the actual number of cases could be closer to 475. 
 Reported NEPA-based claims against the Forest Service and State Wilderness 
Act passage exhibit remarkably related trends over time (Figure 5.2).  Until 1978, 
reported case filings were one a year. The increase in reported cases between 1978 and 
1979, to three cases, precedes the enactment of three State Wilderness Acts a year 
later. Between 1979 and 1983, the year prior to the peak in State Wilderness Act 
enactments, reported case activity rose to between two and three cases per annum as 
compared to only one case a year in the preceding nine years. In 1984, the majority of 
State Wilderness Acts are passed, along with statutory language that precluded court 
challenges to the Forest Service EIS underlying the RARE inventory process. No 
reported cases were filed in 1984, and this is likely a response to the State Wilderness 
Acts. The rise in NEPA-based challenges after 1984 captures challenges to the State 
Wilderness Acts and litigation crafted to circumvent the prohibition on judicial 
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review.152 The lack of legislative response after 1990153 is a function of the fact that 
most states (36) were already covered by State Wilderness Act protections. 
 
 
Source: Environmental Jurisdiction Stripping Database, 2009. 
 
Figure 5.2.  State Wilderness Acts and NEPA-Based Timber Litigation Case 
 Filings, U.S. Forest Service Defendant, 1970 to 1990 
 
 When the data are examined at the federal circuit level, the trends become even 
clearer. Congress passed the initial State Wilderness Acts first in circuits with NEPA 
based timber litigation. Once these prototype Acts were through the legislative 
process, and as lawsuits continued, Acts were passed not only in litigation heavy 
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circuits, but prophylactically across the country in response to concerns that the 
environmental, multiple suit litigation strategy might appear in other circuits as well.  
The circuit level analysis reveals these patterns because federal circuits are regional, 
usually encompassing several states, each of which may contain one or more federal 
district courts. The appellate court sets precedent for all courts, in all states, within a 
jurisdictional circuit. This means that cases filed in one district court potentially can 
affect other trial courts in the same circuit, either by providing a decisional example to 
follow, or because a case moves to the appellate level and creates precedent for the 
entire circuit. In the State Wilderness Act context, litigation activity within a circuit 
had potential ramifications for all states within the circuit’s jurisdictional reach. 
 From 1970 to 1979, NEPA based cases challenging Forest Service timber 
policies were filed in six different federal circuits. In 1980, when the first State 
Wilderness Acts were passed, every state was from a circuit that experienced this 
NEPA-based litigation. Conversely, where no such litigation was identified in a state’s 
federal circuit, no State Wilderness Act was enacted (Figure 5.3). The only exception 
is the D.C. Circuit, which was the forum for some litigation, but contains no national 
forests. At the state level, two of the seven State Wilderness Act states, Alaska and 
South Dakota, experienced litigation directly, both within five years of the Acts passed 
with respect to their respective in-state national forests. The difference in the state 
level and circuit level relationships suggests, as is argued in more detail later, that 
Congress’s primary concern was not necessarily particular judges, but rather a larger 
pattern of litigation, the costs it created, and the underlying threat, that lawsuits in one 
area presaged case filings elsewhere. 
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Source. Environmental Jurisdiction Stripping Database, 2009. 
 
Figure 5.3.  State Wilderness Act Enactments, 1980, and Reported NEPA Based 
Timber Case Filings, U.S. Forest Service Defendant, 1970 to 1979 
 
 The pattern generally holds for the Acts passed in 1982 and 1983, with two of 
the three State Wilderness Acts enacted in circuits experiencing litigation: Missouri 
(8th) and West Virginia (4th). From 1981 to 1982, additional reported cases all were 
filed in the 9th Circuit, with the exception of a contract claim filed in the U.S. Court of 
Federal Claims,154 leaving the reported case filing pattern shown in Figure 5.3 largely 
unchanged. The Indiana Wilderness Act passed in 1982, is the exception, located in 
the 6th Circuit where no reported cases were identified.   
 The Indiana case signals the coming flurry of enactments in 1984, when Acts 
are passed in states from every federal circuit except D.C. (Figure 5.4). This broad 
legislative response anticipated additional lawsuits and responded to overall litigation 
on an aggregate level, but also protected the states directly experiencing litigation. By 
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the end of 1984, the majority of states located in circuits with reported case filing 
activity were covered by State Wilderness Acts. This included four of the five states in 
the 4th Circuit, all states in the 5th Circuit, and four of six states in the 10th Circuit. The 
8th and 9th Circuit states showed substantial legislative activity, although slightly lower 
than the other regions. In the 9th Circuit, where the highest number of reported case 
filings were identified from 1970 to 1983, State Wilderness Acts were passed for five 
of the nine states by 1984, with six of nine covered by 1989.155 In the 8th Circuit, three 
of seven states had Wilderness Acts by 1984, which rose to four of seven by 1986. 
 
Source: Environmental Jurisdiction Stripping Database, 2009 
 
Figure 5.4.  State Wilderness Act Enactments, 1984, and Reported NEPA Based 
Timber Case Filings, U.S. Forest Service Defendant, 1970 to 1983 
 
 Preliminary Injunction Rules. Judicially created standards for preliminary 
injunctions in environmental cases made litigation against the Forest Service attractive 
to environmental plaintiffs regardless of whether the case ever went to trial. Injunctive 
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relief is an equitable action where the court orders the defendant to halt her contested 
behavior. Injunctions can occur at several points during litigation. Temporary 
restraining orders and preliminary injunctions take effect pre-trial, with a preliminary 
injunction, if granted, often operating to stay the defendant’s actions throughout the 
litigation process until the trial court’s judgment.156 The trial court can also issue an 
order that keeps an injunction in place as an appeal progresses.157 Standards for 
granting a preliminary injunction (and other injunctive relief) are a matter of case law 
and vary by circuit. As a general matter, however, in order for a judge to halt a 
defendant’s actions, the plaintiff must show the following: irreparable harm should the 
defendant continue her actions, inadequacy of other legal remedies, lack of excessive 
harm to the defendant if she is restricted from acting, any affect on third parties, and a 
likelihood that when the case is decided the plaintiff will prevail on the merits.158 If 
the environmental plaintiff can satisfy these requirements, she can halt timber sales on 
the forest land at issue throughout the pendency of the trial. This was of no small 
consequence, since, for example, the average time between filing a case and final 
disposition in the Environmental Database is roughly two years. This delay could 
easily disrupt a timber harvest for much longer than the court related time, since the 
Forest Service engages private companies to conduct forest harvesting and sales, and a 
contract in limbo for 24 months poses significant planning and revenue problems for a 
private entity. 
 The practical application of these standards by many courts in environmental 
cases advantaged plaintiffs seeking preliminary injunctions in environmental disputes 
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with the government. The purpose of a preliminary injunction is to freeze the status 
quo in order to prevent harm pending a legal decision on the dispute’s merits. Logging 
in a forest by definition changes the status quo. If the final decision in a case is the 
determination that certain land is pristine wilderness worthy of protection, allowing 
forest harvesting to continue during a trial functionally eviscerates the case outcome. 
This analysis was employed by a wide range of courts in districts all over the country. 
Trial courts issued preliminary injunctions, for example, in Minnesota Public Interest 
Group v. Butz (1975) (enjoining logging in the Boundary Waters Canoe Area of 
Minnesota); West Virginia Highlands Conservancy v. Island Creek Coal Co. (1971) 
(enjoining timber cutting in West Virginia); and Earth First v. Block (1983) (enjoining 
Forest Service activity in areas adjoining wilderness land in Oregon).  
 The Supreme Court recognized what had become common practice by federal 
courts in Amoco Production v. Village of Gambell (1987), a case involving the federal 
government’s grant of oil and gas leases on protected land in Alaska. Despite ruling 
against the right to a preliminary injunction in the case at hand, in dicta regarding the 
standards for issuing preliminary injunctions in cases where environmental harm is 
alleged, the Court said, “Environmental injury, by its nature, can seldom be adequately 
remedied by money damages, and is often permanent, or at least of long duration, i.e., 
irreparable. If such injury is sufficiently likely, therefore, the balance of harms will 
usually favor the issuance of an injunction to protect the environment” (Amoco 
Production v. Village of Gambell, p.480). 
 Preliminary injunctions and temporary restraining orders issued on timber sales 
were a cause of substantial disruption and substantial cost to the Forest Service.159 The 
costs were independent of final case disposition. A preliminary injunction issued by a 
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district court in Texas, for example, was later overturned by the 5th Circuit, but 
nonetheless resulted in the cessation of timber sales in the disputed regions for seven 
years.160 Preliminary injunctions stopping timber harvests in Oregon and Washington 
were such an ongoing problem that Congress included language overriding injunctions 
and authorizing the Department of Agriculture to conduct specified timber sales in 
1985 and 1989.161 
 In NEPA cases against the Forest Service, the grant of intermediary injunctive 
relief to plaintiffs appears to be more a function of the legal standards applied than a 
function of judicial ideology. Of the 282 cases identified in the Environmental 
Database, slightly over 40% (116) involved injunctive relief either during the lower 
court handling of the case or upon pendency of an appeal.162 The judges in these 116 
cases were split fairly evenly between Democrat and Republican appointees. 62 judges 
(53%) were appointed by Democrat presidents, 54 (47%) by Republican presidents.  
 It may be, however, that the judicial preferences of the appellate judges in a 
circuit affected trial court grants of intermediate injunctive relief in the identified 
cases. A disproportionate number of the 116 cases, 78 (70%), were decided by courts 
in the 9th Circuit. However, if only judges in the 9th circuit are considered, the 
ideological mix remains neutral, both in terms of appointing party and in terms of the 
median ideological scores for the court of appeals. Exactly half (39) of the 9th Circuit 
district court judges in these cases were Democrat appointees. As not all cases were 
appealed, the overall ideological tenure of the 9th Circuit Court of Appeals was 
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considered using the Judicial Common Space scores described in Chapter Three. The 
average common space score for the 9th Circuit between 1970 and 2006 (the last year 
Judicial Common Spaces scores are available) was -0.06. For the years 1970 to 1990, 
during which the State Wilderness Acts were passed, the 9th Circuit average score was 
-0.008. Both these measurements, although weakly liberal, as a practical matter show 
very little inclination toward either a conservative or liberal perspective in the circuit. 
 Parker v. United States and California v. Bergland. Two court decisions were 
the final legal factors that contributed to the efficacy of the NEPA-based litigation 
strategy against the Forest Service’s attempts to complete the RARE process and 
finalize forest management plans. The Forest Service lost both cases. Although the 
judicial scope in each case was limited to a single circuit, these decisions created 
heightened uncertainty for the Forest Service as to the outcome of legal challenges to 
RARE on a nationwide scale. That uncertainty increased litigation avoidance behavior 
by the Forest Service, which provided the delays in implementing forest management 
policy that satisfied environmentalists’ primary goal.163 
 The Forest Service finished its first roadless areas review and evaluation 
(“RARE I”) in October 1973. The review covered 12.3 million acres and identified 
274 wilderness areas to be included in the Wilderness Preservation System as dictated 
by the national Wilderness Act. RARE I was abandoned before any recommendations 
were made to Congress or the president, due to a lawsuit filed in the 10th Circuit. The 
dispute in Parker v. United States (1971) was over a timber contract granted by the 
Department of Agriculture covering land in the White River National Forest which 
had not been surveyed for its wilderness status by the Forest Service and was 
                                                 
163
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contiguous to other land acknowledge as worthy of wilderness protection. The court 
determined that the Forest Service should have considered the wilderness character of 
the land under contract and enjoined the timber harvest. The Forest Service decided to 
conduct a new, nation-wide, RARE survey (“RARE II”), rather than take the chance 
that other courts in the 10th Circuit, where Colorado is located, or in other circuits 
around the country, might also add new land to the wilderness survey inventory. The 
litigation economics of this is discussed further in the next section, but as an 
introductory matter, the adverse decision in a single case was sufficient to increase the 
Forest Services’ uncertainty as to potential outcomes in other cases, and given the 
costs involved in addressing the issue through litigation, the agency decided to start 
over.  
 The RARE II survey, along with the EIS required by NEPA, was finished in 
1979, nearly seven years after RARE I. Almost immediately, the Forest Service was 
sued by the State of California and various environmental groups claiming the EIS 
underlying the new roadless survey failed to take into consideration adequate 
alternatives to the various wilderness determinations. What unified both the state and 
the environmental plaintiffs was not necessarily the need to preserve as much 
wilderness as possible, but rather a deep dissatisfaction with the Forest Service’s 
determinations and process. As evidenced by the later California Wilderness Act of 
1984,164 which was crafted with the input of much of the state’s congressional 
delegation, California wanted to be an active participant in determining the wilderness 
allocations of national forests within its boundaries. The 9th Circuit in California v. 
Bergland  (1982)165 agreed with the plaintiffs, ultimately holding that the Forest 
Service needed to redo its EIS with respect to a contested list of 47 areas comprising 
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almost 1 million acres of land. As with the prior case, although the decision directly 
affected only 5% of the national forest land in California, the uncertainty created by 
the court ruling with respect to the remaining California national forests, the other 
states in the 9th Circuit, and potentially with respect to the rest of the country, led the 
Forest Service to begin talking about a RARE III.166  
Forest Service Litigation Avoidance  
 The combination of all these factors left the Forest Service with the following 
economic choice: it could continue with its RARE process, approve timber sales in the 
interim, draft forest management plans, and face the ongoing threat of litigation, or it 
could take actions designed to avoid litigation. The Forest Service made the rational 
choice to minimize its litigation exposure. In doing so, it also strategically elevated 
costs to key congressional constituencies in national forest reliant states, thereby 
elevating the institutional costs of the environmental litigation, and setting in motion 
the passage of the State Wilderness Acts and the related jurisdiction stripping 
provisions. 
  For the purpose of this analysis, the extent of the Forest Service’s litigation 
avoidance is a function of the agency’s expected loss at trial. And, as noted, this 
calculation is affected by the unique characteristics surrounding the State Wilderness 
Acts, including the significant outcome uncertainty created when an agency is granted 
a considerable degree of discretion in its authorizing statutes, is subject to vague and 
sometimes conflicting legislative directives, must comply with mutable rules 
governing environmental assessments, and finds itself the target of a multi-suit 
litigation strategy aimed at disrupting policy. As discussed in Chapter Two,167 the 
defendant’s expected trial loss can be expressed as pidJ + Cd, where  pid  is the 
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defendant’s assessment of the likelihood that the plaintiff will win at trial, (J) is the 
value of the potential judgment for the plaintiff (and loss to the defendant), and (Cd) is 
the defendant’s litigation costs.168 The defendant will engage in litigation avoidance 
(YL) provided it is less costly than the expected trial loss. This can be expressed as 
follows: 
YL  < pi dJ + Cd         (16) 
An increase in the value of YL corresponds to the increasing levels of self-imposed 
costs the defendant, in this case the Forest Service, is willing to bear in order to avoid 
trial.   
 The litigation factors discussed affect this equation in the following ways. The 
Forest Service was facing very expensive potential judgments, both in real economic 
terms and in terms of policy control.169 A full halt to timber harvesting in national 
forests essentially would remove the agency’s mandate to manage for multiple uses, 
and, as discussed earlier, the Forest Service supported controlled timber harvesting in 
national forests, provided such activity was under the agency’s direction (Clary 1986; 
Hirt 1994; Kaufman 1960). Timber harvest reductions also impact the Forest Service 
budget, as the agency relies on its share of revenues from timber sales to fund the 
agency (GAO Report 07-764). A decision mandating that the RARE process must start 
anew meant surveying millions of acres of forestland, involving both extensive 
diversion of forest service labor and considerable economic expense. Preparation of a 
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new EIS for the RARE process could also involve potentially millions of dollars and 
months if not years of policy implementation delay.170 As a result, the potential 
judgment cost (J) increased. The relaxed rules for preliminary judgments in 
environmental cases meant that all costs attendant to halting forest management and 
timber harvesting, discounted by the probability of injunctive relief, became part of 
the costs of trial for the government. If the discount number is close to the 40% 
intermediate injunction rate found in the Environmental Database, this is a sizeable 
increase in Cd.  
 Uncertainty regarding litigation outcomes plays an important role. The Forest 
Service’s policy discretion, and the generality of authorizing statutes, meant the 
agency could not comfortably rely on legislative language to protect its actions from 
suit. In addition, key victories by environmental interests in Parker and California v. 
Bergland, with regard to NEPA compliance in connection wilderness designations, 
increased the Forest Service’s uncertainty about what constituted a legally defensible 
environmental impact statement. This uncertainty increased the Forest Service’s (and 
the environmental plaintiff’s) assessment of the plaintiff’s chances for winning at trial 
especially given a multiple suit strategy. As a result, pid increased.  Accordingly, YL 
increased as follows: 
↑YL  <  ↑pi d↑J + ↑Cd         (17) 
In other words, the litigation strategy employed by the environmental plaintiffs in 
combination with the delegatory and general nature of the statutes affecting the agency 
created significant incentives for the Forest Service to engage in increasingly 
expensive behavior in order to avoid litigation.  
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 The Forest Service did this primarily by reducing timber sales and threatening 
to begin RARE III.171 Not only did the Forest Service engage in a rational response to 
litigation by these actions, but it also engaged in strategic behavior of its own. It was 
in the agency’s best interest to be protected from environmental litigation, at the very 
least in the context of finishing RARE and getting forest management plans in place. 
Relying on courts to do this was an uncertain, expensive, and time consuming process. 
However, if Congress was sufficiently motivated it might intervene. Through curtailed 
timber production and unresolved commercial access parameters, which promised to 
continue for a prolonged time if a nationwide RARE III came to fruition, the Forest 
Service contributed to significant economic distress in the national forest rich states, 
conditions which created pressure on congressional delegations. 
 Reduction in Timber Sales. Timber harvests in the national forests decreased 
steadily after the passage of NEPA. In 1970, the volume of timber harvested in 
national forests was 11,538,725 million board feet (mbf). The volume dropped to 
9,178,209 mbf in 1980, and reached a ten year low of 6,747,260 in 1982, just prior to 
the enactment of most State Wilderness Acts.172 These drops occurred in both 
Democrat and Republican administrations. From 1977-1979, during the Carter 
administration, timber harvesting was fairly even (10,481,536 mbf to 10,376,955 
mbf). The decreases started in 1980, Carter’s last year in office, (10,376,955 in 1979  
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to 9,178,209 in 1980) and continued through the Reagan administration, hitting a low 
point in 1982 (6,747,260). 
 These reductions were primarily the result of self-imposed restrictions by the 
Forest Service in reaction to the threat of litigation, or settlement agreements between 
the agency and environmental plaintiffs (Jones and Taylor 1995 Hassler and O’Connor 
1986). These actions are consistent with agency avoidance behavior in the face of 
litigation cited in the broader literature (Levin 1996; Meltzer 1998; Wald 1996). Forest 
industry representatives testified before Congress that due to the uncertainty created 
by appeals and litigation threats surrounding the RARE process, the Forest Service 
was in “chaos” and was “gun-shy” about approving management programs that 
allowed development on potential roadless areas.173 In Utah, for example as soon as 
litigation was filed challenging timber sale activities in roadless areas, the Forest 
Service brought all timber related planning and action to a complete halt.174 
Congressmembers grew increasingly frustrated with the policy stagnation. One group 
of senators asked, “must the State of Alaska constantly petition for relief because the 
Forest Service is afraid of litigation and would rather deny any roads as the easier 
course . . .?”175 
 Forest Service policy implementation also stagnated because the agency began 
testing the waters for possible litigation response when timber sales or forest 
management plans were finalized. The Forest Service authorized an action and if a suit 
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was filed, the Forest Service withdrew the proposed plan. This behavior was so 
prevalent that one court noted “the Forest Service has developed a practice of making, 
withdrawing, and reinstating timber sales and forest policy decisions in a way that 
might forestall judicial review indefinitely if left unchecked.”176 
 The Forest Service also settled numerous suits, most commonly agreeing to 
stop or reduce timber harvesting, or revisit the extent and degree of wilderness 
protections, with respect to certain contested areas (Thomas 2005). The Forest 
Service, for example, agreed to cancel a timber sale in the Olympic National Forest, 
despite the plaintiff’s failure to obtain a lower court injunction.177 In another case, the 
Forest Service stopped timber sales in California pursuant to a settlement after being 
sued under NEPA.178  Environmental groups were well aware of the Forest Service’s 
willingness to settle and made this an explicit part of their litigation strategy. As the 
Wilderness Society noted in one of its publications, “the Forest Service may well 
initiate settlement negotiations. The agency is usually anxious to avoid having the 
planning process tied up in appeals, especially those that might result in adverse 
rulings in federal courts” (The Wilderness Society 1985, 456). In the alternative, the 
Forest Service negotiated the parameters of timber harvests with environmental groups 
before the fact. It was noted, in a House committee report on NEPA, that “because of 
an excellent collaborative dialogue in the southern U.S. between the Forest Service 
and interested parties, there is no active litigation involving National Forests in 
Alabama, Louisiana or Mississippi.”179 
 Threatened RARE III. After the court decision in California v. Bergland, in 
February of 1983, John Crowell, Assistant Secretary of Agriculture, announced the 
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agency’s intent to reevaluate all roadless areas previously studied for wilderness 
potential nationwide. In other words, the agency signaled an intention to embark upon 
RARE III. This proposal was expressly designed “to minimize future risk of court 
challenge,” as opposed to being a court ordered mandate.180 In practical terms, this 
meant that the disruption to timber policy could continue for some time. The 
Wilderness Act was passed in 1967. Sixteen years and two RARE iterations later a 
fully realized assessment of national forest land was still unfinished. This possibility 
resonated in Congress. Representative John Seiberling of Ohio bemoaned that if 
Congress did not address the situation, RARE III would come out and “you are going 
to find the same lands tied up in court and possibly a lot more under RARE III, and we 
will be off for another 10 years of lawsuits and timberlands that ought to be released 
tied up.”181  In urging Congress to take some action to prevent more wilderness 
studies, Senator Jesse Helms declared a third RARE study “a tremendous waste of 
taxpayers’ money.”182 Congressman Jim Weaver described a potential RARE III as a 
“costly and time consuming,”183 and Senators Wallop and Simpson urged legislative 
action to prevent additional RARE-related expenses estimated at between $15 and $30 
million.184  
Congressional and Agency Litigation Costs 
 The actual dollar cost of RARE III, was not the only, or even the primary, cost 
that concerned congressional representatives. Failure to resolve the litigation-inspired 
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timber management paralysis and failure to clarify wilderness designations in the 
national forests imposed costs across a wide range of private commercial interests185 
and institutional actors, starting with political costs and pressures on congressional 
representatives from states with a meaningful national forest presence. The 
congressional reactions reported in the following sections were culled from a full 
review of the legislative history generated in connection with the passage of the State 
Wilderness Acts, including the Congressional Record, Senate and House hearings and 
committee reports, and related exhibits. These documents cover roughly 14 years of 
congressional debate.186  
 In keeping with the theoretical predictions of Chapter Two, Congress is 
primarily concerned with the following litigation costs: economic effects in 
constituent states, policy disruption and delay, the spread of copycat litigation (not 
necessarily related to court ideology), and administrative costs. As with the Forest 
Service analysis, each of these factors increased the cost Congress was willing to bear 
in order to avoid litigation. Unlike the Forest Service, Congress could change the 
equation by stripping jurisdiction and removing litigant access to the courts. 
 Economic Effects in Constituent States. Timber production on national 
forest land sank to a 10-year low in 1982, in the midst of a severe nation-wide 
recession (Congressional Budget Office 1982). As Table 5.3 shows, direct 
employment from logging and mill processing, the employment affected first by 
restrictions in forest harvesting, dropped from 251,000 in 1972 to its own ten-year low 
of 223,500 in 1982. This was compounded by a drop in the price per million board 
feet of timber from steady increases from 1970 to 1981, to a six year low in 1982 of 
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$50.27.187 This meant that at a time when the Forest Service was reducing timber 
harvests in response to litigation, the timber industry, despite labor related cost cutting, 
faced fixed expenses (including capital assets and a minimal workforce) that could not 
be met without increased harvest production. 
 This profoundly affected the local economies of states with the greatest share 
of timberland in national forests, such as Utah (91%), Colorado (72%), and Oregon 
(63%). The combination of a stagnant national economy and the litigation induced 
slow-down in national forest harvesting caused the governor of Oregon to declare a 
state of emergency in the timber industry in late 1982. In a plea for some kind of 
congressional intervention, the governor testified that, since 1979, 25% of the 
plywood mill workers were laid off, lumber production was down 30%, and the state 
was experiencing increasing bankruptcies in lumber related industries.188 The 
economic pain, however, was not narrowly limited. Congressional representatives 
from Arkansas, West Virginia, Utah, Colorado, and New Hampshire, to name a few, 
expressed concern in committee hearings about job losses and the overall negative 
economic impact connected with the failure to resolve wilderness uses in national 
forests.189    
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 The litigation effects, market conditions, and opportunity to use national forest 
access to alleviate constituent economic woes were not lost on the state delegations 
and the oversight committees, whose composition, as discussed earlier, was heavily 
tilted toward representatives from states with the largest percentage of commercial 
timber in national forests and the highest overall acreage of federal forest land. 
Congress and the Forest Service were both uniquely positioned to provide more timber 
and more wilderness access to commercial interests because of their mutual control 
over national forests, but first the Forest Service needed to be extricated from the 
RARE related litigation. Once the Forest Service was free to assign public land use to 
commercial interests, without interference from environmental groups, the economic 
pressures to the timber industry and other commercial actors might be reduced. This 
is, of course, a classic case of allocating public goods to satisfy special interests, and 
the specific wilderness designation and Forest Service litigation protections in the 
State Wilderness Acts were designed to make these public goods available. The first 
State Wilderness Acts passed in 1980. Of the initial states covered, all were in the top 
ten largest national forest states in the country: Alaska ranked first, with over 21 
million acres; Colorado ranked sixth with roughly 14 million acres; and New Mexico 
eighth with over nine million acres.  
 Policy Disruption and Delay. Congressmembers, in the various hearings 
related to the State Wilderness Acts, repeatedly expressed their apprehensions about 
the inherent policy disruption, delay, and uncertainty created by ongoing NEPA-based 
litigation against the Forest Service. This was not a policy neutral concern. Congress 
was concerned about environmental litigation demands that were getting in the way of 
the Forest Service approving commercial and non-preservationist uses for national 
forests. When speaking about the agency’s participation as a defendant in the litigation 
process, the comments reflect a generalized concern with the multiple suit strategy 
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against the agency and that strategy’s impact on Forest Service multi-use management 
regardless of outcome. Accordingly, much of the record largely is devoid of references 
to any specific case, court, or judge (with the exception of California v. Bergland 
discussed below). Senator Robert Packwood argued for congressional intervention in 
the French Pete Wilderness to end six years of public litigation and lobbying.190 The 
Forest Service expressly argued that diversion of resources and procedural delays 
created by the need to respond to lawsuits made management of the forests nearly 
impossible (Forest Service 2002). A House Report in 1983 from the Committee on 
Interior and Insular Affairs supported the need for a legislative response to the 
ongoing delay in the forest planning process created by potential lawsuits.191 Concerns 
that the RARE process would never end were expressed in House hearings on the 
Vermont Wilderness Act.192 General litigation-created delay and interference were 
cited as a reason for the majority of the State Wilderness Acts, including those 
proposed for Oregon,193 Texas,194 and Utah.195  
 Alleviating uncertainty in connection with forest management issues was also 
a frequently expressed concern. What was meant by this term, even though it was 
often used elliptically in the congressional record, was the need to stop suits 
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challenging wilderness designations and timber sales so that the Forest Service could 
make some definitive judgments about wilderness status thereby releasing 
nonwilderness land for commercial and recreational uses. A Senate committee report 
in connection with the Vermont Wilderness Act argued legislation was needed to 
address the uncertainty over forest management created by environmental lawsuits 
against the Forest Service aimed at stopping multi-use management practices.196 
Resolving uncertainty was likewise cited in debates over the Oregon Wilderness 
Act,197  Colorado Wilderness Act,198 and Montana Wilderness Act.199 In addition to the 
number of suits, and the vague statutory terrain, several other factors contributed to 
this uncertainty. First, although government actors in general, and the Forest Service 
in particular, were likely to win federal cases, winning was not a given. The flip side 
of overall litigation success rates is the percent of cases lost. From this perspective, 
what matters is not that the Forest Service won 63% of the cases filed between 1970 
and 1990. Instead, what matters is that the agency lost 37% of the time.200 When the 
Forest Service lost a case this generally meant two things, both of which benefitted the 
environmental plaintiffs’ forest preservation goals. First, the court halted the contested 
timber harvest or sale. Second, the court ordered the agency to redo its environmental 
studies regarding the impact to the forestland at issue.  Congressional and agency 
concerns were heightened by the decision in California v. Bergland. 
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 Copycat Litigation. While the overall disruption created by the litigation 
process clearly mattered to Congress, another court decision, along the lines of 
California v. Bergland, was also a concern. California v. Bergland is mentioned in the 
legislative history of most State Wilderness Acts, including the State Wildness Acts of 
Colorado, Vermont, New Hampshire, Florida, Arkansas, Texas, and Tennessee.201 The 
issue, however, is not that a future court will hold the same way, but that a future court 
might do so. This is an important distinction, since what is at issue is not that the 
ideology of a known court will create policy problems, but rather that the assessed risk 
that any court might create policy problems increases with each positive example. This 
affects Congress’s calculus as to the costs and benefits of legislative intervention, just 
as it affected the Forest Service’s calculus with respect to litigation avoidance.  
Representative Robert Smith (Oregon), in the course of objecting to the Oregon 
Wilderness Act as premature, heatedly told the Senate, “the fact is that we are here in 
this room today simply because of the hollow threats of a handful of environmental 
enthusiasts, shaking the stick of a ‘potential’ lawsuit over our heads.”202 Senator Orrin 
Hatch put the issue more evenly, “Unless it is clear that the Forest Service shall not 
manage the released acres as wilderness, they will operate under the constant threat 
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that if they fail to do so, they will be challenged in court.”203 While the specific 
antagonists in these quotes are not expressly identified, it is clear both “environmental 
enthusiasts” and “they” refers to the environmental public interest groups actively 
using courts to challenge policy. With respect to the Utah Wilderness Act, for 
example, the topic of Senator Hatch’s remarks, both the Sierra Club and the 
Wilderness Society testified in opposition to the wilderness allotments in the Senate 
hearings.204 As of 1984, the two organizations, combined, were parties in four reported 
10th Circuit environmental lawsuits, where Oregon is located. These groups’ presence 
in the policy debate also carried a credible threat of future litigation. Through 1984, 
the Sierra Club was plaintiff in 206 reported environmental suits nationwide, and the 
Wilderness Society was a party in 30 such suits.205 
 A strong desire to address case precedent in states where a court decision 
already existed, such as California and Oregon, prompted State Wilderness Acts in 
those jurisdictions.  The impetus for State Wilderness Act legislation for much of the 
rest of the country, however, was the desire to prevent litigation from spreading. In 
fact, many states had no history of Forest Service litigation pending, but still wanted 
pre-emptive congressional relief from a potential copycat lawsuit challenging 
wilderness and nonwilderness designations. For example, no NEPA-based timber 
cases appear in the Environmental Database at either the district court or circuit court 
level, prior to the passage of State Wilderness Acts for Florida, Georgia, Indiana, 
                                                 
203
 Statement of Orrin Hatch, Senator from Utah, Before the Senate Subcommittee on Public Lands and 
Reserved Water of the Comm. on Energy and Natural Resources, Hearing Utah Wilderness Act 
Designating Certain National Forest System Lands and Public Lands in Utah and Arizona as 
Wilderness, 98th Cong. 2nd sess., S. Hearing No. 98-779 (February  9, 1984), 67. 
204
 Senate Subcommittee on Public Lands and Reserved Water of the Committee on Energy and Natural 
Resources,  Senate Hearings on the Utah Wilderness Act Designating Certain National Forest System 
Lands and Public Lands in Utah and Arizona as Wilderness, 98th Cong. 2nd sess., S. Hearing No. 98-
779,  (February 9, 1984).  
205
 Westlaw search results for the 10th Circuit and “allfeds,” using the respective party name. 
 158 
 
Kentucky, Mississippi, New Hampshire, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, Vermont or 
Michigan. 
 Nor does the desire for such legislation appear to be based on any particular 
concern with the respective ideology of the federal judiciary, as Table 5.4 shows. At 
the time of most State Wilderness Acts’ passage, the median Judicial Common Space 
Scores of the various appellate courts evidence no particular party or ideological 
disparity between the enacting Congress and the federal courts with jurisdiction in the 
relevant state.206 The Judicial Common Space scores are the median score in the 
relevant circuit and range from -1 (most liberal) to 1 (most conservative). The median 
range across all courts is fairly narrow with the most liberal score at -0.30 (9th Circuit 
in 1980) and the most conservative scores of 0.26 attributable to the 4th Circuit (1983-
1984) and 6th Circuit (1985-1987). This range is consistent with the average Judicial 
Common Space score medians for all circuits in the federal system between 1980 and 
1993, which range from -0.22 (1980) to 0.27 (1993).207 With respect to circuit court 
composition related to the enactment of the State Wilderness Acts, 9 circuits are 
categorized as liberal, 11 as conservative, and 13 as neutral. 
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Table 5.4.  State Wilderness Acts, Legislative Majorities, Presidential Party, and 
Federal Appellate Court Median Judicial Common Space Scores 
State Year Cir Median CS 
Court 
Liberality 
House 
Majority 
Senate 
Majority 
President 
Party 
Alaska 1980 9 -0.30 Liberal D D D 
Colorado 1980 10 -0.14 Liberal D D D 
New Mexico 1980 10 -0.14 Liberal D D D 
Indiana 1982 7 0.01 Neutral D R R 
Missouri 1983 8 -0.29 Liberal D R R 
West Virginia 1983 4 0.26 Conserv D R R 
Wisconsin 1984 7 0.01 Neutral D R R 
Vermont 1984 2 -0.05 Neutral D R R 
New Hampshire 1984 2 -0.05 Neutral D R R 
North Carolina 1984 4 0.26 Conserv D R R 
Oregon 1984 9 -0.16 Liberal D R R 
Washington 1984 9 -0.16 Liberal D R R 
Arizona 1984 9 -0.16 Liberal D R R 
California 1984 9 -0.16 Liberal D R R 
Utah 1984 10 0.08 Neutral D R R 
Florida 1984 11 -0.03 Neutral D R R 
Arkansas 1984 8 -0.07 Neutral D R R 
Georgia 1984 11 -0.03 Neutral D R R 
Mississippi 1984 5 0.08 Neutral D R R 
Wyoming 1984 10 0.08 Neutral D R R 
Texas 1984 5 0.08 Neutral D R R 
Tennessee 1984 6 0.23 Conserv D R R 
Pennsylvania 1984 3 -0.14 Liberal D R R 
Virginia 1984 4 0.26 Conserv D R R 
Kentucky 1985 6 0.26 Conserv D R R 
Tennessee 1986 6 0.26 Conserv D R R 
Nebraska 1986 8 0.15 Conserv D R R 
Michigan 1987 6 0.26 Conserv D D R 
Oklahoma 1988 10 0.25 Conserv D D R 
Alabama 1988 11 0.18 Conserv D D R 
Nevada 1989 9 0.01 Neutral D D R 
Maine 1990 1 0.01 Neutral D D R 
Colorado 1993 10 0.25 Conserv D D D 
Source. Environmental Jurisdiction Stripping Database, 2009. 
Notes. D =Democrat; R = Republican. 
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 Administrative Costs. Lawsuits against the agency also imposed direct 
budgetary costs on both the Forest Service and the Department of Agriculture. The 
inability to meet financial and budgetary goals, due in large part to the inability to 
complete timber sales under the cloud of litigation, was a reoccurring theme in the 
Forest Service’s appropriations and budgetary review testimony.208 Adding to the 
policy gridlock, according to the agency, was the diversion of staff out of the field and 
away from management related activities in order to comply with litigation and NEPA 
requirements either in response to or in anticipation of litigation.209 The Department of 
Agriculture’s General Counsel was responsible for overseeing litigation involving the 
agency.  In multiple budget requests and related testimony before Congress, the 
general counsel attributed the need for additional attorney’s and staff to Forest Service 
timber harvest and land management litigation under NEPA. Such was the case, for 
example, in 1971 (“the demand for legal assistance has recently increased greatly as a 
result of the number lawsuits disputing Forest Service land management 
decisions”);210 1979 (citing to ongoing litigation over land management among 
“conservation, recreation, timber, and industrial development interests”);211 as well as 
staffing increases petitioned for in 1985, 1990, and 1991.212 
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Congressional Jurisdiction Stripping Response. 
The costs to timber and other commercial interests, recreational groups, state 
and local governments, and agency resources created by litigation against the Forest 
Service resonated in Congress, and the Forest Service oversight committees with their 
timber industry and national forest multi-use slant. These costs included the virtual 
cessation of active forest management, the resource diversion attributable to litigation, 
and the attendant economic stress felt by state governments, regional constituencies, 
and the timber industry and other commercial industries reliant on nonwilderness 
designations for national forest access. This dynamic was exacerbated by heightened 
uncertainty over the Forest Services’ litigation chances based on the level of litigation 
and the environmental lobby’s success in California v. Bergland.213 However, for 
Congress, the solution did not turn upon a rational level of action designed to avoid 
litigation. The agreed upon legislative response crystallized around the need stop the 
NEPA-based litigation that was creating such havoc. In other words, Congress wished 
to prevent environmental litigants from suing the Forest Service. And, unlike the 
Forest Service, Congress had the power to accomplish this goal by stripping court 
jurisdiction. As noted in this first chapter of this dissertation, if Congress removes 
federal court jurisdiction, litigants lose their basis for suit, and those that try to sue are 
subject to a quick case dismissal.  
                                                                                                                                            
the Rural Development, and Related Agencies Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1986, 99th Cong., 1st 
sess., S. Hearing No. 99-262 (April 4-5, 1985), 489-490;  Statement of Alan C. Raul, General Counsel, 
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Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations, Hearings on the Departments of Commerce, 
Justice, and State, the Judiciary and Related Agencies Appropriations for 1992, 102nd Cong. 1st sess., 
U.S. Government Printing Office No. 42-372 ( March 7, 1991).  
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 The Forest Service lost in other court decisions based on differing environmental claims that did not 
challenge the RARE process. For the purposes of this analysis, given California v. Bergland’s 
prevalence in the legislative record, it is the focus of the analysis. 
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This is what Congress chose to do in the State Wilderness Acts. It sought to 
free up the RARE process, and, in doing so, the management of national forests, by 
foreclosing NEPA challenges to the Forest Service’s 1979 RARE II environmental 
impact statement. The statutory language, which also is referred to as “sufficiency and 
release language,” in all the State Wilderness Acts is, for the most part, identical and 
very straightforward. Congress declares that the EIS prepared in January 1979 in 
connection with RARE II is not subject to judicial review with respect to national 
forests in the subject state. The Acts then go on to provide that the Department of 
Agriculture (and therefore the Forest Service) have adequately categorized the federal 
forestland within the state as wilderness or nonwilderness. The Wisconsin Wilderness 
of 1984 is a typical example, and in pertinent part, reads as follows: 
 
“SEC. 5. (a) The Congress finds that -- 
(1) the Department of Agriculture has completed the second roadless area 
review and evaluation program (RARE II); and 
(2) the Congress has made its own review and examination of National Forest 
System roadless areas in the State of Wisconsin and of the environmental 
impacts associated with alternative allocations of such areas. 
(b) On the basis of such review, the Congress hereby determines and directs 
that -- 
(1) without passing on the question of the legal and factual sufficiency of the 
RARE II final environmental statement (dated January 1979) with respect to 
National Forest System lands in States other than Wisconsin, such statement 
shall not be subject to judicial review with respect to National Forest System 
lands in the State of Wisconsin; 
(2) with respect to the National Forest System lands in the State of Wisconsin 
which were reviewed by the Department of Agriculture in the second roadless 
area review and evaluation (RARE II) and those lands referred to in subsection 
(d), that review and evaluation or reference shall be deemed for the purposes 
of the initial land management plans required for such lands by the Forest and 
Rangeland Renewable Resources Planning Act of 1974, "16 USC 1600 note" 
as amended by the National Forest Management Act of 1976, "16 USC 1600 
note" to be an adequate consideration of the suitability of such lands for 
inclusion in the National Wilderness Preservation System and the Department 
of Agriculture shall not be required to review the wilderness option prior to 
the revisions of the plans, but shall review the wilderness option when the 
plans are revised, which revisions will ordinarily occur on a ten-year cycle, or 
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at least every fifteen years, unless, prior to such time, the Secretary of 
Agriculture finds that conditions in a unit have significantly changed;”214 
State Wilderness Acts were handled on a state by state basis, after a few failed 
attempts in the 96th and 97th Congresses to pass a nationwide act. As a practical matter, 
this meant that each state’s delegation acted as the arbiter between the timber industry 
and environmental interests,215 in what appears to be part of a political quid pro quo, 
or logroll, in no small part because the conflict over forest management affected more 
than one state’s national forests and regional economy. The Utah Wilderness Act, for 
example, sponsored by Republican Senator Jake Garn, was the product of close work 
with Utah’s Democrat Governor, Scott Matheson, Utah Senator Orrin Hatch, and Utah 
Congressmembers Hanson, Nielson, and Marriott. Each testified in Senate hearings 
that the legislation was a negotiated compromise, the result of extensive private and 
public meetings, between interest groups competing over national forest management, 
including preservationists, the timber industry, farmers, and the mining industry.  The 
Forest Service also participated in crafting the Acts’ language. The legislative histories 
of the remaining Acts are similar. The state congressional delegations stepped in and 
supplanted the judicial process (or threatened judicial process) by crafting a political 
settlement between the parties, and with the addition of the jurisdiction stripping 
language, attempted to keep that political settlement out of court.  
Additional facts suggest that, by the time of the Act’s passage, the litigation 
interference with Forest Service activities was of sufficient magnitude to unify a wide 
range of political actors’ interests behind the proposition that the lawsuits needed to 
stop. A majority of the Acts were either sponsored or supported by the entirety of a 
states’ congressional delegation, both House and Senate, regardless of party. This was 
the case, for example, with the State Wilderness Acts covering New Mexico, 
                                                 
214
 Wisconsin Wilderness Act of 1984, Public Law 98-321, U.S. Statutes at Large 98 (1984): 250. 
215
 Paddy Creek Wilderness Act  of 1982, 97th Cong. 2nd sess., Congressional Record 128 (December 
16, 1982): H9945-6. 
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Colorado, Oregon, Wyoming, and Indiana.216  Of the 33 Acts, 11 of the primary 
sponsors were from the Senate, 22 came from the House. 60% (20) of the primary 
sponsors were Democrats, not surprising given House control during the relevant time 
periods, but of note since the jurisdiction stripping provisions worked to the detriment 
of environmental interests. Over 70% (24) of the State Wilderness Acts had sponsors 
and co-sponsors from both political parties. The Acts generally passed the full House 
or Senate floor with little opposition, as one would expect from a legislative quid pro 
quo designed to benefit various states. The Tennessee Wilderness Act217  and the 
California Wilderness Act218 are typical, both passing the Senate on a voice vote and 
the House by substantial margins (Tennessee by 404 to 12, California by 368 to 41). 
 Accurate accounts of the state by state financial exposure to continued timber 
harvesting reductions and other access restrictions on national forests are not readily 
available. However, some of the congressional testimony provides an indication of the 
vulnerability of many national forest reliant state economies. One lumber company 
official estimated that the industry and its related businesses contributed $6 billion per 
annum to Oregon’s economy.219 The Association of Oregon Counties, in support of 
multiple use, noted that 31 of the 36 Oregon counties shared in national forest 
revenue, a vital source of income for roads and schools. The Forest Service 
contribution dropped from $100 million on average to $45 million in 1982220 and $60 
                                                 
216
 Senate Subcommittee on Parks, Reaction, and Renewable Resources, Committee on Energy and 
national Resources, Hearings on S.2741, 96th Cong. 2nd sess., S. Hearing No. 96-117 (June 3, 1980), 
545. 
217
 Tennessee Wilderness Act of 1984, Public Law 98-578, U.S. Statutes at Large  98(1984): 3088. 
218
 California Wilderness Act of 1984, Public Law 98-425, U.S. Statutes at Large  98(1984): 1619. 
219
 Testimony of John Hampton, President Hampton Affiliates, Before the Senate Subcommittee on 
Public Lands and Reserved Water of the Committee on Energy and Natural Resources, Hearing on the 
Oregon Wilderness Act of 1983, 98th Cong. 1st sess., S. Hearing No. 98-635 Pt. 1 (July 21, 1983, August 
25, 1983), 673. 
220Testimony of this nature was common from commercial interests. It should be noted, however, that 
environmental groups and groups favoring preservation presented alternative economic scenarios, 
including those that blamed the economic hardship on the national recession, not Forest Service 
litigation avoidance. Regardless, the interpretation that the litigation caused economic harm, on the 
whole, received a favorable reception by the congressional committees. 
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million in 1983.221 Opponents to wilderness set asides in the Texas Wilderness Act 
estimated that denying access even to the designated sections of national forest would 
cost the taxpayers $1.6 million.222 Timber industry supporters of the Pennsylvania 
Wilderness Act argued that the timber industry in that state employed 82,300 people, 
garnering wages valued at over $1 billion a year and generating sales revenues of $2.5 
billion a year.223 Recreational and related tourism interests, also a part of the timber 
coalition in favor of multi-use, were estimated by supporters of Colorado’s Wilderness 
Act to generate $3.9 billion in 1983.224  
  Trends in passage of the Acts and timber harvests volume on national forest 
land strongly suggest that the economic hardships created by the litigation were a 
unifying force. State Wilderness Act passage occurs after timber harvest declines, with 
the first incidence in 1980 and then the bulk of State Wilderness Acts passed after the 
prolonged drop in timber harvests from 1979 to 1982, which correspond to the 
litigation challenges launched against the 1979 RARE II survey.  Timber harvests did 
begin to increase in 1983 (from 6,747,260 mbf to 9,244,037 mbf) just prior to the 
1984 spike in State Wilderness Act passage, however a one year increase likely did 
                                                 
221
 Statement of Kess Cannon, Executive Assistant, Association of Oregon Counties, Before the Senate 
Subcommittee. on Public Lands and Reserved Water of the Comm. on Energy and Natural Resources, 
Hearing on the Oregon Wilderness Act of 1983, 98th Cong. 1st sess., S. Hearing No. 98-635, (July 21, 
1983, August 25, 1983), 686. 
222Senate Subcommittee on Soil and Water Conservation, Forestry, and Environment of the Committee 
on Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry, Hearing on Additions to the National Wilderness Preservation 
System and the Sabine National Forest Land Conveyance,  98th Cong. 2nd sess., S. Hearing No.  98-
1035 (May 24, 1984), 11. 
223
 Statement of Robert J. LeBar, Forest Resources Administrator, Hammermill Paper Company, Before 
the Senate Subcommittee on Soil and Water Conservation, Forestry, and Environment of the Committee 
on Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry, Hearing on the Additions to the National Wilderness 
Preservation System and the Sabine National Forest Land Conveyance, 98th Cong. 2nd sess., S. Hearing 
No. 98-1035 (May 24, 1984), 74. 
224Testimony of Congressmember Timothy Wirth Before the House Subcommittee on Public Lands and 
National Parks of the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, Hearing on Additions to the National 
Wilderness Preservation System, 98th Cong., 2nd sess., H. Hearing No. 98-3  Part A (May 10, 1984), 
275. 
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not dispel the economic concerns created by a four year slide in production (Figure 
5.5).  
 
 
Source. Environmental Jurisdiction Stripping Database, 2009. Notes. Timber harvest on left axis. 
 
Figure 5.5  National Forest Timber Harvest Volume (mbf) and State Wilderness 
Act Passage, 1970 to 1990 
 The Acts’ legislative history shows unequivocally that the jurisdiction 
stripping language was intended to put an end to the lawsuits’ interference with Forest 
Service policy implementation. It is hard to misinterpret articulated congressional 
intent when the Senate oversight committee, in this case reporting on the Oregon 
Wilderness Act, asserts that the jurisdictional removal is designed to “resolve the 
RARE II issue in Oregon.”225 The House oversight committee report on the Wisconsin 
                                                 
225
 Senate Committee on Energy and Natural Resources, Report on the Oregon Wilderness Act of 1984,  
98th Cong. 2nd sess., S. Report No. 98-465 (May 18). 
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Wilderness Act was equally direct. “Enactment of the legislation will resolve the 
RARE II issue in Wisconsin, eliminating the possibility of lawsuits related to 
wilderness review requirements in the current generation of forest plans and thereby 
ending uncertainties plaguing the national forest planning efforts. It will also terminate 
the ongoing RARE III re-study of roadless lands in the planning process and in so 
doing will avoid significant additional delays and costs in the implementation of 
national forest land use plans in Wisconsin.”226 None of the Acts leave any doubt that 
they are designed to resolve the litigation issues surrounding the RARE process. 
Legislative reports, for example, regarding State Wilderness Acts in Vermont, New 
Mexico, Alaska, Missouri, West Virginia, Indiana, North Carolina, New Hampshire, 
and Texas all echo the jurisdiction stripping rationales cited in connection with the 
Wisconsin and Oregon Acts.227  
 The examination of jurisdiction stripping in the context of litigation against the 
Forest Service provides additional support for the broader theoretical and empirical 
claims made in this dissertation. The State Wilderness Act case study reinforces the 
                                                 
226House Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, House Report  3578, Establishing the Wilderness 
Areas in Wisconsin, 98th Cong. 1st sess., H. Report No.  98-531, Part 1 (Nov. 10, 1983), 1-2. 
227
 Senate Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry,  Senate Report to Accompany S.R. 
4198,Vermont Wilderness Act of 1984, 98th Cong. 1st sess., S. Report No. 98-416 (April 26, 1984), 10-
11; Senate Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry, Hearing on the New Hampshire 
Wilderness Act, 98th Cong., 2nd sess. S. Report No. 98-414 (April 26, 1984); . Senate Subcommittee on 
Parks, Reaction, and Renewable Resources, Committee on Energy and national Resources, Hearings on 
S.2741, 96th Cong. 2nd sess., S. Hearing No. 96-117 (June 3, 1980); Senate Committee on Agriculture, 
Nutrition, and Forestry,  Hearing on the Texas Wilderness Act, 98th Cong., 2nd sess., S. Report No. 98-
614 (Sept. 18, 1984); Senate Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry,  Hearing on the North 
Carolina Wilderness Act, 98th Cong., 2nd sess. S. Report No. 98-415 (April 26, 1984); House 
Subcommittee on Public Lands and National Parks of the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, 
Hearing on Additions to the National Wilderness Preservation System, 98th Cong. 1st sess. (May 17, 26, 
1983); House Subcommittee on Public Lands and National Parks of the Committee on Interior and 
Insular Affairs, Hearings to Establish the Charles C. Deam Wilderness in the Hoosier National Forest, 
Indiana, 97th Cong. 2nd sess., S. Hearing No. 97-9 (December 2,6, 1983); Senate Subcommittee on 
Parks, Recreation, and Renewable Resources of the Committee on Energy and Natural Resources, 
Hearing on a Bill to Designate Certain Lands in the State of Missouri, in the Black Hills National 
Forest, South Dakota, and National Forest System Lands in the State of New Mexico for Inclusion in 
the National Wilderness Preservation System,  96th Cong. 2nd sess., S. Hearing No. 96-140, (May 29, 
1980). 
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assertion that congressional reaction to the courts cannot be separated from either the 
underlying dynamics of the litigation process or the litigants that make strategic use of 
that process. As expected, jurisdiction stripping in the State Wilderness Acts was 
aimed at litigants and their access to the court system, and designed to protect 
government institutions from the costs imposed by litigation against the government. 
Also, as conjectured, in this instance jurisdictional removal implicates interest group 
politics and legislative access. Stripping jurisdiction over RARE II determinations 
benefitted the timber industry and commercial interests, all of which had legislative 
pull with the committees that oversaw the Forest Service. 
  These two larger observations highlight some key points about jurisdiction 
stripping behavior in the State Wilderness Act context that likely apply to jurisdiction 
stripping in general. First, the political economy dynamics of these actions are of 
central importance, including the degree to which economic costs and policy 
disruption costs are intertwined. In the State Wilderness Acts study, it mattered that 
policy disruption translated so directly into economic pressure on key congressional 
constituencies, who in turn affected and motivated congressional actors to intervene. 
The study also reveals that litigation against the government provides strategic 
opportunities for the defendant agency as well. The Forest Service wanted Congress to 
pass protective legislation. The agency used the existing litigation activity and the 
threat of additional legal action as justification for RARE III, an extreme and costly 
endeavor, whose specter finally catalyzed Congress into action.  In addition, it may be 
the case that jurisdiction stripping occurs, as it did in the State Wilderness Act context, 
when litigation costs and disruptions hit a tipping point, which creates a unification of 
interests across a wide range of political actors.  
 With respect to court behavior, clearly legal rules, such as the standards for 
obtaining injunctive relief, play an import role in shaping litigation incentives, 
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responses, and costs. And in this context, the preferences of courts also matter. The 
holding in California v. Bergland, by increasing the assessed chances that plaintiffs 
would win, increased the likelihood that environmental interest groups would 
challenge RARE II in court, and increased the likelihood that the Forest Service would 
take costly actions to avoid litigation. 
 In addition, the congressional role in jurisdiction stripping extends beyond the 
immediate act of removing court review. In the State Wilderness Act study, vague and 
delegatory congressional statutes set the stage for environmental litigation against the 
Forest Service. Congress failed to provide the agency with detailed guidance about the 
appropriate balance between conservation and commercial activity in national forests. 
NEPA, and its requirements for environmental impact statements in connection with 
major federal actions, also contained generalized and open-ended statutory language, 
which provided insufficient direction as to what constituted an adequate 
environmental impact statement, or what constituted a major federal action. In 
conjunction, the generality of these statutes left considerable discretion with the Forest 
Service and gave dissatisfied interests adequate grounds to sue the agency. Broad 
delegation to agencies in the absence of specific congressional directives likely plays 
an important role in jurisdiction stripping.  
 Congress could fix this dynamic by either being more specific in its statutory 
language or, in the State Wilderness Acts case, exempting all Forest Service decisions 
regarding management of national forest land from judicial review. Congress did 
neither of these things. Instead, it responded to one active area of litigation and 
contention while leaving remaining forest land designations and management plans 
both subject to review and to the varying statutory dictates and uncertainties created 
by the interplay between environmental statutes and statutes addressing forest 
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management, including NEPA, the Endangered Species Act, NFMA, and the national 
Wilderness Act. 
 This is, however, a case study whose facts fit easily in to the litigation effects 
analysis. The concentration of interests on either side of policies affecting the 
management of National Forests, and the available statutory basis to challenge these 
policies in court may not generalize across all statutes in the jurisdiction stripping 
database. Additional case studies are needed to determine whether statutes that remove 
review, for example, over social service benefits, or railroad corridor improvements, 
exhibit the same dynamics identified here.  
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CHAPTER SIX 
 
CONCLUSION: JURISDICTION STRIPPING AND LITIGATION   
 Jurisdiction stripping protects government actors from public interference.  
Congress removes federal court review in response to lawsuits against the federal 
government. These cases, which include challenges to governmental policy by private 
citizens, impose costs on all three branches starting at the point of case filing. This is 
true because, for all the parties involved, litigation demands resources in time and 
money, and with agencies in particular it can result in delayed policy implementation. 
Increased litigation also places pressure on a federal judiciary whose institutional 
structure makes responding to a rising workload difficult. Litigation against the 
government threatens to impose political costs on Congress by potentially forcing 
Congress to revisit the nature and content of a particular policy and by creating policy 
interference for key constituencies. The resultant policy disruption, resource diversion, 
and caseload pressure caused by litigation against the government create strong 
incentives for Congress to alleviate litigation pressure by removing public access to 
the judiciary. Jurisdiction stripping is the result. 
 The study of jurisdictional removals is the study of court-Congress interaction. 
Jurisdiction stripping is simply an extreme form of this interaction, or so it might 
appear, depending on how one views institutional relationships. If one assumes that 
Congress removes court review as a systemized response to judges and the decisions 
they make, then jurisdiction stripping becomes a procedural tool in a strategic game 
between two powerful institutions jockeying over the content and nature of public 
policy. A different, more cooperative picture of institutional relations emerges if 
jurisdiction stripping is understood as a reaction, not to the judiciary alone, but rather 
to the entire litigation process overseen by the judiciary. The federal courts are not 
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solely comprised of judges and judicial decisions. In fact, properly understood, the 
federal courts are not an entity, but rather of an intricate process that resolves public 
and private disputes. Congressional control over the structure and procedure of case 
disposition in the federal courts provides the government with a unique ability, not 
available to private defendants, to react to litigation by manipulating public access to 
the court system. Jurisdiction stripping is a limitation on litigant access to the courts 
with jurisdictional removals insulating government actors from litigation disruption 
and costs. From this perspective, Congress’s strategic behavior is directed at the 
public, not at other government actors.   
 Institutional views that posit an adversarial relationship between Congress and 
the courts fail to capture the full range of institutional incentives attendant to 
interactions with the federal judiciary. This is, to some extent, an artifact of scholarly 
attention directed at the Supreme Court, an entity whose purpose and place in judicial 
and governmental hierarchies mean that it engages in first order, policy based decision 
making. But the overwhelming majority of federal litigation is resolved far away from 
the Supreme Court, in the trial and appellate courts of the federal system. Most 
litigation is resolved by the lower courts, but not necessarily decided by a judge; a 
vital distinction. Judicial decisions are only a small, albeit significant, part of what the 
court system produces. The vast majority of federal court cases terminate without a 
judge’s final opinion on the case merits. Instead, disputes are resolved in response to 
the incentives generated by the judicial process. In other words, litigation economics 
affects much case resolution.  
Litigation Effects and Jurisdiction Stripping Solutions 
 This dissertation argues that jurisdiction stripping is a congressional response 
to litigation against the federal government and can best be explained by litigation 
economics and the strategic behavior it creates, not by ideological measures. 
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Jurisdiction stripping is considered in three contexts. The two empirical studies 
examine aggregate trends with respect to two different jurisdictional removal 
strategies; complete jurisdiction stripping, and partial jurisdiction stripping through 
exclusive jurisdictional grants to federal courts in the District of Columbia. The third 
study considers removal of court review in a single policy area: NEPA challenges to 
Forest Service management in national forests. 
 Lawsuits create policy disruption, costs, and delay for government actors 
including agencies, courts, and Congress. Jurisdiction stripping alleviates these costs 
by reducing a plaintiff’s expected value of suit, making suits against the government 
less attractive. The basic structure of this argument differs slightly for full jurisdiction 
stripping and exclusive jurisdictional grants. With respect to full jurisdiction stripping, 
removing court review means one of two things: either a lawsuit regarding the 
protected agency action will never be filed, or if it is filed it will be subject to early 
and rapid dismissal. Federal courts may operate under “notice pleading” rules that 
allow for easy access, but one of the foundational requirements of a federal suit is 
jurisdiction.228 In either case, lawsuits become less appealing to plaintiffs, because of 
the reduced chances for staying in court long enough to achieve plaintiff’s goals, 
including general policy disruption, satisfactory settlement, intermediary injunction, or 
disposition on the merits.  
 For exclusive jurisdictional grants, funneling litigation into one jurisdiction, 
particularly one proximate to the center of national government, reduces the plaintiff’s 
value of suit by taking away her choice of forum (and attendant choice of judge and 
regional legal precedent) and forcing her to absorb the costs of litigating in a distant 
court. Creating a single specialized forum also reduces outcome uncertainty which 
                                                 
228
 Rule 8, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 
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allows potential government defendants to adjust their behavior in ways that comport 
with the court’s rulings thereby reducing the chances the government will be sued.  
 This dissertation’s empirical analyses and related case study all provide 
evidence that supports the litigation effects explanation for jurisdiction stripping in the 
following ways.  Ideological proximity between courts and Congress do not explain 
jurisdiction stripping. Litigation against the federal government, however, is strongly 
related to the removal of court review. The language of jurisdiction stripping statutes 
is consistent with predictions generated by litigation economics models: jurisdiction 
stripping protects agency decision making, and most often designates a D.C. forum 
when the plaintiff is likely to have her ties elsewhere. The State Wilderness Act study 
shows that policy disruption, delay, and resource diversion created by litigation 
against the Forest Service were core considerations for removing judicial review. 
 Ideology. The ideological explanation for jurisdiction stripping, in which 
Congress reacts to the policy preferences of a hostile judiciary, finds no support as a 
primary explanatory factor in the studies presented here. The two empirical studies 
measure institutional ideological preferences in a variety of ways, both through 
Common Space scores and political party identification. The Supreme Court and each 
federal circuit were considered separately in the event that Congress might react to the 
ideology of a single, influential court. The House and Senate also were considered 
separately to account for each chamber’s preferences (although ancillary analyses 
were performed using an aggregate congressional measure of ideology as well). None 
of the ideological variables rise to significance in any of the empirical analyses. With 
respect to exclusive jurisdictional grants, not only did the U.S. Court of Appeals for 
the D.C. Circuit fail to be the ideologically closest circuit to the either the House floor 
or the Senate floor, but during two peak years (1980 and 1996), the D.C. Court of 
Appeals was the least proximate federal court to congressional ideology.  
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 Nor does the State Wilderness Act study provide evidence that jurisdiction 
stripping is primarily a congressional response to hostile courts. The House and Senate 
were controlled by different parties during the passage of most of the State Wilderness 
Acts, and the judiciary was often either ideologically neutral or, given the 
congressional split in control, aligned with one of the two chambers. Certainly, some 
court cases are mentioned in the congressional debate and hearings, particularly the 
suit in California that declared the Forest Service’s environmental impact statement 
inadequately prepared with respect to certain forest land.  The articulated 
congressional concern, however, expressed repeatedly throughout the legislative 
histories, was not about the perceived hostility of the courts, but rather was about the 
policy disruption caused by the litigation process itself, and the threat of future 
disruption should a multiple suit strategy continue to be employed by environmental 
interests bent on stopping commercial activity in national forests.  
 This is not to say that court preference is irrelevant to jurisdictional removals. 
Legal doctrine and specific judges’ predilections likely do contribute to the overall 
litigation effects, as discussed in more detail below. These individuated preferences, 
however, are different from a systemic and identified set of court preferences that 
sway congressional action.  
 Litigation Pressure. In all three studies, jurisdiction stripping is related to the 
pressures created by litigation against the federal government, whether broadly 
represented by case filings in the federal system, or captured in more detail in the 
political dynamics of environmental litigation against the Forest Service. These are the 
very cases one would expect to exert the greatest unwanted cost and pressure on the 
government as a whole, as they represent litigation brought by private parties 
contesting government action, suggesting Congress does not remove jurisdiction to 
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curtail government actors, but rather to curtail private parties’ capacity to bring the 
government in to court.  
 As litigation pressure increases, jurisdiction stripping increases. This is true in 
every analysis, in every model, and for every kind of jurisdiction stripping studied. 
The regression analyses for full jurisdiction stripping show a robust positive 
correlation between civil case filings against the federal government and the number 
of jurisdiction stripping laws enacted in a particular congressional session. The studies 
show not only corresponding increases in both measures over time, but also strikingly 
similar patterns of variation, with activity peaks and valleys occurring during roughly 
the same time periods for both measures.  
 Exclusive jurisdictional grants to the D.C. federal courts demonstrate the same 
strong correlation between case filings and jurisdiction removal in the regression 
analyses, even though the manner of eliminating court review differs from full 
jurisdiction stripping. This was true in both the House and Senate models. As 
litigation pressure against the federal government increases, Congress increasingly 
makes the D.C. Circuit an exclusive litigation forum, an act that makes litigation 
against the government less attractive to plaintiffs. 
 The State Wilderness Act study reaffirms this relationship in the specific 
context of 33 jurisdiction stripping statutes. Numerous congressmember statements, 
and related agency and public testimony in the legislative histories, make it clear that 
the jurisdiction stripping provisions in the Acts were a response to litigation and 
threats of litigation against the Forest Service. The legislative history is supported by 
corresponding trends between State Wilderness Act passage and NEPA based lawsuits 
identified in the litigation databases.    
 Statutory Language. The statutes identified in the jurisdiction stripping 
databases protect administrative action, in keeping with the litigation effects analysis 
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which predicts that removal of court review is meant to insulate government actors 
from suit. All jurisdiction stripping provisions, in both the full jurisdiction stripping 
database and the exclusive jurisdictional grant database, remove court review of 
agency decision making, an act that is protective of both agencies and their policy 
implementing duties. The Safe Drinking Water Act Amendments of 1996 contains 
typical statutory language. The Act provides that in the course of listing maximum 
allowable contaminant levels, “The Administrator's decision whether or not to select 
an unregulated contaminant for a list under this clause shall not be subject to judicial 
review.”229 Exclusive grants of jurisdiction to the federal courts in the District of 
Columbia follow a similar pattern. Challengers to the Secretary of Transportation’s 
decisions regarding automobile fuel economy exemptions, for example, may file “a 
petition for review in the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia 
Circuit. That court has exclusive jurisdiction to review the decision and to affirm, 
remand, or set aside the decision under [the Administrative Procedure Act].”230 Court 
review of the Forest Service’s 1979 environmental impact statement is removed in the 
State Wilderness Acts’ to protect Forest Service management plans based on the EIS 
from continuous litigation. 
 Additional characteristics of exclusive jurisdictional grants also comport with 
the expectations generated by a litigation centered analysis. These Acts are designed to 
raise plaintiff’s costs of suit and lower her expectations of winning, conditions more 
likely to occur if the plaintiff or cause of action is located away from the District of 
Columbia. 51% of the identified laws were categorized as Individualized Government 
Action, laws affecting specific individuals or corporate entities who, as a general 
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 Revision of Title 49, United States Code Annotated, Transportation, §32904(b)(5)(a), Calculation of 
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matter, are not primarily situated in Washington, D.C. An additional 13% of the 
exclusive jurisdictional grants deal with environmental matters which implicate 
localized conditions. 
 Policy Disruption and Costs. This dissertation argues that litigation costs, 
both in terms of policy disruption and resource diversion, are the engine that drives 
jurisdiction stripping. The empirical analyses capture these costs inferentially, by 
measuring overall litigation pressure, and find strong correlations between increased 
litigation against the government and increased jurisdiction stripping. The State 
Wilderness Act case study allows a more direct examination of litigation costs.  
 Like the empirical analyses, the State Wilderness Act case study also supports 
the litigation effects model. It finds that Congress removed review of the Forest 
Service EIS in response to environmental litigation against the agency. The litigation 
created three kinds of costs that deeply concerned Congress. It disrupted agency forest 
management decisions, thereby imposing economic hardship on key constituencies, 
including the timber industry.  It diverted Forest Service personnel and resources away 
from their management duties and into litigation related tasks.  It produced agency 
behavior designed to avoid litigation, including formation and withdrawal of various 
forest management plans, additional environmental assessments, and a threatened third 
remote area roadless evaluation.   
 Commercial interests, located in the national forest rich states, including the 
timber industry, tourism related businesses, and mining and farming interests stood to 
lose significant revenues and future revenues without access to national forests. State 
and regional economies, and the governments reliant on these businesses and the tax 
revenues they generated, also were vulnerable. Forest Service timber sales ground to a 
halt, and timber harvests plummeted, largely in response to agency concerns about 
being sued. State Wilderness Acts were passed in large numbers soon after timber 
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harvests in national forests reached a 13 year low.231 The economic pressures faced by 
the agency included its reliance on timber sales to meet budgetary goals. Both the 
Forest Service and the Department of Agriculture repeatedly requested additional 
resources from Congress to address increasing litigation related costs. The legislative 
history is filled with congressmember statements evidencing frustration and increasing 
anger over the costs and policy gridlock generated by the environmental litigation.  
Generalizability 
 Jurisdiction stripping is a largely unstudied area. While this dissertation starts 
the inquiry by establishing the importance of litigation and the lack of ideological 
effects, as well as framing the analysis in terms of litigation economics, additional 
questions remain. The State Wilderness Act study makes a compelling case for the 
effect of litigation costs, and it comports with inferential evidence presented in the 
empirical analyses. It is a fair question, however, to ask whether these particular 
statutes fully capture the underlying dynamics of jurisdiction stripping legislation. It 
may be that other legislative histories and other litigation profiles do not evidence the 
same clear congressional intent to insulate government actors from the costly and 
disruptive effects generated by policy challenges filed in federal court. The Wilderness 
Act Studies do seem to be an easy case, particular because they involve environmental 
litigation against the government. These cases are often part of a multiple suit, public 
interest litigation strategy specifically aimed at disrupting policy implementation by 
imposing costs on the government, as was the case with the NEPA suits against the 
Forest Service. 
 A full answer to this question requires in depth case studies for the remaining 
jurisdiction stripping statutes in the databases, a project well worth pursuing, but 
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beyond the foundational inquiries presented here. There are, however, other 
characteristics of the jurisdiction stripping statutes identified that suggest the State 
Wilderness Act study is not an anomaly. A substantial number of jurisdiction stripping 
statutes implicate agency action related to environmental issues. Provisions addressing 
environmental matters make up 20% (76 of 378) of the full jurisdiction stripping 
database.  13% (12 statutes) of the D.C. jurisdictional grants contain environmentally 
related jurisdiction stripping provisions. These numbers suggest that the specific 
litigation dynamics identified in State Wilderness Act study, at the very least, may be 
found in multiple other congressional decisions to remove court review. 
 Other statutory categories, while not environmental in nature, also suggest the 
suitability of a litigation economics approach. A large number of jurisdiction stripping 
provisions, particularly in the full jurisdiction stripping database, deal with benefit 
payments made by the federal government. Removal of court review in this context 
protects agency decisions regarding how government money is spent from challenge 
in federal court. 30% of the full jurisdiction stripping database involves government 
benefits. Social benefits, including housing, food, loss compensation, social security, 
and Medicare/Medicaid account for 84 provisions (22%). Industry benefits and 
benefits to states, including transportation, schools and urban renewal comprise 
another 8% (28 provisions). At the very least, one component of any related litigation 
very likely involves government expenditures, a factor that fits easily in to the cost 
benefit analyses presented here in connection with litigation economics.  
 Another large statutory segment of the database is regulatory in nature. 51% of 
the full jurisdiction stripping data base and 45% of the exclusive jurisdictional grants 
fall into this category. As discussed in more detail below, this type of legislation is 
likely to arise in the context of interest group dynamics similar to those examined in 
the State Wilderness Act study. Taken in conjunction with environmental statutes and 
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benefit conferring legislation, a significant portion of the jurisdiction stripping 
legislation is likely either to echo directly the dynamics presented in the State 
Wilderness Act study or expressly implicate policies that involve financial 
considerations. 
Additional Factors and Areas of Study 
 The nature of the jurisdiction stripping statutes and the details provided by the 
State Wilderness Act study suggest several additional dynamics that may affect 
jurisdictional removals and should be considered when conducting further studies of 
jurisdiction stripping. Interest group behavior, including rent seeking, may play a key 
role. Legal doctrine governing the availability of injunctive relief may matter. 
Individual court preferences and the influence of a particular judicial circuit may 
impact the underlying litigation economics. Agency ideology is worth consideration. 
Broader questions about jurisdiction stripping also remain which suggest additional 
avenues for study addressing why Congress strips jurisdiction only in selective policy 
areas and varies between full and partial jurisdiction stripping. Finally, it is worth 
asking whether the economic effects identified here apply to other jurisdictional 
manipulations. 
 Interest Group Politics. Litigation against the federal government, because it 
challenges agency decisions and therefore policy implementation, does not affect 
government actors alone. Policy disruption, interference, or change has ramifications 
for segments of the public affected by the policy regime under contestation. Certain 
issue areas, commonly found in jurisdiction stripping statutes, suggest that removal of 
court review may be linked to interest group politics. Regulatory laws make up the 
largest statutory category identified in the databases. This means that many of the 
jurisdiction stripping public laws deal with agencies that promulgate and implement 
rules governing private activity. In the full jurisdiction stripping database, categories 
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identified as environmental regulation, law enforcement, industry regulation, and 
immigration policy make up 193 of 378 total provisions or 51% of the identified 
public laws. In the D.C. jurisdictional grant database, 41 of the 91 public laws, or 
45%, fall into one of these categories. These are the type of laws whose passage and 
enforcement generates interest group politics since they are legislatively designed to 
delineate between affected individuals based on group level classifications (Lowi 
1972).  In the case of the State Wilderness Acts, although the environmental regulation 
in question was directed at the agency requiring NEPA compliance with respect to 
forest management plans, the legislation in essence regulated commercial activity in 
national forests, limiting such activity to nonwilderness areas. 
 Social benefits statutes comprise another large portion of the jurisdiction 
stripping databases, as noted above. This type of legislation also can involve interest 
group activity, particularly statutes addressing Medicare and Medicaid. Health care 
matters implicate insurance companies, hospitals, and related trade associations, as 
well as medical professionals and their related policy organizations, such as the 
American Medical Association. This does not mean interests must be part of a 
formally organized group, although this usually is the case. Interest group action can 
include disparate litigants with no formal connection, all of whom, for example, 
choose to challenge Medicare payment schedules. These separate individuals may act 
as if they were a group, at least with respect to litigation. This is because there are 
often fee shifting statutes, rights of action, and legal strategies that are common to 
some policy litigation.232 Through the mediating force of attorneys, these legal rules 
create a group of individuals who act in consort without a formal organization.  
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 In the interest group context, in addition to shielding the government from 
litigation costs, congressional removal of court review could involve classic rent 
seeking behavior in which one interest group tries to use legislation to disadvantage 
competing interests. Accordingly, some jurisdiction stripping could be designed to 
achieve interest group goals by protecting favorable policy and removing litigation as 
a lever for policy change or disruption, thereby forcing opposing interest groups into 
the legislative arena were their success rate is lower. Certainly in the State Wilderness 
Act study, one of the intended purposes behind the jurisdiction stripping provisions 
was to advantage timber industry and other commercial interests who wanted 
environmental interest group litigation to stop so that the Forest Service could resume 
management policies that allowed multiple-use in national forests. Other regulatory 
provisions (and some of the benefit conferring statutes) in the jurisdiction stripping 
database may also exhibit this kind of rent seeking behavior. 
 Legal Doctrine and Intermediary Relief.  Procedural rules for intermediary 
injunctive relief that favor plaintiffs may be common in litigation that leads to 
jurisdiction stripping.233 The standards for granting injunctions affected the levels of 
policy delay created by lawsuits in the State Wilderness Act study. When the harm 
alleged cannot be rectified with monetary damages, and is irreparable, courts tend to 
err on the side of plaintiffs, granting a halt to agency action until the case merits are 
decided. In effect, this makes some of the costs of a favorable plaintiff judgment (a 
halt to agency policy) part of the defendant’s ongoing litigation costs by creating 
policy disruption as the case proceeds.  This, in turn, increases both plaintiff’s 
expected value of suit, as well as defendant’s maximum level of litigation avoidance.  
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 This is particularly true in suits alleging potential environmental harm, as there 
is a strong presumption that harm to the environment is irreparable (Amoco v. Gambell 
1987).  In the State Wilderness Act study,  of  the 282 NEPA based timber cases 
identified against the Forest Service, slightly over 40% (116) involved injunctive relief 
either during the lower court handling of the case or upon pendency of an appeal. This 
dynamic may also be found in connection with the other jurisdiction stripping statutes 
in the databases that involve environmental matters.  
 Specific legal doctrine governing injunctive relief in other issue areas may also 
play a similar role. This dynamic is less salient in nonequity cases, where the relief 
sought is primarily monetary, since injunctions usually are not appropriate in cases 
where money damages can make the plaintiff whole, a circumstance which militates 
against characterizing the potential harm as irreparable (Nelson v. National 
Aeronautics and Space Administration 2008).  The dissertation databases do  include 
jurisdiction stripping laws with statutory language that suggests nonequity claims, 
including the large number of  laws dealing with social benefits (roughly 22%) in the 
full jurisdiction stripping database, and the economic nature of many Individualized 
Government Action statutes (51%) in the D.C. jurisdictional grant database.  The 
statutory language alone, however, can be misleading. Whether equitable or 
nonequitable claims are at issue turns on the underlying litigation history of the 
particular provision and the interest groups involved. For example, court review is 
removed regarding certain payment adjustments made to rehabilitation facilities for 
inpatient rehabilitation service under Medicare/Medicaid.234 Intermediary injunctive 
relief is an integral part of litigation against Medicaid agencies (Lever and Eastman 
1991). 
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 Court Preferences. Judicial preferences may impact jurisdiction stripping in 
ways different from the broad ideological struggles depicted by many institutional 
accounts. Evidence from the State Wilderness Act study, and the basic economic 
dynamics of litigation incentives described in Chapter Two, both suggest that 
individualized judicial preferences can exert tangible and interactive influences on the 
congressional decision to remove court jurisdiction on an issue by issue basis.  
 Litigation economics shows that a plaintiff’s overall value of suit is directly 
affected by the parties’ assessments of plaintiff’s chances to prevail in court. These 
assessed chances rise if the known judge is disposed toward the plaintiff.  A plaintiff 
may be able to increase her chances of getting a favorable judge if her litigation is part 
of multiple suit strategy located in a circuit with influence over the contested policy 
issue.  
  This was the dynamic in the State Wilderness Act study. Environmental 
plaintiffs challenged timber harvesting, with many of the suits filed in the district 
courts of the 9th Circuit. The evidence in the study shows that, overall, the 9th Circuit 
ideology varied from liberal, to moderately liberal, to neutral during the time in which 
the State Wilderness Acts were passed, but numerous suits allow litigants access to 
numerous different judicial profiles, particularly in the larger judicial circuits. The 9th 
Circuit Court of Appeals, for example, covers nine states, and 13 federal trial districts. 
This impact was compounded by the concentration of national forest land in the 
northwest.  
 The trial court in one of the filed cases, California v. Bergland (1982), ruled in 
favor of the environmental interests holding that the Forest Service’s environmental 
impact statement was inadequate. The ruling was later upheld by the appellate court. 
These rulings changed Forest Service and congressional behavior by changing the 
government defendants’ assessments of plaintiff’s overall court chances. This was the 
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case, despite the fact that the ruling only applied to specific forests in California, did 
not necessarily apply to EIS for other states in the 9th Circuit, and did not have 
precedential value in other appellate circuits. The legislative history shows that 
Congress and the agency were concerned that the success in California v. Bergland 
would incite copy cat lawsuits, not only in the 9th Circuit, but all over the country.  
 The concern with copy cat lawsuits was not with the perceived ideology of 
courts in the federal system. Neither the congressional record nor the ideological 
characteristic of the federal bench support this interpretation. Instead, the concern was 
that multiple suits in numerous districts would increase litigation costs against 
government actors, creating more policy disruption, while at the same time increasing 
plaintiff’s chances of finding another court willing to hold in the plaintiff’s favor. To 
stop current, threatened, and potential litigation, Congress removed judicial review 
over the immediate point of policy contention, the 1979 environmental impact 
statement supporting RARE II. 
 This suggests several things for the broader study of jurisdiction stripping. 
Judicial preference may matter on an issue by issue basis. Court preference is not 
significant with respect to aggregate measures of jurisdiction stripping, as evidenced 
by the broader empirical studies, but it may play a role depending on the nature of the 
litigation and its geographic location. As the State Wilderness Act study shows, this 
may not be a systemized reaction by Congress to perceived court hostility, but rather a 
pragmatic response to judicial profiles in certain circuits and the potential spread of 
multiple suit strategies. This does suggest, as discussed earlier, interest group activity, 
which further limits the applicability to all the statutes in the database. It does mean, 
however, that when further case studies are conducted, particular attention should be 
paid to litigation patterns, including concentrations of litigation in certain forums, the 
size and policy influence of involved circuits, and the presence of pivotal cases. 
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 Agency Preferences. It may also be the case that agency preferences matter, 
even if the congressional choice between court and agency preferences does not. In 
other words, Congress may act to protect agencies from policy disruption only under 
circumstances in which agencies and Congress are aligned, regardless of the 
ideological composition of the federal courts. While this was not tested directly, the 
broader empirical analysis tend to cut against this argument, given the strong 
correlation between jurisdiction stripping and litigation pressure across the full term of 
the study (1943 to 2004), during which time the government was both unified and 
divided, and the executive branch at varying times was unified with one or both 
chambers or in opposition to one or both chambers. The State Wilderness Act study 
also raises doubts, since, as noted above, jurisdiction stripping provisions were passed 
under a wide variety of congressional-executive policy configurations.  
 The State Wilderness Act study raises another complicating issue in 
considering agency preferences: how to measure agency ideology. The empirical 
analyses use party of the executive, the standard approach in the literature; however, 
this may be too simple an heuristic. The Forest Service, for example, has many 
characteristics that argue it operates as its own principal (Carpenter 2001; Kaufman 
1960).  Other agencies may follow suit, or may be subject to control by either the 
president or congressional oversight committees, and this may vary depending on the 
type of agency and the nature of its activities. Despite these initial reservations, 
additional analyses using agency ideology are worth consideration. 
 Questions Concerning Jurisdiction Stripping Variations. It is also worth 
asking why Congress might choose one form of jurisdictional removal over another. In 
most of the examples discussed below, the first step towards an answer requires 
additional, specific case studies of the identified statutes, including their legislative 
and litigation history. Certain jurisdiction stripping characteristics, established by the 
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initial studies presented here, provide both a frame work and some directional 
guidance for these wider inquiries.  
 Selective Jurisdiction Stripping. Why does Congress revoke judicial review 
only over those specific agency actions identified in the jurisdiction stripping 
database, while leaving judicial review over other administrative behavior? Most 
administrative action may be challenged in federal court. The Administrative 
Procedure Act (“APA”) expressly provides that administrative agencies may be 
sued.235 The Act overrides general principles of sovereign immunity which hold that 
the government is not subject to suit for carrying out governmental business. 
Jurisdiction stripping provisions in administrative laws are an exception to the APA’s 
default rule which allows judicial review. The federal courts generally uphold these 
provisions, provided there is explicit evidence of congressional intent to remove 
review in the statutory language or legislative history (Block v. Community Nutrition 
Institute 1984; Heckler v. Ringer 1984; Weinberger v. Salfi 1975). Congress, 
therefore, must add specific language into a statute expressly stating that judicial 
review is removed. The overall incidence of this legislation, which is rising over time, 
still remains a small percentage of legislative enactments. When combined, the various 
jurisdiction databases identified 339 jurisdiction stripping laws passed from 1943-
2004, most of which occurred after 1960. This represents 2% of all the legislation 
passed during that time period. This suggests that very specific conditions prompt 
Congress to strip jurisdiction. 
 The primary way to explore this dynamic is through additional case studies of 
the identified jurisdiction stripping statutes, examining the specific congressional 
record and litigation history that gave rise to each, and looking for overlapping 
characteristics. Some possible criteria are discussed above, including the presence of 
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interest group activity, the case history and applicable legal doctrine, the overall levels 
of litigation activity, and the measurable indices of economic cost to both the agency 
and to the public actors affected by the policy.  
 Another possible approach is to examine these factors as they apply to 
provisions within the same statute. A number of the Acts in the jurisdiction stripping 
databases contain complex and lengthy legislation. Jurisdiction stripping language in 
these statutes, however, is often quite narrow in scope. As a result, one statutory 
provision removes judicial review over a specific agency action while leaving court 
review with respect to other, related provisions. For example, Health, Education, and 
Welfare determinations leading to suspension of payments to Professional Standards 
Review Organizations overseeing Medicare-Medicaid reimbursements are not 
reviewable, but the Secretary’s approval of the associated monitoring plan is subject to 
suit.236 Rulemaking by the Secretary of Transportation is still actionable in the 
Intermodal Surface Transportation Efficiency Act of 1991, but notices that rulemaking 
will be delayed cannot be reviewed in court.237  The same circumstances apply to the 
laws in the D.C. jurisdictional grant database. Challenges to the Secretary of 
Agriculture’s decisions on plant variety protection applications may only be brought in 
the federal courts sitting in Washington, D.C., but challenges to the broader regulatory 
scheme are not limited to that forum.238  
 Full Jurisdiction Stripping or Exclusive Jurisdictional Grants. Congress 
takes an affirmative act not only when it removes judicial review, but also when it 
designates the form that removal will take. The jurisdiction stripping data bases 
contain both complete jurisdictional removals and exclusive jurisdictional grants 
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which have the effect of removing jurisdiction from all courts other than the District of 
Columbia federal circuit. What influences Congress to take one action instead of the 
other? Initial characteristics of the statutes contained in each database suggest that 
there are significant overlaps in the kinds of action protected, but also significant 
variation between the two jurisdiction stripping actions. Both databases address 
environmental matters, but exclusive jurisdictional grants contain a smaller percentage 
of these statutes (13%) than the full jurisdiction stripping database (20%). Conversely 
benefits statutes appear more frequently in the full jurisdiction stripping database 
(30%) than in the exclusive jurisdictional grant statutes, where these kinds of laws are 
almost non-existent. Finally, exclusive jurisdictional grants are heavily regulatory with 
close to 71% of the statutes falling into one of three categories (environmental, 
industry regulation, and individualized government action).  
 It may be the case that, depending on the specific kinds of regulatory statutes 
involved, Congress chooses a single forum more often in areas that benefit from 
judicial expertise, either because of wide variation in approaches between circuits or 
due to the technical nature of the regulatory scheme. So, for example, the federal 
courts in the District of Columbia are the exclusive forum to challenge rulemaking 
under the Federal Energy Administration Act of 1974,239 or to challenge exemptions 
from fuel efficiency standards.240  This allows some review, which may be a more 
politically palatable than full jurisdiction stripping, while at the same keeping that 
review in a more predictable setting than if the issues are considered in multiple 
circuits. Once case studies are completed on the statutes in the individual databases, a 
comparative perspective between the two groups is needed, with a particular focus on 
the technical complexity of the statutes involved. 
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 Other Jurisdictional Manipulation. The salience of litigation effects across 
two different methods for controlling court jurisdiction (full jurisdiction stripping and 
exclusive jurisdictional grants) suggests that the litigation effects analysis presented 
here may shed light on other congressional actions that affect court access. Statutes of 
limitation, federal amount in controversy minimums, and rules regarding prior 
exhaustion of administrative remedies all place limitations on federal litigation and 
may also be designed to insulate government actors from public suit.   
Court and Congressional Studies  
 This dissertation presents one of the first systematic studies of jurisdiction 
stripping in the federal system. In doing so, it argues for a modest, but important 
change in approach toward institutional studies when the federal courts are involved. 
The judicial system is a process, not an entity. In most cases, its dynamics and effects 
cannot be captured through the heuristic of judicial ideology. This is because the 
federal courts take in, process, and resolve disputes through litigation. Courts cannot 
be separated from litigation effects, incentives, and economics. These factors 
determine not only when the judiciary is engaged, but also the nature, form, and 
duration of that engagement. These factors must be taken into consideration when 
modeling the interactions between Congress and the courts. To do otherwise risks 
misunderstanding the nature of those interactions. Jurisdiction stripping, for example, 
is not a predatory congressional response to federal courts and their ideological 
preferences over policy. It is a response to the access courts provide to the public. It is 
a response to public litigation against the federal government and the pervasive 
resource diversion, costs, and policy disruption such litigation often brings.  
 This dissertation also argues for a second, but related shift in analytic 
approach. Much institutional scholarship is couched in terms of strategic 
adversarialism between the government branches. This is often the foundational 
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assumption made when approaching court-congressional studies. But as this 
dissertation demonstrates, government actors can be motivated by common concerns, 
and they can react in ways that are cooperative rather than obstructive. What triggers 
this in the jurisdiction stripping context is public interference with government 
business. Government institutions often are not jockeying among each other, they are 
jockeying instead against external pressures. In many institutional interactions, the 
strategic adversary may not be the other governmental branches, it may be the public. 
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